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Prudent management of the coastal zone is of major importance given that competition 
for coastal resource use is being intensified by increasing population pressure and the 
impending impacts of climate change. Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) is 
internationally regarded as the best-practice approach for the planning and management 
of coastal resource use. ICM espouses effective integration between governing bodies. 
However, numerous Australian government inquiries and academic literature on coastal 
zone management have concluded that ICM has been difficult to implement in Australia, 
with intergovernmental integration particularly elusive. Whilst Australia’s federal system 
of government has been implicated in this, studies have not explicitly addressed the 
nature of the relationship between Australian federalism and intergovernmental 
integration between the local, state and federal spheres. Thus, the aim of this study was 
to generate a theory as to why ICM, particularly intergovernmental integration, has been 
so difficult to implement in Australia.  
The study, employing elements of grounded theory and comparative case study 
methodology, was designed to explore the relationship between federalism and 
intergovernmental integration based on the experiences of coastal managers and 
decision-makers responsible for coastal management ‘on-the-ground’. Three natural 
resource management (NRM) case study regions in South Australia were selected: Eyre 
Peninsula, South East, and Adelaide & Mount Lofty Ranges. The nature of Australia’s 
federal system of government and the functions and capacity of the three spheres – local, 
state and federal – were also explored via literature review and document analysis.  
Primary data collection was accomplished via thirty three in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews with local government staff and elected representatives, NRM Board staff and 
SA government ‘Department for Environment’ staff with responsibilities for coastal 
management and/or decision-making. Interview questions revolved around interviewees’ 
perceptions of the roles and responsibilities of each sphere of government; financial 
arrangements for funding coastal management; and the level of intergovernmental 
integration. Constant comparative analysis elicited themes from interview transcripts. 
Triangulation of interview data with secondary data obtained via literature review and 
document analysis verified interview data and scaffolded theory development.   
Two prominent themes emerged from the analysis of participants’ perceptions regarding 
the roles and responsibilities of the three spheres of government: disempowerment and 
intergovernmental tension. Synthesis of interview data with secondary data revealed two 
fundamental issues underpinning these themes at both the local and state level: 1) 
asymmetries in responsibility relative to capacity and 2) a lack of autonomy. 
Understanding of these issues was enhanced by examining the evolving role of the federal 
government within the Australian federation, whereby Australia’s practice of fiscal 
federalism has resulted in fiscal centralisation characterised by a large vertical fiscal 
imbalance between the federal and state spheres and a comparative lack of fiscal 
autonomy at the state government level. Fiscal centralisation poses a significant barrier to 
the operation of effective cooperative federalism in Australia. Thus, this thesis theorises 
that fiscal centralisation is a significant barrier to meaningful integration between the 
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 Introduction  
1.1 Study premise 
Two months after commencement of this PhD on the broad topic of ‘Coastal Governance 
and Integrated Coastal Management in Australia’, the Australian government1 released 
the findings of its House of Representatives inquiry into climate change and 
environmental impacts on coastal communities: ‘Managing Our Coastal Zone In A 
Changing Climate: The Time To Act Is Now’ (House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Climate Change Water Environment and the Arts 2009). Its release had a 
significant impact on the formulation of this study. This was because of the realisation 
that almost thirty Commonwealth and state inquiries into issues related to coastal zone 
management in Australia preceded it and, despite recurrent expert recommendations for 
improving coastal resource management, significant problems remain. To illustrate this 
point, Table 1.1 summarises the key governance recommendations from the four most 
recent Commonwealth inquiries into Australian coastal zone management2. The table 
shows that, despite recommendations for the implementation of various governance 
arrangements over repeated inquiries, few recommendations are implemented, and even 
fewer implemented recommendations are sustained. Rather ironically, over thirty years 
ago the HORSCEC 1980 report contained this rebuke: 
The Committee believes that had Commonwealth Governments adopted and implemented 
recommendations made in previous reports, the need for this Inquiry may not have arisen 
(House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and Conservation 1980, p. 38). 
All four reports from the Commonwealth inquiries advocate for a national approach to 
coastal zone management in Australia. The term ‘national’ is understood to mean the 
consideration of issues on a nation-wide scale, beyond jurisdictional boundaries. A 
‘national approach’ thus refers to any policy, strategy or initiative that incorporates state 
and federal interests, and is cooperative and coordinated by nature of its agreed 
objectives, development and implementation. Central to the idea of a national approach 
is the concept of intergovernmental integration, whereby plans, policies and principles 
are agreed and coordinated between all spheres of government – local, regional, state 
and federal – involved in coastal management in Australia.   
As depicted in Table 1.1, the key governance arrangements recommended by all four 
inquiries to fulfil a national approach comprise: a national coastal strategy, federal 
government integration with state governments, and federal financial assistance to state 
and local governments to support them in funding their coastal management 
responsibilities.  
  
                                                     
1 The terms federal government, Commonwealth government and Australian government will be used 
interchangeably throughout this thesis. The term national government will not be used; rather, use of the 
term ‘national’ will be reserved to reflect the nation as a whole or the involvement of all spheres of 
government. 
2  See Appendix 1.1 for the Terms of Reference for each of these Inquiries. 
2 
 
Table 1.1 Recent Commonwealth inquiries into coastal zone management in Australia: 
Comparison of recommendations towards a national approach 
 Institutional arrangement recommended; Institutional arrangement implemented;  Institutional 
arrangement not sustained. Adapted from Haward (1995b). 
Year: 1980 1991 1993 2009 
Title: 
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All four inquiries observed the need for better intergovernmental integration in terms of 
governance arrangements for coastal zone management. The HORSCEC 1980 report, 
noting similar recommendations from numerous previous inquiries, clearly asserted that 
national policies and objectives for coastal conservation and preservation were necessary. 
It stated that these should be developed in consultation with the states (House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and Conservation 1980, p. 38). 
Similarly, the HORSCERA 1991 report also called for integration across spheres of 
government (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment Recreation 
and the Arts 1991), while the RAC 1993 report noted the lack of integration of coastal 
management at different government levels and championed an Integrated Resource 
Management approach (Resource Assessment Commission 1993)3.  
Whilst the federal government did establish a Commonwealth coastal policy (Living on 
the Coast 1995) in the wake of the RAC 1993 report, it was not a truly national policy due 
to its focus on federal government responsibilities in the coastal zone (Harvey 2016). In 
any case, it was abolished the following year by the incoming federal (Liberal National 
Coalition) government. The RAC 1993 report was also the instigator of the community 
participation program Coastcare. Federally funded through the Commonwealth Coasts 
and Clean Seas initiative, Coastcare was heralded as a triumph in terms of a national 
approach to coastal zone management in Australia, due to its involvement of the three 
spheres of government, as well as the community (Clarke 2003, 2008; Harvey, Clarke & 
Carvalho 2001). However, Coastcare has since been effectively dismantled and subsumed 
by Landcare, the general environmental program (Harvey, Rudd & Clarke 2008; House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Climate Change Water Environment and the Arts 
2009).  
Harvey and Caton (2010, p. 10), while acknowledging the progress made towards a 
national approach since the RAC Inquiry in 1993, lament the difficulty in obtaining such a 
goal:    
Within the Australian system of cooperative federalism, the Commonwealth would need to 
obtain broad agreement, through the Council of Australian governments, to establish a 
national coastal policy or strategy. Given the complexity of the issues, the varied—and 
changing—attitudes of the states, and the low political profile of the organisation of coastal 
management, it is not surprising that an agreed national approach has yet to be established. 
Propelled by the recommendations from the RAC Inquiry, the ‘National Cooperative 
Approach to Integrated Coastal Zone Management – Framework and Implementation 
Plan’ (Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council 2006) was devised. The Plan 
reflected the principles of Integrated Coastal Management (ICM)4, the internationally-
accepted best practice approach to the planning and management of coastal areas and 
resource use (Cicin-Sain 1993; Cicin-Sain, Knecht & Fisk 1995; Ehler 2003; Moksness, Dahl 
& Støttrup 2013; Olsen 2003a; Sorensen 1993, 1997, 2002; Thia-Eng 1993). As a 
                                                     
3 It is relevant to note that the final RAC 1993 report featured two reports, a majority report and a 
dissenting minority report which reflected major differences of opinion between Commissioners. 
4 Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) is also often referred to as Integrated Coastal Zone Management 
(ICZM), Integrated Coastal Resource Management (ICRM), Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management 
(ICOM) or Integrated Coastal Area Management (ICAM). This thesis will use the terms Integrated Coastal 
Management or ICM, except when directly quoting literature using the other variations. 
4 
 
framework for the governance of coastal land and resource use, ICM places an emphasis 
on integration of competing interests and resource uses across space, governance scale 
and sector (Cicin-Sain & Knecht 1998). Whilst the principles of ICM have been endorsed in 
the previous inquiries, the most recent Commonwealth inquiry, HORSCCCWEA 2009, was 
the first to explicitly recommend the ICM model (House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Climate Change Water Environment and the Arts 2009, p. 15):  
The Committee agrees that the ICZM principle is essential to encouraging a national 
cooperative approach to coastal zone management and a focus on the catchment-coastal-
marine continuum. 
The HORSCCCWEA Inquiry in 2009 criticised the lack of impact of the ‘National 
Cooperative Approach to Integrated Coastal Zone Management – Framework and 
Implementation Plan’ due to “no new government investment or commitment, no 
ownership of issues, and no incentive or leadership from the Commonwealth” resulting in 
the agreement being largely “ignored” (Harvey 2016, p. 13). Many scholars of ICM have 
noted that the development of ICM plans is comparatively simpler than the 
implementation of them, resulting in what has been termed the ‘implementation gap’ 
(Bower, Ehler & Basta 1994; Clarke 2003; Crawford, Stanley Cobb & Friedman 1993; 
Nursey-Bray & Harvey 2013; Olsen 2003b). To this end, the HORSCCCWEA 2009 report 
stressed the importance of a cooperative approach to coastal zone management, 
denoting Australia’s failings in this aspect to date:    
A cooperative approach to coastal zone management … is urgently required in the coastal zone 
due to the potentially severe impacts of climate change on the coast, the continuing 
environmental degradation of the coast, and the current complex and fragmented governance 
arrangements for the coastal zone (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Climate 
Change Water Environment and the Arts 2009, p. 244). 
Given the repetition of these government inquiries, and the similarities regarding the 
issues described and recommendations made, two important deductions can be made: 
firstly, the recurrence of inquiries suggests the coastal zone is still being degraded and 
significant management problems still exist; and secondly, the recurrence of the same or 
similar recommendations means that recommendations are not being implemented or 
sustained. Therefore, it is reasonable to hypothesise that there may exist some systemic 
issue(s) preventing meaningful and sustained action in this area. The following section 
presents the aim of this study and the research questions devised in order to meet this 
aim. 
1.2 Study aim and research questions 
Based on the study premise described above, the broad aim of this study was to develop 
a theory to explain why intergovernmental integration, as endorsed by the ICM model, is 
so hard to achieve or sustain in Australia. This was achieved by exploring some of the key 
determinants in the success or failure of ICM implementation, including the nature of the 
prevailing political system, and the functions and relative strengths of the local, 
provincial, and central levels of government (Cicin-Sain & Knecht 1998), using a case 
study of South Australia (SA). The rationale behind the research design is explained in 
chapters two and three.  
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Issues regarding coastal governance arrangements, including the division of 
responsibilities for coastal management between the spheres of government and their 
associated capacity to fulfil these responsibilities, are explored. Interviews were 
conducted with representatives from those spheres of government responsible for 
coastal management within state government jurisdiction, in order to understand the 
different perspectives of these spheres and, in doing so, develop a theory grounded in 
empirical data. In order to meet the study objectives, the following research questions 
were devised:  
1. What is the nature of local government in South Australia? From the local 
government perspective, what are the governance issues posed by Australian 
federalism? 
2. What is the nature of state government in South Australia? From the state 
government perspective, what are the governance issues posed by Australian 
federalism? 
3. What is the nature of the federal government in Australia? How does this relate to 
the local and state spheres? 
4. Considering the nature of Australian federalism, given the findings of this study, 
what are the implications for intergovernmental integration and the 
implementation of integrated coastal management in Australia?   
1.3 Thesis Organisation 
To address the study aim and answer the research questions listed above, this thesis is 
organised into the following chapters. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter One has introduced the issues which constituted the research problem and led to 
the conceptualisation of this research project, thus providing the broad aim of the study. 
The research questions were posed and the organisation of the thesis outlined.  
Chapter 2: Integrated coastal management in the Australian federation – A case 
for exploration 
Chapter Two provides the rationale for the research undertaken during this PhD. The 
chapter explains the importance of the coastal zone and the imperative for its prudent 
management. The current best-practice approach to coastal zone management, known as 
Integrated Coastal Management (ICM), is described. A review of the Australian coastal 
management literature focuses on what is known about the impact of Australia’s federal 
system on governance arrangements for coastal zone management and the 
implementation of ICM, with a particular focus on the nature of intergovernmental 
integration. The chapter concludes by reiterating the study’s aim and the research 




Chapter 3: Research design 
Chapter Three describes the research design employed in this study, including the 
methodology, methods and data analysis techniques employed as well as the range of 
verification strategies used. Chapter Three also clarifies the scope of the research. 
Chapter 4: Coastal governance arrangements in South Australia 
Chapter Four provides background information to the case study by outlining the coastal 
governance arrangements in place in the state of South Australia.   
Chapter 5: Case study sites: Key characteristics and coastal management issues 
Chapter Five provides a summary of the case study sites including key geographic, 
economic and demographic characteristics of the local government areas and natural 
resource management (NRM) regions studied. The chapter also describes the main 
coastal management issues facing each region, as derived from interviewees’ perceptions 
and compared with secondary data, thus depicting the current status of coastal 
management issues within the case study sites.   
Chapter 6: Coastal governance issues for local government: Results of a South 
Australian case study 
Chapter Six describes the nature of local government in the context of coastal zone 
management, both in theory and in South Australian practice. Interview data from the 
case studies illustrate local government’s perspective on the main issues with respect to 
coastal governance arrangements within the Australian federation.   
Chapter 7: Coastal governance issues for state government: Results of a South 
Australian case study 
Chapter Seven describes the nature of the state government in the context of coastal 
zone management, both in theory and in South Australian practice. Interview data from 
the case study illustrates the state government’s perspective on the main issues with 
respect to coastal governance arrangements within the Australian federation.   
Chapter 8: The role of the federal government in coastal governance and 
intergovernmental relations in Australia 
Chapter Eight explores the nature of Australia’s federal government and illustrates the 
evolution of the federal government since federation. In light of local and state 
government perceptions described in Chapters Six and Seven, this is analysed to explore 
the intergovernmental relationships between the three spheres of government. 
Chapter 9: A theory on Australian federalism, intergovernmental integration and 
ICM   
Chapter Nine synthesises the results from the local, state, and federal analyses to reflect 
on the relative strengths of the three spheres of government and the nature of the 
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Australian federation. Chapter Nine explicates the theory derived through these analyses, 
in order to explain the difficulty implementing ICM in Australia to date.  
Chapter 10: Conclusion  
Chapter Ten concludes the thesis by providing an overview of the study premise, main 
findings and the theory generated, and the implications of this theory for the future of 






 Integrated Coastal Management in the Australian 
federation: A case for exploration 
2.1 Chapter overview 
Chapter Two provides the rationale for the research undertaken during this PhD. This 
chapter explains the importance of the coastal zone, both in a global context and in 
Australia’s case, providing the imperative for its prudent management. The current best-
practice approach to the management of human use of coastal resources, known as 
Integrated Coastal Management (ICM), is described. A review of the Australian coastal 
management literature focuses on what is known about the impact of Australia’s federal 
system on governance arrangements for coastal zone management and the 
implementation of ICM. The chapter concludes by reiterating the study’s aim and the 
research questions proposed to meet the study aim.  
2.2 The Coast: Definitions, importance, threats and imperative for 
management  
The edge of the sea is a strange and beautiful place. All through the long history of 
Earth it has been an area of unrest where waves have broken heavily against the 
land, where the tides have pressed forward over the continents, receded, and then 
returned. For no two successive days is the shoreline precisely the same. Not only 
do the tides advance and retreat in their eternal rhythms, but the level of the sea 
itself is never at rest. It rises or falls as the glaciers melt or grow, as the floor of the 
deep ocean basins shifts under its increasing load of sediments, or as the Earth’s 
crust along the continental margins warps up or down in adjustment to strain and 
tension. Today a little more land may belong to the sea, tomorrow a little less. 
Always the edge of the sea remains an elusive and indefinable boundary         
(Carson 1955, p. 1). 
2.2.1 What is the coast? 
Broadly speaking, the coast is defined as the interface between the land and the sea. In 
this place, the mix of interactions between physical, chemical and biological processes 
makes for an extraordinarily complex and dynamic environmental system (Bourman, 
Murray-Wallace & Harvey 2016). Due to this complexity and dynamism, there is no 
universal definition for the coastal zone. This coastal process-related definition of the 
coastal zone, offered by Sorensen and McCreary (1990), is often quoted (Cambers 2001, 
p. 1; Clark 1995, p. 1; Harvey & Caton 2010, p. 14; Hinrichsen 1999, p. 2; Korakandy 2005, 
p. 108):  
… that part of the land affected by its proximity to the sea and that part of the ocean affected 
by its proximity to the land … an area in which processes depending on the interaction between 
land and sea are most intense. 
In a purely physical sense, the coastal zone always comprises intertidal and supratidal 
zones, including floodplains, mangroves, wetlands and salt ponds, beaches, dunes and 
fringing coral reefs (Cambers 2001; Clark 1995). In an holistic sense, the coastal zone 
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should be considered to include “the land, seabed, marine waters, terrestrial waters and 
aquifers, atmosphere above, and associated areas of vegetation, animal habitat, and 
human activity” (Creary 2003, p. 6). While it is widely accepted that the coast comprises 
the transition zone where the sea meets the land, a key question for management is: how 
far seaward and how far landward does the coastal zone extend? Accordingly, 
institutional definitions of the coastal zone vary depending on the management need, 
subject area or ecosystem under consideration (Harvey & Caton 2010). Table 2.1 provides 
a sample of definitions from various institutional sources, used to delineate the coastal 
zone for their main purpose.   
Table 2.1 Definitions of the coastal zone 
Table depicting the various definitions of the coastal zone, depending on the purpose for which the coastal 




Extending from the coastal plains to the outer edge of the continental shelves, 
approximately matching the region that has been alternately flooded and exposed 
during the sea-level fluctuations of the late Quaternary period (International 





For the purpose of the actions of the Commonwealth, the boundaries of the 
coastal zone are considered to extend as far inland and as far seaward as 
necessary to achieve the Coastal Policy objectives, with a primary focus on the 








All land that is—  
(a) within the mean high water mark and the mean low water mark on the 
seashore at spring tides; or  
(b) above and within one hundred metres of that mean high water mark; or  
(c) below and within three nautical miles of that mean low water mark; or  
(d) within any estuary, inlet, river, creek, bay or lake and subject to the ebb and 
flow of the tide; or  
(e) declared by regulation to constitute part of the coast for the purposes of this 
Act (Government of South Australia 2015). 
Five main zones in the coastal-marine spectrum have been identified:  
 inland areas, which affect the oceans mainly via rivers and non-point sources of pollution;  
 coastal lands – wetlands, marshes, mangroves, swamps, flood plains, beaches, dunes, wave-cut 
platforms, cliffs, rock ledges and escarpments, and associated environment, where human activity 
is concentrated and directly affects adjacent waters;  
 coastal waters – generally estuaries, rivers, streams, lagoons, and nearshore  waters, sea bed and 
reef, where the effects of land-based activities are dominant;  
 offshore waters – mainly out to the edge of national jurisdiction (200 nautical miles offshore); and  
 high seas – beyond the limit of national jurisdiction (Cicin-Sain & Knecht 1998, p. 43; Creary 2003, 
p. 6).   
For the purposes of this study, the main zones under consideration are inland areas and 
coastal lands, and to a lesser extent coastal waters, corresponding to the majority of 
areas under state government jurisdiction in Australia.   
10 
 
2.2.2 Importance of the coast 
Earth is said to be a coastal planet; 71 per cent of the planet surface is water and the 
remaining 29 per cent land, with the two environments interacting along the world’s 1.6 
million kilometre (km) coastline (Martínez et al. 2007, p. 255). Given the vastness of 
coastal systems around the world, it is little wonder that they are areas of both high 
ecological significance, and fundamental social and economic importance to human 
civilisation. 
The coastal zone is a particularly special environmental system due to the richness and 
diversity of the ecosystems it supports. On a global scale, coastal ecosystems contain a 
high percentage of the world’s biodiversity, especially because coasts are home to two of 
the richest ecosystems of the world: tropical rainforests and coral reefs (Martínez et al. 
2007). Furthermore, the coastal estuarine mix of freshwater and saltwater is home to 
some of the world’s most productive habitats (Clark 1995).  
Aside from its intrinsic ecological value, the coastal zone is home to a large proportion of 
the human population. In 2003, 41 per cent of the world’s population lived in the coastal 
zone, and the majority of coastal countries have 80-100 per cent of their populations 
living within 100 km of the coastline (Martínez et al. 2007). A more recent estimate is that 
60 per cent of the world’s population lives within 60 km of the coast and, taking into 
account the current growth rate, this is projected to reach 75 per cent within 20 years 
(Moksness, Dahl & Støttrup 2013). Furthermore, near-coast population density is three 
times higher than the global average, with populations concentrated within 5 km of the 
coastline, and densities highest at elevations lower than 20 m (Small & Nicholls 2003). 
The social importance of the coastal zone is attributed to its aesthetic beauty, 
accessibility, and the number and availability of goods and services it is capable of 
providing.  
Coastal zones have been centres of human activity for millennia. Civilisations have relied 
on coasts for goods (such as food; salt; minerals and oil resources; and construction 
materials in the form of sand, rock, lime and wood) and services (such as shoreline 
protection against extreme events, like storms and hurricanes; the storage and cycling of 
nutrients; sustaining biodiversity; and water capture). Coasts also provide areas for 
leisure, recreation and tourism, and enable commerce through the trade of goods via 
ports (Martínez et al. 2007). Of growing importance to economic activity are the coastal 
tourism and aquaculture sectors (Moksness, Dahl & Støttrup 2013). In terms of overall 
economic importance, the value of goods and services provided by the coastal zone is 
high. Martínez et al. (2007, p. 269) have calculated the total value, or Ecosystem Service 
Product (ESP), provided by coastal ecosystems of the world to be at least 77 per cent of 
global ecosystem-service value5.   
                                                     
5 Martínez et al. (2007, p. 261) calculate the Ecosystem Service Product (ESP) of coastal ecosystems up to 
100 km inland of the coastline. The authors opted for a relatively wide inland boundary in recognition of the 
significance of terrestrial ecosystems to the overall functioning and value of the coastal zone. ESP is 
calculated as the total value provided by the services and products specific to the ecosystem type, where 
assigned values were applied using Costanza et al.’s (1997) existing methodology estimating individuals’ 
“willingness to pay” for an ecosystem service.    
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2.2.2.1 The Australian coastal zone 
Australia has the fourth longest coastline in the world. At 66,530 km, it is smaller only 
than Canada (265,253 km), the United States (133,312 km) and the Russian Federation 
(110,310 km) (Martínez et al. 2007). This figure differs to the official length of Australia’s 
coastline, as stated in the 1996 State of the Environment report, to be 69,630 km 
(Australia State of the Environment Committee 1996). As Harvey and Caton (2010) note, 
different methods of calculating coastline lengths, as well as the inclusion or exclusion of 
offshore islands, will produce different results. The other commonly-quoted estimation of 
the length of Australia’s coastline is in the range of 36,000-37,000 km (Haward 1995b; 
Norman 2009b).  
Australia’s coastline is the longest ice-free coastline of any nation (Haward 1995b) and 
features an incredible number and array of biophysical environments, from “the largest 
coral reef system in the world to huge expanses of dune and cliff systems” (Kay & Lester 
1997, p. 266). The ecological, social and economic importance of Australia’s coastal zone 
is recognised in the opening paragraph of the HORSCCCWEA 2009 report, which states 
that “Australia’s coastal zone is a significant national environmental asset that is also 
fundamentally important to our lifestyle and economy” (House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Climate Change Water Environment and the Arts 2009, p. 1). 
From a global perspective, Australia’s aquatic coastal ecosystems rank among the highest 
in terms of the proportions of sea grasses, coral reefs, and mangroves, while Australia’s 
terrestrial coastal ecosystems rank highly for their size, diversity, and also the area of 
unaltered natural ecosystems (Martínez et al. 2007). In 2003, the Australian coastal zone 
was calculated to be populated by 17.69 million people, or 89.8 per cent of the country’s 
population (Martínez et al. 2007, p. 262). This is comparable to other figures quoted: 86 
per cent by Norman (2009b); 80 per cent by House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Climate Change Water Environment and the Arts (2009); and 85 per cent 
by Gurran, Norman and Hamin (2013). Though sparse in population relative to many 
other coastlines around the world, the Australian coastal zone is home to all major 
population centres, except the land-locked capital city of Canberra (Kay & Lester 1997). In 
terms of economic importance, the ESP of Australia’s natural coastal ecosystems 
(terrestrial and aquatic combined) is calculated to be US$312,875 million, while the value 
of Australia’s human-modified coastal ecosystems (semi-altered and altered combined) is 
in the range of US$3309.82 million6.  
However, despite its profound importance to the Australian economy and way of life, this 
significant national asset remains at risk of serious degradation due to the cumulative 
impacts of human activity in the coastal zone (Australian State of the Environment 
Committee 2006; Harvey & Caton 2010; Martínez et al. 2007; Thia-Eng 1993). Thus, while 
Australia fares comparatively well on a global scale in terms of having among the highest 
percentages of natural (unmodified) coastal ecosystems (Martínez et al. 2007), Australia’s 
economic reliance on these intact natural ecosystems should not be underestimated. 
                                                     
6 Martínez et al. (2007, p. 256) define natural ecosystems as locations with minimal human intervention; 
semi-altered ecosystems have a mosaic of natural and human-altered ecosystems (e.g. croplands and 
urbanisations); and fully-altered ecosystems as those fully covered by urban development and croplands.  
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2.2.3 Threats and imperative for management 
The previous section illustrated the importance and value of the functional integrity of 
coastal ecosystems, and their provision of goods and services ranging from production to 
protection. However, coastal zones around the world – and the ecological, social and 
economic value they provide – are under increasing threat from human activity and the 
impending impacts of climate change (Moksness, Dahl & Støttrup 2013). In Australia, the 
independent report to the Australian government on the state of the environment (SoE) 
in 2011 identified three principle drivers as having a significant impact on the coastal 
environment: climate change, population growth and economic growth (Australian State 
of the Environment Committee 2011). In order to manage the impacts of these drivers 
within the coastal zone, an appropriate governance response is required. As defined by 
Olsen (2003a, p. 15): 
Management is the process by which human and material resources are harnessed to achieve a 
known goal within a known institutional structure. … Governance, on the other hand, sets the 
stage in which management occurs by defining—or redefining—the fundamental objectives, 
policies, laws and institutions by which societal issues are addressed. … During the 
Anthropocene, the urgent need to redirect the forces of change in coastal ecosystems and 
promote stewardship of these critically important areas is most often a challenge of 
governance rather than of management.  
There have been numerous government inquiries and independent scientific reports into 
coastal management in Australia and the state of coastal ecosystems. Many have 
reported degraded coastal assets due to poor catchment and coastal land-use 
management and planning practice, and have implicated ineffective governance 
arrangements as a critical factor in these outcomes (Australian State of the Environment 
Committee 2001, 2006, 2011; House of Representatives Standing Committee on Climate 
Change Water Environment and the Arts 2009; House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Environment and Conservation 1980; House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Environment Recreation and the Arts 1991; Resource Assessment 
Commission 1993). Table 2.2 outlines the issues relating to coastal governance that have 
been identified in the last three SoE reports. These comments support the study premise 
outlined in the Introduction. Furthermore, a chapter was dedicated solely to ‘Coasts’ for 
the first time in the history of Australian SoE reporting in 2011, signalling a change in the 
conception of coasts: 
The State of the Environment Committee preparing this report considered that the unique 
characteristics of coastal environments, the strong focus on coasts in Australian culture and 
settlement patterns, and the growing concern about the convergence of social, economic and 
environmental issues around our coasts warranted a chapter discussing the key issues 
(Australian State of the Environment Committee 2011, p. 850). 
With pressures becoming intensified due to population growth and the impending 
impacts of climate change, there is a strong imperative for improved governance 
arrangements for planning and sustainable management of coastal zone areas and 
resource use (Australian State of the Environment Committee 2011; Gurran, Norman & 
Hamin 2013; House of Representatives Standing Committee on Climate Change Water 
Environment and the Arts 2009; Norman 2009b). The next section will define the concept 
of governance as applied in this study, and summarise traditional approaches to the 
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management of the various interrelated and competing aspects of coastal resource use. 
This will lead into a discussion on the current best practice approach, known as Integrated 
Coastal Management (ICM). 
Table 2.2 Australian State of the Environment Reports: Issues with coastal governance 
Source: Australian State of the Environment Committee (2001, 2006, 2011) 
SoE 2001 “There is clearly still a need for a nationally applicable Coastal Zone Policy to be developed to 
further assist in reducing the fragmentation of effort to manage the coastal zone and 
associated coastal waters. This issue was highlighted by a House of Representatives report in 
1991, which said: ‘The absence of a national perspective towards the entire Australian 
coastline could lead to national interests being undervalued or even lost for future 
generations, as the existing ad hoc, hodge-podge pattern of development slowly nibbles away 
at a precious and beautiful resource, the natural coastline’.” 
SoE 2006 “The overall conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that in 2006, most, if not all, of 
the issues identified and assessed in both the 1996 and the 2001 national State of the 
Environment reports still remain to be resolved. Some issues have changed in importance, but 
all have been foreshadowed in earlier state of the environment reports. This calls into 
question the effectiveness of Australia’s responses to identified key national problems that 
afflict coastal and marine ecosystems, and particularly the reforms in governance that are 
required to enable a move away from short-term and sectoral management towards a more 
systematic, integrated and planned approach to managing coast and ocean issues.” 
SoE 2011 
“Two major uncertainties that are likely to determine the future of Australia’s coasts are:  
• how government and governance arrangements develop (especially whether cooperative 
and strategic approaches to managing coastal resources can be developed that are effective 
over the same spatial scales as the challenges)                                                         
• how extreme and rapid the effects of climate change are on coastal Australia.” 
2.3 Governance for effective coastal management 
Prudent coastal management is necessitated by the economic value associated with the 
goods and services provided by the coastal zone, together with the escalating risk of 
deterioration of coastal ecosystems due to human activity, increasing population 
pressure, and vulnerability created by climate change. However, governance of the 
coastal zone is exceedingly complex due to the dynamic nature of the biophysical 
features of the land-sea interface, coupled with the competitive nature of the multiple-
use resources, and the existence of discrete governmental units of management founded 
on administrative rather than ecosystem-based boundaries (Ballinger 2015; Harvey & 
Caton 2010). Of paramount importance to the way we govern human use of coastal areas 
and resources is the understanding that this system is in a state of constant flux 
(Bourman, Murray-Wallace & Harvey 2016). The task of coastal governance is particularly 
complicated, as Clark (1995, pp. 1-2) notes, because the land-sea interface is: 
… the place where agency authority changes abruptly, where storms hit, where waterfront 
development locates, where boats make their landfalls, and where some of the richest aquatic 
habitat is found. It is also the place where terrestrial-type planning and resource management 
programs are at their weakest.  
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As there are many different definitions of governance and an extensive and diverse 
literature dealing with the concept, the next section will briefly clarify how the concept of 
governance has been approached and applied in this study.  
2.3.1 Governance defined 
The term ‘governance’ has been used widely in government and non-government 
organisation (NGO) literature, and is the subject of much debate and theory in multiple 
disciplines of academic literature (Bevir 2007, 2011). Whilst the term has been in use 
since the nineteenth century, the definition of the concept is continually evolving; hence, 
there is little consensus regarding its definition (UN Economic and Social Council 2006). It 
is thus important to define what is meant by the term in the context of this study.  
Throughout this thesis, governance is conceptualised and applied in its most general 
sense, which is concerned with “theories and issues of social coordination and the nature 
of all patterns of rule” (Bevir 2011). In this study, governance is best understood as 
referring to:  
National political systems and international political relations and their functioning in relation 
to law, public administration and democratic participation of key stakeholders and the public at 
large. It is about the interaction between institutions in all sectors, that must set goals and co-
operate in achieving them and creating an orderly framework for action—not only at the global 
level, but also at regional, national and local levels, all of which could contribute to (or 
undermine) achievement in management of the commons (Carley & Christie 2000, p. 18).  
It is relevant to understand governance as also comprising “lateral and inter-institutional 
relations in administration” (UN Economic and Social Council 2006, p. 2). In a broad sense, 
the concept of governance used in this thesis encompasses informal processes and power 
relations which interact with formal processes, such as goal setting, the development of 
institutional structures, and everyday practice. In this context, it is appropriate to 
envisage governance as a “process through which diverse elements of a society wield 
power and authority” (Ehler 2003, p. 335). While it is recognised that international 
bodies, civil society, the market and the private sector all play a role in the process of 
governance, the main focus of this study is the role of the Australian national and sub-
national governments, and the interactions between these levels of government which 
serve to achieve, or undermine, the goal of sustainable coastal development and resource 
use.  
According to Olsen (2003a, p. iix):  
Effective governance systems are what create the preconditions for achieving sustainable 
environmental and social benefits. We have learned that good coastal governance functions 
best when it exists as part of a nested system—that is, one that operates simultaneously at 
scales ranging from the local to the global.  
However, as described in the Introduction, this type of nested (or integrated) governance 
has been difficult to achieve in Australia. Furthermore, effective coastal governance 
regimes have also been difficult to implement internationally (Ibrahim & Ghoneim 2013; 
Mee 2012; O’Hagan & Ballinger 2010; Portman et al. 2012; Shipman & Stojanovic 2007). 
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The next section highlights the issues related to poorly integrated governance with 
respect to traditional approaches to coastal land and resource management.  
2.3.2 The need for integrated governance: Failures of traditional approaches to 
coastal management 
Historically, the approach to coastal management has been ad hoc, sectoral, reactive and 
protective in nature, due to its origin in response to coastal hazard damage (Harvey 2016; 
Harvey & Caton 2010). Technologically based in engineering, this type of ‘Development-
Defend’ approach is underpinned by an anthropocentric philosophy of “working ‘against’ 
nature” and an “almost unquestioning reliance on technological fixes” (Ballinger 2015, p. 
374). This creates a cycle of decision-making in which the vulnerability of populations and 
assets is perpetuated through further inappropriate development behind hard-defence 
structures, thus providing more impetus for protection works – and so the cycle continues 
(Ballinger 2015). Some of the largest problems with the use of traditional hard 
engineering approaches include the downstream effects caused by the structures’ 
interruption of natural coastal processes, the loss of sediment and beach amenity, and 
“coastal squeeze” because intertidal habitats cannot migrate landwards and are 
consequently “squeezed” against fixed hard defences (Ballinger 2015, p. 375). Given 
these failings, a more sophisticated approach capable of providing a framework for 
managing competing resources and tackling such multi-dimensional coastal problems is 
required (Ballinger 2015).  
As indicated in the Introduction, Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) is one such 
framework for the integrated planning and management of coastal areas and resource 
use. Advocates of ICM emphasise the integrated governance aspect, which is argued to 
enable more balanced and sustainable outcomes, especially related to managing coastal 
risk (Ballinger 2015). As Ehler (2003, p. 335) notes: 
What distinguishes “integrated coastal management” from “coastal management” or “coastal 
resource management” is the ability to create a governance system capable to manage 
multiple uses in an integrated way through the cooperation and coordination of government 
agencies at different level of authority and of different economic sectors.  
Similarly, Sorensen (1993, p. 50) notes that ICM can be differentiated from other 
environmental planning and management initiatives in coastal zones by the presence of a 
systems perspective and multi-sectoral approach. The following section provides an 
overview of the concept of ICM as a framework for sustainable coastal development and 
resource use.  
2.3.3 Integrated Coastal Management (ICM): A framework for sustainable 
development and resource use in the coastal zone 
ICM is the internationally-accepted, best-practice model for managing human use, 
development and protection of coastal resources (Ballinger 2015; Cicin-Sain 1993; Cicin-
Sain, Knecht & Fisk 1995; Harvey 2016; Javier 2015; Moksness, Dahl & Støttrup 2013; 
Olsen 2003a; Sorensen 2002; Thia-Eng 1993; Vallega 2013). The principle features of ICM 
– integration, participation and transparency – are promoted in search of solutions to 
many complex problems facing society today. As Olsen (2003a, p. 56) notes: 
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ICM is the approach called for by a wide range of international declarations and treaties on 
topics relevant to coastal areas—from wetlands, coral reef and biodiversity conservation, to 
adaptation to global climate change and sea level rise, to controlling land-based sources of 
marine pollution. 
ICM has multiple significant goals, which include the sustainable development of coastal 
and marine areas; reducing vulnerability of coastal areas to natural hazards; and 
maintaining essential ecological processes, life-support systems and biological diversity in 
the coastal zone (Cicin-Sain 1993, p. 30). There are various definitions of the model, but 
all place an emphasis on the fact that it is a process, and it entails cooperation through 
the integration of competing interests and resource uses in the coastal zone. Sorensen 
(1993, p. 49) provides a commonly-used definition of ICM which was derived from 
discussions of international delegates at an ICM workshop in Charleston, USA in 1989: 
A dynamic process in which a coordinated strategy is developed and updated for the allocation 
of environmental, social, cultural and institutional resources to achieve the conservation and 
sustainable multiple use of the coastal zone. 
The main strength of ICM as a framework for sustainable coastal resource use is that it 
simultaneously incorporates the dynamism and interconnectedness of the physical land-
sea environment with the complexity of the socio-cultural aspects of competing values 
and uses, and complicated institutional contexts. Championed by seminal author Cicin-
Sain (1993, pp. 29-30), ICM is unique when compared to traditional methods of coastal 
management in its recognition of the exceptional nature and value of the coastal zone as 
the land-sea interface, taking into account that it:  
 is a dynamic and frequently changing environment;  
 comprises valuable ecosystems which require conservation to support their great 
productivity and biodiversity;  
 is valuable to human populations for settlement, use and recreation;  
 is a ‘launching pad’ for human activities in the marine space;  
 is a finite resource for which there are multiple competing uses and therefore 
conflict; and  
 is complex to manage because of the differential ownership and governance 
arrangements for the land and sea components of the coastal zone (such as 
public/private ownership of land with general-purpose government authorities, 
and public ownership of the ocean with single-purpose authorities governing 
management).  
2.3.3.1 History of ICM 
The concept of integrated management of coastal zones proliferated internationally 
between the 1970s and 1990s, with programs initiated or feasibility studies underway in 
all regions of the world (Sorensen 1993). The ICM model gained momentum in the 1990s 
due to international commitments made under the Declaration of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro 
(Kenchington & Crawford 1993). UNCED highlights the global imperative for an integrated 
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approach to management of coastal resources. Although a non-binding agreement, the 
‘Rio Declaration’ augmented the previous ‘Stockholm Declaration’ of 1972 by adding such 
key principles as polluter pays; the precautionary principle; Environmental Impact 
Assessment; public participation; and inclusion of indigenous people and women (Harvey 
& Caton 2010). Implementation of the ‘Rio Declaration’ was progressed via Agenda 21, 
which was essentially an action plan for all levels of government to commit to and 
implement the new UNCED principles (Cicin-Sain 1993). Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 
emphasises the importance of sustainable development of the oceans and coasts, given 
their critical role in supporting life and livelihoods (Cicin-Sain, Knecht & Fisk 1995). 
Agenda 21 commits signatories to the integrated management and sustainable 
development of coastal areas:  
Protection of the oceans, all kinds of seas, including enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, and 
coastal areas, and the protection, rational use and development of their living resources 
(United Nations 1992). 
The following sections outline the key characteristics of the ICM model and describe 
some of the key factors required for its successful implementation.   
2.3.3.2 Key characteristics of ICM 
ICM is characterised by an interdisciplinary and holistic approach to the coastal 
management which encompasses: 
1. the ecosystem approach, whereby the ecosystem should be managed as a whole 
rather than as separate individual components (for example, the catchment-
coast-ocean continuum);  
2. sustainable development, where the goal is the long-term conservation of 
resources;  
3. integration, whereby decision-making should be coordinated across space, 
sectors, disciplines and governments, and involve all stakeholders who may 
impact or be impacted by the coast; and 
4. iteration, whereby ICM is considered to be a continuous and dynamic process and 
is specifically designed, monitored and adapted to the particular requirements of 
the nation, region or locale (Cicin-Sain & Knecht 1998; Harvey & Caton 2010; 
Sorensen 1993, 1997).  
The next section outlines the multiple dimensions of ICM’s central principle – integration 
– and defines it as it relates to the purpose of this research. 
2.3.3.3 Integration: Putting the ‘I’ into ‘ICM’ 
As implied by the name, the concept of integration is the foundation of the ICM model: 
“the coastal management system is built on the essential elements of integration and 
coordination throughout the entire program” (Thia-Eng 1993, p. 84). Accordingly, ICM 
promotes a focus on coordinated decision-making between various levels of government 
and broad consultation with all interest groups (Harvey & Caton 2010). Within the 




(1) Integration among sectors  
This refers to integration among coastal and marine sectors (e.g. industries, such as oil 
and gas development, fisheries, coastal tourism, port development; conservation, such as 
marine mammal and beach protection; and recreation) as well as between coastal and 
marine sectors, and land-based sectors that affect the coastal and ocean environment 
(such as agriculture, forestry, and mining). Inter-sectoral integration also implies conflict 
resolution among sectoral government agencies, which is integral to effective planning, 
and is often referred to as horizontal integration (Cicin-Sain 1993, p. 25; English 2003, p. 
5; Harvey & Caton 2010, p. 6). 
(2) Integration between the land and the water sides of the coastal zone  
This refers to integration across the catchment-coast-marine continuum, where marine 
pollution has required an integrated approach to catchment management and 
environmental protection regulations (Cicin-Sain 1993, p. 25; English 2003, p. 6; Harvey & 
Caton 2010, p. 6). 
(3) Integration among levels of government  
Intergovernmental integration “helps to realize the variance in perspectives of different 
levels of government so as to facilitate harmony among national, provincial, and local 
governments in addressing public needs … This harmony should help to coordinate 
development policies” (English 2003, p. 6). This is also often referred to as ‘vertical’ 
integration (Harvey & Caton 2010). 
(4) Science-management integration 
Science-management integration involves the sharing of knowledge and information 
among various disciplines (such as the natural sciences, social sciences, and engineering) 
and the sharing of information and data with other actors in the resource management 
process for monitoring, evaluation and adaptive management (Cicin-Sain 1993, p. 25; 
English 2003, p. 6; Harvey & Caton 2010, p. 6).  
(5) International integration 
“International integration focuses on minimizing and quelling international disputes over 
fishing activities, transboundary pollution, establishment of maritime boundaries, passage 
of ships, and other issues” (English 2003, p. 6). 
The following section will serve to define what is meant by vertical and 
intergovernmental integration for the purpose of this study.  
2.3.3.3.1 Defining vertical and intergovernmental integration in ICM 
Derived from the prescriptions of Agenda 21, vertical integration refers to coordination 
between a wide spectrum of decision-making centres, including intergovernmental 
organisations at the supra-national level, governmental organisations, regional 
authorities, local authorities, economic associations and non-government organisations 
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(Vallega 2013). Effective integration would be characterised by cooperation between 
these different decision-making centres via “efficient top-down and bottom-up 
relationships” (Vallega 2013, p. 193).   
Whilst recognising the influential role of supra-national organisations such as the United 
Nations in driving ICM uptake through international treaties and declarations, as well as 
the role of economic associations such as Regional Development Australia and many 
other non-government organisations, particularly within the environmental movement, 
this study will be focussing on the level of integration between the spheres of 
government within Australia responsible for planning and management in the coastal 
zone. For this reason, the term ‘intergovernmental integration’ will be used to distinguish 
it from the more comprehensive notion of ‘vertical integration’.  
Elsewhere in the literature, intergovernmental integration is vaguely defined as 
integration among the different levels of government, in the recognition that national, 
state and local governments have different roles and perspectives (Cicin-Sain & Knecht 
1998; Harvey & Caton 2010). It is fairly well-recognised that these differences “often pose 
problems in achieving harmonized policy development and implementation between 
national and sub-national levels” (Creary 2003, p. 17). As mentioned in the Introduction, 
it has been noted that the development of ICM plans is comparatively simpler than the 
implementation of them, resulting in what has been termed the ‘implementation gap’ 
(Bower, Ehler & Basta 1994; Clarke 2003; Crawford, Stanley Cobb & Friedman 1993; 
Nursey-Bray & Harvey 2013; Olsen 2003b). Thus, the next section focuses on the critical 
aspect of implementation, and its relationship with intergovernmental integration.  
2.3.3.4 Implementing ICM 
With regard to implementing the “ambitious, far-reaching and forward-looking” 
mandates of Agenda 21, some of the main challenges for countries looking to implement 
ICM are, as noted by Cicin-Sain (1993, p. 22), prioritisation, operationalisation, 
institutionalisation and funding:  
Nations have to choose priorities among the large number of important actions that are called 
for regarding oceans and coasts; key concepts need to be further defined and operationalised; 
appropriate institutions and/or processes need to be strengthened or established; funding 
needs to be obtained and committed.  
In terms of ICM governance, “governance refers to the structures and processes used to 
govern behaviour, both public and private, in the coastal area and the resources and 
activities it contains” (Ehler 2003, p. 335). Cicin-Sain, Knecht and Fisk (1995, p. 111) note 
the importance of implementing coordinating mechanisms within and between 
governments to achieve effective ICM governance:  
Overcoming the sectoral and intergovernmental fragmentation that exists in today's coastal 
management efforts is a prime goal of ICM. Institutional mechanisms for effective coordination 
among various sectors active in the coastal zone and between the various levels of government 
operating in the coastal zone are fundamental to the strengthening and rationalization of the 
coastal management process. From the variety of available options, the coordination and 
harmonization mechanism must be tailored to fit the unique aspects of each particular national 
government setting.  
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However, according to Harvey and Caton (2010), the complexity of managing the dynamic 
physical nature of the land-sea interface and its conflicting uses has resulted in few 
examples of ICM best-practice to date. The next section discusses these challenges to 
implementation.  
2.3.3.4.1 Challenges to implementation 
As mentioned above, integrated governance for effective coastal zone management has 
been difficult to achieve internationally (Ibrahim & Ghoneim 2013; Mee 2012; O’Hagan & 
Ballinger 2010; Portman et al. 2012; Shipman & Stojanovic 2007). 
There have been international attempts to develop guidelines for ICM, stressing the 
importance of strengthening and harmonising cross-sectoral management. While there are 
various approaches towards achieving ICM, most agree that horizontal and vertical integration 
and coordination must be part of any ICM attempt (Harvey & Caton 2010, p. 6). 
While the ICM model espouses a governance system which enables and promotes 
coordination of decision-making to ensure the long-term conservation, development and 
productivity of the coastal zone, ICM is recognised as being difficult to achieve. According 
to Bower, Ehler and Basta (1994), attention must be given to:  
(1) effective institutional arrangements for continuous management,  
(2) new incentives, positive and negative, to induce changes that will fulfil desired objectives, 
and  
(3) creative means for financing ICZM over time (Creary 2003, p. 4).  
If ICM is to be successfully implemented, variables affecting ICM implementation in each 
government setting need to be understood. Governance arrangements play a large role in 
determining the ability to coordinate and harmonise diverse and conflicting resource 
uses, thus influencing the effectiveness of coastal resource management. According to 
Cicin-Sain and Knecht (1998, p. 10), such variables include:  
 Nature of the legal system;  
 Nature of prevailing political system;  
 Nature and strength of central government;  
 Nature and function of provincial level of government; 
 Nature and strength of local and community levels of government; 
 Relative strengths of executive and legislative branches;  
 Nature of government bureaucracy;  
 Relative strengths of political parties and other interests; 
 Private and public; and,  
 Relative roles of local communities, non-governmental organizations, and major coastal 
stakeholders, including indigenous peoples.  
For successful implementation of ICM, Cicin-Sain and Knecht (1998, p. 10) stress that “any 
government program must be adapted to these realities”. Furthermore, “a program’s 
ultimate success depends on building positive working partnerships among the various 
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levels of government and the sectoral programs active in the coastal zone” (Cicin-Sain & 
Knecht 1998, p. 10).  
The success of ICM as a model for coastal resource management also relies on the 
development of capacity within the governance system to implement ICM. The following 
“various dimensions of capacity” are described by Cicin-Sain (1993, p. 34) to be:  
 Legal and administrative capacity: e.g., to designate a coastal zone, to develop and carry out 
coastal plans, to regulate development in vulnerable zones, to designate areas of particular 
concern;  
 Financial: adequate financial resources to carry out the planning and implementation of coastal 
management efforts; 
 Technical: information gathering and monitoring of coastal/marine ecosystems and processes, 
patterns of human use, and assessments of the effectiveness of government coastal management 
programs. Establishment and maintenance of coastal database and information system;  
 Human resources capacity: interdisciplinary training in social sciences (including law and planning), 
natural and physical sciences, and engineering. Also, raising of public awareness and 
understanding of the coastal ocean environment, and the problems and opportunities it offers. 
In most cases, a combination of authorities operating at different scales are needed to 
implement an ICM program. Consideration of a government’s capacity is central to the 
question of which level of government should do what, and what types of institutions are 
required. The answers are largely dependent “on the type of political system present in a 
particular country and on the combination of institutions already in place” (Cicin-Sain 
1993, p. 35).  
As the type of political system will impact the implementation of the ICM model in a real-
world setting, the focus will now shift to understanding the role of political systems in 
implementing ICM. 
2.3.3.4.2 The role of political systems 
In their global analysis of integrated coastal and ocean management, Cicin-Sain and 
Knecht (1998) stated that the broader political environment must be well-understood in 
order to design an appropriate ICM strategy. ICM must be tailored to a country's unique 
context: 
The failure of ... 'copied' institutions ... has emphasized the need for careful tailoring and 
adaptation of institutional and management approaches to a country's specific historical, 
cultural, socio-economic, and political context (Cicin-Sain & Knecht 1998, p. 125).  
Furthermore, the type of political system determines which level of government has 
authority for implementing ICM. In terms of understanding political systems for the 
purposes of effectively implementing ICM, it is important to consider the division of 
authority between national and subnational levels of government, and whether power 
and authority is concentrated at the national level, or shared between different levels of 
government (Cicin-Sain & Knecht 1998, p. 124). Since the responsibility for coastal zone 
management “rarely falls exclusively on one level of government”, it is also particularly 
important to understand the relative capacities of the various levels of government to 
implement ICM (Cicin-Sain & Knecht 1998, p. 140).  
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Therefore, a synopsis of the key characteristics of federalism and how coastal 
management is undertaken within the Australian federation is warranted. The next 
section provides a summary of the political theory underpinning federalism as a system of 
government, followed by an overview of the governance arrangements for coastal 
management in the Australian federation.  
2.4 Theoretical foundations of federalism 
Australia is a federal parliamentary democracy with a written Constitution outlining the 
separation of powers between the federal government and the states (Cicin-Sain & 
Knecht 1998, p. 347; Summers 2006). Thus, federalism is the political system in which ICM 
is to be implemented in Australia. While federalism is able to maintain “territorial 
differences within an overarching political system … [it] seeks to provide the benefits of 
unity without sacrificing the advantages of local autonomy, community choice and 
diversity within a nation” (Wanna et al. 2009, p. 9). These concepts are foundational to 
federalism as a political theory: 
Federalism is a theory developed and applied to allow for the centralization of various 
governmental functions, [and a] decentralization of other governmental functions in the sense 
that some remain with the states … The basic conditions of federalism are of decentralized 
governmental powers, and those who wish to centralize any specific function need to justify 
themselves (Blank 2010, pp. 526-527).  
The concept of sovereignty (or autonomy) is critical to the understanding of federalism as 
a power-sharing system. Federations are composed of two units of government: the 
constituent states and the federation. The constituent states are recognised as the 
foundational building blocks and their identity is protected constitutionally (Parkin & 
Summers 2006); thus “the autonomy of the constituent units is as legitimate as that of 
the nation as a whole” (Blank 2010, p. 529).  
 
Figure 2.1 Federalism in theory  
This figure depicts the theoretical lack of hierarchy between federal and state governments. The two 
jurisdictions share sovereignty over domains specified in the Constitution, while local governments are not 
constitutionally defined and exist purely at the discretion of their state governments. Adapted from Sansom 




In a federation, the division between the units of government is based on functions, not 
territory. A Constitution protects the division of powers between the two units (Blank 
2010; Parkin & Summers 2006). In this way, sovereignty allows both units of government 
“a sphere of action immune from exterior intervention” (Blank 2010, p. 525). An 
important aspect of this autonomy is that “the constituent units must enjoy full (or near-
full) discretion over their own populace and territory” and the constituent units can 
“divide themselves (or not) and control their internal affairs within a federation, without 
the intervention of the federation” (Blank 2010, pp. 525-526). Furthermore, as clearly 
depicted in Figure 2.1, the federal government should not be referred to as an "upper" 
level of government nor thought of as the top of a hierarchy7. As explained by Blank 
(2010, p. 524):  
The functions of the federation are not inherently more important or more basic than those of 
the states; the federation does not metaphysically precede the states; nor is the federation a 
pre-condition of the states… If anything, many argue that the federal government is, by 
principle, weaker than the states and metaphysically inferior to them, since they are the 
foundations of the federation. … Indeed, in many federal regimes, the states are vested with 
primary (or residual) powers, while the federal entity is vested only with specific and finite 
powers--those that are supposed to enable the functioning of the union as a whole. 
Therefore, it is clear that federalism is designed to be a system in which the two units of 
government (i.e. state and federal) share power, since the most notable feature of a 
federal system is the preservation of each unit of government’s autonomy. However, as 
Blank (2010, p. 531) notes: 
Simply stating that a system is (or should be) federal hardly tells one what the exact legal 
arrangements are (or should be) in any specific governmental function. What matters more is 
the way these legal (and political) mechanisms and structures operate in a concrete setting, 
how they are interpreted, and how they are adjudicated. And while it is crucial to observe the 
status quo from which it emerges, whether it is a unitary state deciding to splinter itself or 
whether these are sovereign states deciding to unite under a federal regime, it is more 
important to see the "career" of the scheme afterwards. 
Thus, this thesis will explore the ‘career’ of federalism in Australia with respect to coastal 
zone management. The following section provides a brief overview of the theoretical 
aspects of the Australian federal system, followed by an outline of the roles and 
responsibilities of each sphere of government for coastal planning and management in 
Australia. The practical aspects of Australian federalism will be explored in more detail 
throughout the results and discussion chapters. 
  
                                                     
7 For this reason, the term ‘sphere’ is used throughout this thesis in preference to the terms ‘level’ or ‘tier’, 
which may imply a notion of hierarchy.  
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2.5 The Australian federation 
In 1901, six British colonies united to form a federation called the Commonwealth of 
Australia8, modelled on the federal system of the United States. A concurrent and non-
hierarchical written Constitution demarcated certain exclusive powers to the new federal 
government9. These were restricted to powers that made sense to be handled nationally, 
such as “naval and military defence, currency, coinage and legal tender, immigration and 
emigration and external affairs” (Parkin & Summers 2006, p. 52). The residual powers 
remained with the states, in line with the principle of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is an 
important principle of government which says:  
‘Governments need to delegate their powers, authorities, and duties to the smallest (or to the 
closest-to-the-citizens) jurisdiction that can efficiently perform them’ … or ‘action should be 
taken at the lowest level of government at which particular objectives can adequately be 
achieved’ (Blank 2010, p. 533). 
Hence, state responsibilities included public services and regulations which were most 
relevant, or ‘closest’, to the citizens: the provision of schools, hospitals and health 
centres, personal welfare services, police and correctional services, roads, commuter 
transport services, public housing, and emergency services; the provision and regulation 
of electricity, gas, water and sewerage infrastructure and services; the regulation of 
construction and retail trade; and city planning, environmental protection and ports 
(Parkin & Summers 2006, p. 52). The latter three responsibilities are of particular 
importance to coastal zone management. Due to the principles implied by a non-
hierarchical and concurrent Constitution, some refer to the Australian system as 
‘cooperative federalism’ (Harvey & Caton 2010; Huggett 1998; McQuestin & Woods 2010; 
Painter 1996; Wanna et al. 2009). 
The Constitution also separated the federal government legislature from the judiciary. Of 
particular importance to this review is the role of the latter, the High Court, which was 
established by Section 71 of the Constitution as the highest court in the Australian judicial 
system. The High Court was established to act as an “umpire” in the federal system: 
namely, to interpret and apply the law of Australia; to hear cases of special federal 
significance, including challenges to the Constitutional validity of laws; and to decide on 
appeals from federal, state or territory courts (Parkin & Summers 2006, p. 53). “The High 
Court has the power to invalidate any laws, of either level of government, that it 
determines as outside the constitutional allocation of power to that government” (Parkin 
& Summers 2006, p. 53).  
  
                                                     
8 The Northern Territory was founded in 1911 and the Australian Capital Territory in 1909.  
9 One of the key characteristics of a federal system is that is imposes checks on power. In the Australian 
system, amendments to the Constitution are difficult to obtain due to the consensus required at both the 
federal and state levels: an absolute majority in both houses of the federal Parliament (the House of 
Representatives and the Senate), and in terms of state referenda, support must equate to both a majority 
of states and a majority of votes cast (McLean 2004, p. 8). As such, any changes to the status quo are 
difficult to achieve. 
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2.5.1 Coastal management and the Australian federation: An overview 
In Australia, coastal governance arrangements are essentially a product of the federal 
system of government; the roles and responsibilities for coastal management are 
variously divided between the federal government and the constituent state and territory 
governments, in line with the constitutional division of powers. As is their prerogative, 
state and territory governments delegate many responsibilities for coastal zone 
management to local governments. Accordingly, governance of the coastal zone in 
Australia is complicated. A convoluted array of federal and state or territory departments 
and agencies, local governments, and more recently regional bodies, are involved. The 
next sections provide a brief overview of coastal governance arrangements in the 
Australian federation. Figure 2.2 provides an example, from Victoria, of the range of 
jurisdictional boundaries that exist between federal, state and local governments across 
the catchment-coast-marine continuum, to be discussed below. 
 
Figure 2.2 Jurisdictional boundaries across the catchment-coast-marine continuum 
Schematic view of the zones of jurisdiction of Victorian state government agencies in 1993. Source: Harvey 
and Caton (2010, p. 219). 
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2.5.1.1 Commonwealth government 
In terms of Constitutional heads of power, the federal government has sovereignty and 
jurisdiction over the Australian territorial sea from the low water mark. However, the 
1980 Offshore Constitutional Settlement (OCS) negotiated that state governments have 
authority over marine areas up to three nautical miles offshore (Harvey & Caton 2010; 
Haward 1989).  
Internationally, the Commonwealth government is the key negotiating actor and 
signatory to international policies and legislation affecting the conservation and 
management of ocean and coastal resources. The Commonwealth government is 
signatory to several important international environmental conventions which affect the 
management of the coastal zone. These include the Declaration of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). As part of these obligations, 
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 commits Australia to the integrated management and 
sustainable development of coastal areas:  
Coastal states commit themselves to integrated management and sustainable development of 
coastal areas and the marine environment under their national jurisdiction (United Nations 
1992). 
Further to this, the federal government has an international obligation to assist in the 
implementation of integrated ocean and coastal zone management in Australia.   
Each coastal State should consider establishing, or where necessary strengthening, appropriate 
coordinating mechanisms … for integrated management and sustainable development of 
coastal and marine areas and their resources, at both the local and national levels (United 
Nations 1992). 
Chapter 17 supplements and builds on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) 
1982, which Australia ratified in 1994 providing the Commonwealth with jurisdiction over 
a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The LOSC:   
… delimits states’ jurisdiction at sea, primarily with regard to resource use and navigation. This 
convention establishes conservation and management regimes for fisheries in exclusive 
economic zones. It imposes obligations to prevent, reduce and control marine pollution from 
land, the atmosphere, and vessels and from dumping. It also includes a regime for the 
enforcement of marine pollution laws (Harvey & Caton 2010, p. 207). 
The federal government is also responsible for areas of international significance 
reflecting specific international agreements Australia is a party to. These include the 
World Heritage Convention (covering areas such as the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park) 
and Wetlands of International Importance in accordance with the Ramsar Convention 
(Harvey & Caton 2010). Also included are agreements on migratory birds (Japan-Australia 
migratory bird agreement; China-Australia migratory bird agreement), and some of these 
international obligations have been enshrined in Commonwealth, state and territory 
legislation (Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council 2006, p. 15). 
Since the international drive toward sustainable development gained momentum in the 
1990s, the federal government has taken a more active interest in coastal issues (Harvey 
2016; Harvey & Caton 2010; Thom & Harvey 2000). This is also evidenced by a series of 
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inquiries into coastal zone management commissioned by the federal government. 
However, in terms of domestic responsibilities, the Commonwealth’s role in the landward 
coastal zone is diminished by not having constitutional responsibility for the majority of 
planning and resource use in this jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the federal government plays 
a significant role through its various policy initiatives and provision of funding for 
Commonwealth environmental and natural resource management programs, which 
invariably impact local government, NRM and state government management within 
coastal zone (Clarke 2011; Harvey 2016).  
2.5.1.2 State governments10 
In terms of the Australian Constitution, the states maintained authority over any powers 
that were not exclusively centralised at the federal level. Hence, planning and 
management responsibilities in the coastal zone reside with the states (Harvey & Caton 
2010). As mentioned above, the 1980 Offshore Constitutional Settlement agreement 
provides state governments with responsibility for marine areas up to three nautical 
miles offshore (Harvey & Caton 2010; Haward 1989).  
Due to the Australian Constitution preserving the autonomy of the constituent state 
governments within the Australian federation, it is the responsibility of each state to 
determine how to meet their coastal management and planning responsibilities. 
Consequently, coastal governance arrangements in Australia vary considerably on a state-
by-state basis. All states have enacted a range of legislation and other instruments to 
manage activity within the coastal zone (Clarke 2010; Harvey & Caton 2010). The diverse 
array of legislation, agencies and instruments which complicate comparisons between 
states have been discussed elsewhere (Australian Local Government Association 2006; 
Clarke 2003, 2010; Coastal Climate Change Advisory Committee 2010; Gurran, Blakely & 
Squires 2007; House of Representatives Standing Committee on Climate Change Water 
Environment and the Arts 2009; LGASA 2003; Norman 2009a; Victorian Planning & 
Environmental Law Association 2010) and will not be the subject of this overview since 
this study elected to focus on the coastal governance system in one state: South 
Australia. The specific coastal governance arrangements in South Australia are outlined in 
Chapter Four. 
With respect to federalism, Lazarow (2010, p. 146) contends that this has influenced the 
criticised inconsistency between coastal governance arrangements and coastal 
management initiatives on a national scale: 
The strong position of the states with respect to the development of environmental policy 
compared to the role of the Commonwealth has created a situation whereby the coastal 
management programs in each of the states has developed at a different pace, under different 
pressures and with somewhat different legislative structures supporting coastal management 
programs.    
However, it is well-recognised that while state governments have the constitutional 
power to govern the coast, there is limited funding for this specific purpose (Harvey & 
                                                     
10 For simplicity, herein the term ‘state’ will be used in lieu of ‘states and territories’ to describe the 
constituent units of the Australian federation. 
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Caton 2010). The RAC Inquiry found that state and local governments are responsible for 
95 per cent of expenditure in the coastal zone (Huggett 1998, p. 42). However, due to the 
nature of state-federal financial arrangements in the Australian federation, the majority 
of revenue is collected by the federal government and distributed between the states, 
since state government own-source revenue is insufficient to cover the cost of state 
government outlays (Harvey & Caton 2010; Haward 1995b; Huggett 1998; Wescott 2009). 
Walker (1992) argues that due to their limited fiscal capacity, states have resorted to 
intensive natural resource development projects to build their income from own-source 
revenue; such decisions have ultimately resulted in environmental degradation, inflation 
and under-pricing of natural resources (cited in Cicin-Sain & Knecht 1998, p. 349). Further 
complicating attempts at implementing ICM is the sense of ownership over 
environmental management felt by state governments due to their constitutional 
authority over the matter. Interference by the Commonwealth has been reported as not 
welcome (Harvey 2016; Haward 1995b; House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Climate Change Water Environment and the Arts 2009; Huggett 1998; Kay & Lester 1997; 
Resource Assessment Commission 1993).  
2.5.1.3 Local government11 
In the Australian federation, local governments are enacted by state government 
legislation, hence their responsibilities with respect to coastal zone management are 
delegated by their respective state governments (Sansom 2009). Despite not being 
recognised in the Australian Constitution, local government is regarded as an integral part 
of the Australian federation due to its significant role in municipal governance and service 
delivery. With respect to coastal management, local government across Australia has 
been delegated many responsibilities, including local development planning, 
development assessment, public land management, stormwater management and 
drainage. Local government is also responsible for the day-to-day maintenance of beach 
access and facilities in their jurisdiction. In many cases, this includes significant coastal 
infrastructure such as jetties and boat ramps. Of all its responsibilities, local government’s 
role in land-use planning and development decision-making in the coastal zone is a critical 
one (Harvey & Caton 2010). Similar to state governments, local governments are in a 
position of limited fiscal capacity, relying on state and federal government grants to cover 
a portion of their expenditure needs (Huggett 1998).  
Based on these roles and responsibilities, the following section examines the Australian 
coastal management literature to understand what is known about the division of power 
and authority in Australia's federal system in the context of coastal management, and 
how scholars have proposed this to impact on the implementation of ICM.  
2.6 ICM in Australia 
The call for a national approach to coastal zone management in Australia, as detailed in 
the findings and recommendations of the Commonwealth inquiries described in the 
Introduction, is echoed in the Australian coastal management literature. With respect to 
                                                     
11 The terms ‘local government’, ‘local government areas’ (or ‘LGAs’) and ‘councils’ will be used 
interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
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research considering the roles and responsibilities of the different levels of government, 
the prevailing discourse in the Australian coastal management literature is a call for 
increased federal government action and leadership (Abel et al. 2011; Clarke & Harvey 
2013; Harvey 2016; Huggett 1998; Norman 2009b; Wescott 2006, 2009, 2012). However, 
within this body of literature, problems regarding inadequate governance arrangements 
related to the Australian federation are often cited, but are rarely the central focus.  
Rather, the coastal governance literature in Australia has been predominantly issue-
specific, rarely exploring the federalist foundations on which the governance 
arrangements for coastal management have been built. For example, literature often 
reflects assessments related to planning, coastal development or climate change 
adaptation, often from the perspective of local government (de Freitas, Smith & Stokes 
2013; Gurran, Blakely & Squires 2007; Gurran, Hamin & Norman 2008; Harvey, Rudd & 
Clarke 2008; Harvey & Stocker 2015; Niven & Bardsley 2013; Norman 2009b; Nursey-
Bray, Harvey & Smith 2016; Nursey-Bray & Shaw 2010; Stocker, Harvey & Metcalf 2016) 
or the role of law (Bell & Baker-Jones 2014; Bonyhady 2010; O'Donnell 2016; Rothwell 
1996; Thom 2004).  
Otherwise, the context of the research is focused around how to manage threats to the 
coastal zone such as impacts from climate change and population pressure, through 
improved integration. Aspects of integration that have been explored include: 
horizontal/sectoral integration (Harvey, Rudd & Clarke 2008; Morcom & Harvey 2002; 
Norman 2009b), science-policy integration (Clarke et al. 2013; Clarke, Tually & Scott 2016; 
Mumford & Harvey 2014; Nursey-Bray & Harvey 2013; Nursey-Bray et al. 2014; Scott & 
Harvey 2016; Smith et al. 2009; Stocker et al. 2010), or vertical integration, including 
community participation (Clarke 2003, 2008; Harvey, Clarke & Carvalho 2001; Wescott 
1998, 2004; Wescott & Fitzsimons 2011).  
It is reasonably well-recognised that the constitutional division of powers and the relative 
financial dominance of the federal government in the Australian federation create 
problems for resource management (Cicin-Sain & Knecht 1998; Coffey & Vodden 2012; 
Harvey & Caton 2010; Haward 1995b; House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Climate Change Water Environment and the Arts 2009; Huggett 1998; Kay & Lester 1997; 
Resource Assessment Commission 1993; Wescott 2009). However, the implications of the 
underlying federal structure of government in Australia for the implementation of ICM 
has rarely been explicitly examined. Since Cicin-Sain and Knecht (1998) assert that 
understanding key aspects of the political system is fundamental to resolving 
impediments to the successful implementation of ICM, the following section presents a 
case advocating further examination in this direction.  
2.6.1 The role of federalism 
Due to the multi-level nature of federal democracies, the dimension of intergovernmental 
integration between different spheres of government is important. In a federation, the 
dimension of governmental integration is important both ‘vertically’, as in between 
different spheres of government, and ‘horizontally’, as in between different agencies 
within a sphere of government. For effective ICM, policy and practice should be 
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integrated between and within governments in the federal system (Haward & 
VanderZwaag 1995). As Olsen (2003a, p. iix) notes: 
Sub-national and community-based management efforts stand the best chances to be effective 
and to be sustained over the long term when they are supported by policies and institutional 
structures at the national level. Meanwhile, national-level initiatives build capacity … across 
spatial and sectoral scales, providing support to local initiatives while addressing coastal 
development and conservation of more wide-ranging national interest.  
Javier (2015, p. 2) contends that ICM initiatives, to be successful, must emphasise 
principles of “voluntariness, flexibility, coordination between institutions and territorial 
levels of management, cooperation between the public sector and non-governmental, 
democratic legitimacy involving public participation”. However, Creary (2003, p. 18) 
recognises that horizontal and vertical integration can be difficult to achieve since they 
often require power-sharing between different parts or levels of government:  
Horizontal integration means that disparate functions (planning, permit letting, budgeting, 
development) must be coordinated. … this requires levels of cooperation, which may be new 
for leaders of narrowly focused sectoral agencies. Similarly, local and regional units of 
government that exercise the power of land use planning and regulation have fought against 
vertical integration programs proposed by states or provinces and nations. 
This can pose problems for the implementation of cooperative governance regimes. For 
this reason, “further efforts should be directed to the field of public policy” because 
problems of implementing ICM are mostly “not in the scientific-technic realm, neither in 
the lack of information for managing, on the contrary, they are in the lack of will, 
leadership, coordination, public participation and so on” (Javier 2015, p. 2). 
In this vein, Kay and Lester (1997, p. 266) frame the status of coastal management in 
Australia as an inherently political activity, acknowledging “the inherent complexities and 
tensions within a still relatively young federal system of government (constituted in 1901) 
where the respective governmental roles and responsibilities are continually being 
interpreted”. Similarly, Harvey and Caton (2010, p. 203) note that “the changing overall 
patterns of Commonwealth and state government relations are especially salient to the 
actual role played by the Commonwealth in coastal management”. More recently, Coffey 
and Vodden (2012, p. 65) assessed “the adequacy of current approaches to coastal 
governance” in two federal systems – Canada and Australia – and argued that “while both 
jurisdictions would benefit from a more collaborative approach, the mechanisms for 
bringing about such an approach would vary and will not come easily in light of 
institutional and historic barriers”.  
In light of this, the next section reviews current understanding of the relationship 
between federalism and ICM in Australia within the peer-reviewed literature.  
2.6.1.1 Integrated coastal management in the Australian federation: Research to date  
With respect to the Australian coastal management literature, Haward (1989, 1995b); 
Haward and VanderZwaag (1995), Glazewski and Haward (2005), Kay and Lester (1997), 
Huggett (1998), Wescott (2006, 2009), and Coffey and Vodden (2012) provide various 
accounts of the role of the federal structure of government in their consideration of the 
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difficulties experienced in implementation of ICM in Australia. Much of this work was 
produced around two decades ago, with few scholars exploring the relationship between 
the Australian federal system and ICM implementation more recently.    
2.6.1.1.1 Intergovernmental integration in Australian ICM     
On the topic of state-federal intergovernmental integration in the context of the 
Australian federation, Haward (1989) examines the establishment of the 1980 Australian 
Offshore Constitutional Settlement (OCS) which had been framed as a milestone in 
cooperative federalism. Prior to the OCS, considerable intergovernmental conflict was 
reported between the state and federal spheres with regard to jurisdiction over and 
management of offshore resources. The agreement was reached between the states and 
the federal government after Whitlam’s Commonwealth government passed legislation, 
The Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973, which declared that the federal government 
had sovereignty and jurisdiction of the coast and marine environment from the low water 
mark. In 1975, the states challenged the Commonwealth legislation in the High Court but 
it was upheld (Haward 1989). In response to this decision, the Commonwealth embarked 
on “a reordering and readjustment of powers and responsibilities” to provide the states 
with authority over the seabed and resources within the territorial sea up to three 
nautical miles Haward (1989, p. 337). According to the Commonwealth, the purpose of 
this was to: 
… ensure that the States will have adequate powers to deal with matters in the territorial sea. 
History, common sense and the sheer practicalities make these matters for State 
administration, rather than central control, in the absence of overriding national or 
international considerations (Offshore Australian (1980) cited in Haward (1989, p. 337).     
The result was the 1980 Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement. However, as 
Haward (1989, p. 337) notes, “the High Court decision left the states with little, if any, 
constitutional bargaining power” and the ensuing debate over the exact nature of the 
intergovernmental agreements to be included in the OCS was an example of coercion 
more than cooperation. This paper provides a glimpse into the nature of state-federal 
relations and the impact of the constitutional division of powers on offshore policy and 
management. 
Similarly, in their paper comparing the implementation of Chapter 17, Agenda 21 in 
Canada and Australia in terms of ocean law and policy, Haward and VanderZwaag (1995) 
focus on offshore issues. The “significance of the federal division of powers and 
responsibilities” with respect to implementing the Chapter 17 obligation of a national 
representative system of marine protected areas (MPAs) is highlighted (Haward & 
VanderZwaag 1995, p. 283). In the offshore arena, state and federal collaboration is a 
pertinent issue, necessitated due to the division of responsibility over the territorial sea 
enshrined in the Australian Constitution and the subsequent OCS. In contrast, with 
respect to land-based coastal zone management, state governments have constitutional 
jurisdiction on the terrestrial side12, with federal government responsibilities largely 
confined to their involvement with international treaties, and influence through funding 
programs. State-federal relations in this regard are considered in a review of 
                                                     
12 With the exception of Commonwealth defence land. 
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developments in institutional design and policy-making for coastal management in 
Australia and New Zealand. In this review, Haward (1995b) again recognises the power of 
the Australian government in relation to the states. Firstly, Haward (1995b, pp. 90-91) 
notes the legislative superiority of the Commonwealth government over the states:  
The Commonwealth government is able to exert considerable influence on, and in particular 
areas exercise constitutional powers to over-ride, state decisions. A number of constitutional 
'heads of power' reinforce the Commonwealth's position. Any state law which was found 
inconsistent with Commonwealth law based on these heads of power would be invalidated 
under another provision of the Australian constitution.  
Secondly, Haward (1995b, p. 92) notes the implications of the fiscal superiority of the 
Commonwealth government for local and state-wide coastal management outcomes; this 
will be discussed further in the next section. Based on these observations, Haward 
(1995b) advocates “recognising the realities in constitutional, political and administrative 
frameworks in shaping institutional arrangements” for implementation of ICM. This is 
investigated further in a comparative case study of cooperative governance in coastal 
management in South Africa and Australia (Glazewski & Haward 2005). According to 
Glazewski and Haward (2005, p. 65), cooperative governance provides “a solution to the 
dilemmas arising from divided jurisdiction and overlapping or competing claims for 
responsibility between different units of government.” The paper focuses on the legal and 
political factors which support cooperative governance and reflects on the respective 
roles of all three spheres of government – local, state and federal. Glazewski and Haward 
(2005, p. 66) note that intergovernmental cooperation within the federation is “not … 
necessarily predicated on a harmonious relationship between government units”. Rather, 
as Keohane (1984) contends, “cooperation requires that the actions of separate 
individuals or organisations … be brought into conformity with one another through a 
process of negotiation” (cited in Glazewski & Haward 2005, p. 66). 
While Glazewski and Haward (2005) assert that the complex jurisdictional framework and 
lack of processes facilitating intergovernmental interaction, and therefore negotiated 
outcomes, is a key factor hindering cooperative governance in ICM, Wescott (2006) 
argues that instead of focussing on institutional arrangements, the focus should be on 
determining “how the federal government can add value to coastal planning and 
management outcomes in practice” (Wescott 2006, p. 31). One way the federal 
government could ‘add value’ would be with respect to increased funding assistance to 
local and state governments, specifically for coastal management initiatives as in the 
previous Coastcare arrangement. This option reflects the significance of the financial 
dominance of the federal government within the Australian federation. The next section 
focuses on what has been written about the centralisation of fiscal capacity within the 
Australian federation, in the context of coastal zone management.  
2.6.1.1.2 Federal financial dominance in Australia 
As touched on earlier, the financial dominance of the federal government over the states 
has been recognized to be an issue with respect to coastal management in Australia 
(Coffey & Vodden 2012; Haward 1995b; Huggett 1998; Kay & Lester 1997; Wescott 2009).  
In their discussion of the political, financial and administrative context of coastal 
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management in Australia, Kay and Lester (1997, p. 268) acknowledged the impact of 
vertical fiscal imbalance (or VFI): 
Vertical fiscal imbalance, linked with the various powers of federal, State, and local 
governments has led to an interesting and varied development of coastal programs in Australia. 
The oft-used maxim in local government circles is ‘the Commonwealth has the money; the 
States the power and Local Government the problems’.  
VFI can be described as an imbalance in revenue-raising and spending responsibilities. In 
Australia, “the Commonwealth Government raises revenues in excess of its spending 
responsibilities, while State governments have insufficient revenue from their own 
sources to finance spending responsibilities” (National Commission of Audit 2014, p. 145). 
Haward (1995b, p. 92) illustrates the significance of the fiscal superiority of the 
Commonwealth government in terms of its unofficial role in coastal management:  
… the Commonwealth raises much more revenue that it needs for its own programs while the 
states suffer considerable imbalance between their own revenue-raising capacities and 
financial responsibilities. This imbalance increases the significance of Commonwealth-State 
financial transfers … many of the problems in the coastal zone such as the effects of pollution 
or environmental degradation are beyond the financial capacities of local or state governments 
to finance. While state and local governments will need Commonwealth financial assistance, 
this assistance should not impose other, less tangible, costs such as those of Commonwealth-
imposed coastal management policies or priorities. 
For this reason, Huggett (1998) advocates federal government leadership. In his review of 
the role of federal governments in coastal zone planning and management in the 
European Union, United States of America, Canada and Australia, Huggett (1998, p. 42) 
draws attention to the issues raised by the RAC 1993 Inquiry; when expenditure 
responsibilities are divorced from the fund raising source as in the Australian case, several 
problems arise: 
 Commonwealth government lacks the necessary information needed to determine state and 
local government expenditure levels and priorities; 
 State and local government are able to avoid much of the responsibility for determining the 
extent to which funds are provided to finance those expenditures; and 
 State government develop coastal zone programmes which local government do not have the 
resources to implement. 
In terms of appropriate financial arrangements to build capacity for ICM, the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provided a set of international 
guidelines based on an analysis of 17 country reports and 16 case studies. The analysis 
intended to identify “measures for better integration in coastal zone management and, 
especially, the integration of economic and environmental considerations” (Cicin-Sain, 
Knecht & Fisk 1995, p. 103). According to the OECD 1991 report: 
A major factor to successful ICM depends on how much a government implementing ICM can 
raise its own funds either independently or with assistance from the national government. 
Fundamentally, this flow of financial resources must be dependable and ongoing (Cicin-Sain, 
Knecht & Fisk 1995, p. 108).  
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This has been a problem to date in Australian coastal management (Harvey & Caton 
2010). Wescott (2006, p. 32) highlights both state and federal governments’ reluctance to 
effectively fund solutions to coastal problems, referring to the example of the National 
Cooperative Approach to ICZM Framework and Implementation Plan: “The ‘National 
Framework’ is severely limited in its potential impact by being compelled to be ‘cost 
neutral’, even in a time of very substantial surpluses in most states and federally”.  
To gain traction in this area, Wescott (2006, pp. 33-34) advocates a role for the federal 
government which involves the establishment of a National Coastal Council comprised of 
an independent and diverse membership, with the purpose of identifying solutions to 
coastal problems and, most importantly, “to significantly assist in funding the … 
implementation of the identified solutions”. As Wescott (2006, p. 34) highlights, “talk is 
cheap; improving coastal planning and management will require energy, vision and 
money”.    
The need for substantial federal funding for coastal management in Australia exists due 
to the reality of vertical fiscal imbalance. According to Wescott (2009), without the 
commitment of financial assistance from the federal government, the integrated 
governance framework cannot be effectively resourced or implemented. The lack of 
federal funding to date has been a barrier to “greatly enhancing the implementation of 
ICM and hence improving coastal planning and management across the nation” (Wescott 
2009, p. 506). The underlying cause of this failure to adequately fund ICM is, according to 
Wescott (2009), a lack of political will on the part of the federal government.   
On review of this literature, it appears that the detailed nature of the problems caused by 
the federal system of government in the context of coastal management in Australia is 
under-researched. Few scholars have picked up the threads discussed above and gone on 
to investigate the impact of Australian federalism on coastal management in practice; in 
particular, in the context of the constitutional division of powers and significant vertical 
fiscal imbalance requiring substantial federal government transfers to local and state 
governments. Thus, the following section outlines the rationale for this project. 
2.7 Study rationale: ICM, fiscal centralisation and intergovernmental 
integration in the Australian federation – A case for exploration   
The final report of the RAC Inquiry emphasised the importance of “facing the reality of 
the federal system” when designing a management program for implementation 
(Resource Assessment Commission 1993, p. 31). Thus, this research proposes to 
investigate the relationship between federalism, coastal governance arrangements and 
integrated coastal management in Australia, in order to understand the challenges to 
intergovernmental integration posed by Australian federalism.  
Since many debates and conflicts in the coastal zone are underpinned by the actual 
process of governance and the issues that exist within and between different institutions 
responsible for coastal management (Olsen, Tobey & Kerr 1997), this research will 
explore the issues using a case study of South Australia. The research questions adopt a 
broad context as an initial starting point for research into this area because, as Crowley 
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(1999, p. 50) notes, “a deliberately broad focus maximises the potential to explain 
endemic problems with Australian environmental policy formation”. 
In order to fully implement the intergovernmental integration aspect of ICM, policy and 
management should be consistent between the federal, state and local governments. 
This requires a shared vision for the coast. However, as the RAC 1993 report noted, 
Different governments, Local, State and Commonwealth, will have different philosophies, 
perspectives, and priorities which will influence the way they choose to approach issues to do 
with the Coastal Zone. That is fact (Resource Assessment Commission 1993, p. 31). 
In light of this, the proposed case study of South Australia will explore the governance 
issues from the perspectives of the coastal managers and decision-makers working ‘on-
the-ground’ at the local, regional (NRM) and state level. Since most literature discussing 
intergovernmental integration in ICM in Australia focuses on the potential role of the 
federal government or state-federal relations, this study aims to understand challenges 
and opportunities faced at the local, regional and state level in their attempts to practice 
ICM within the federal system. The case study will focus on two main aspects: 
implications of the intergovernmental financial arrangements in the Australian 
federation, and the level of intergovernmental integration between the spheres of 
government involved in coastal management.  
2.7.1 Study aim and research questions 
Thus, the broad aim of this study is to develop a theory to explain why intergovernmental 
integration in the context of ICM is so hard to achieve or sustain in Australia. This will be 
achieved by exploring what Cicin-Sain and Knecht (1998) describe to be among the key 
determinants in the success or failure of ICM implementation: the nature of the prevailing 
political system, and the nature and relative strengths of the local, provincial, and central 
levels of government. Issues regarding the coastal governance arrangements, including 
the division of responsibilities for coastal management and the financial capacities of 
each sphere of government, will be explored from the perspectives of those spheres of 
government responsible for coastal management, in order to understand the different 
perspectives and priorities of each sphere and, in doing so, develop a theory grounded in 
empirical data. In order to meet the study objectives, the following research questions 
were devised, to be explored in the context of coastal management in Australia:  
1. What is the nature of local government in South Australia? From the local 
government perspective, what are the governance issues posed by Australian 
federalism? 
2. What is the nature of state government in South Australia? From the state 
government perspective, what are the governance issues posed by Australian 
federalism? 
3. What is the nature of the federal government in Australia? How does this relate to 
the local and state spheres? 
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4. Considering the nature of Australian federalism, given the findings of this study, 
what are the implications for intergovernmental integration and the 
implementation of integrated coastal management in Australia?   
2.8 Chapter summary 
Given the ecological, social and economic importance of coastal zones to human 
civilisation, and that competition for valuable resources in the coastal zone is being 
intensified by increasing population pressure and threat of climate change impacts, 
prudent coastal management is of major importance. According to the best-practice 
approach known as Integrated Coastal Management (ICM), effective integration between 
governing bodies involved in coastal management is paramount. Successful 
implementation of ICM requires an understanding of the political and institutional 
context in which it is required to operate. However, there has been little research looking 
at the implications of Australia’s federal system of government for intergovernmental 
integration in Australian coastal management practice. To address this research gap, this 
study will investigate the nature, functions and relative strengths of the three spheres of 
government in the Australian federation, and will consider the impact these have on 
intergovernmental integration for effective ICM.  
The following chapter will detail the research design intended to meet the broad 
objective of this project; that is, to develop a theory to explain why the 
intergovernmental integration aspect of ICM is so hard to achieve or sustain in Australian 
coastal management practice.   
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 Research design  
3.1 Chapter overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the research design employed to achieve the 
overall aim of this study: to develop a theory as to why intergovernmental integration is 
hard to achieve or sustain in Australian coastal zone management. As outlined in the 
previous chapter, a review of the literature led to the refinement of the study to focus on 
exploring the relationship between coastal governance arrangements, the Australian 
federal system of government and intergovernmental integration. Four research 
questions were devised to explore this relationship; the answers to these research 
questions formed the basis of the theory developed. This chapter provides details of the 
research design, including methodology, methods, and verification strategies. The 
chapter concludes by outlining the limitations of the study and clarifying the scope.    
3.2 Methodology 
The methodology for this study was based on grounded theory and the methods followed 
a case study approach. This design was consistent with the purpose of the study to build 
theory from the analysis of qualitative data obtained in the field (Baxter 2010; Birks & 
Mills 2011; Creswell 2012; Crotty 1998; Leech & Onwuegbuzie 2007; Packer 2011; 
Thomas 2009).  
The study was interested in examining inter-relationships between individuals and the 
coastal governance system they were working within. Thus, the research was designed 
purposefully to enable examination of the personal and subjective experiences, opinions, 
attitudes and perceptions of the people working within the governance system for coastal 
management at the local, regional and state scales. Data collection involved semi-
structured, in-depth interviews, designed specifically to provide critical insights into the 
relationship between individuals and the governance system for coastal management 
with which they were interacting, to advance our understanding of the complex issues at 
hand (Dunn 2010). Ritchie and Spencer (1994, p. 174) state the value of this: 
What qualitative research can offer … is a theory of social action grounded in the experiences – 
the world view – of those likely to be affected by a policy decision or thought to be part of the 
problem.  
3.2.1 Grounded theory 
Grounded theory is an appropriate research methodology to employ when the researcher 
seeks to explore an issue and provide an explanation for the phenomena under study, as 
opposed to testing a pre-determined hypothesis (Leech & Onwuegbuzie 2007). In a 
grounded theory study, theory is derived from data via the researcher’s systematic 
interaction with the data and development of hypotheses and concepts over the course 
of the study (Huberman & Miles 1994). As described by Stanley (2016, p. 374), 
grounded researchers:  
 question gaps in the data, seeking information on what influences and directs the people and 
situation being studied;  
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 follow an open process of research rather than a fixed method;  
 recognise the importance of context and social structure; and  
 undertake an inductive process, where theory grows out of the data. 
Thus, grounded theory is an iterative process with the purpose of building a theory about 
the phenomenon of interest (Corbin & Strauss 2008). The researcher begins by raising 
broad, generative questions to guide the research, which evolve over time and do not 
confine the research. Core theoretical concepts begin to be formed through collection of 
data, and are refined through interaction with the interview data and other sources. Over 
time, the researcher seeks to verify the theoretical concepts within the data and 
summarise them such that a conceptually dense theory emerges (Birks & Mills 2011; 
Corbin & Strauss 2008; Grix 2010).  
To fulfil the aim of this research project, the methodology employed needed to provide 
insights grounded in experience of the issues arising from the coastal governance 
arrangements in South Australia, from the perspectives of people working within the 
system. In this way, the study adopted Charmaz’s constructivist approach to grounded 
theory, which focuses on the importance of meanings that individuals attribute to issues 
by interpreting participants’ thoughts, feelings, values, viewpoints and assertions, as 
opposed to describing acts and gathering facts (Charmaz 2014).  
Similar research within the field of coastal management to utilise the methodology of 
grounded theory include: Stojanovic, Ballinger and Lalwani (2004) in their analysis of the 
processes and mechanisms of ICM initiatives and resulting changes in governance; Jentoft 
(2007) in his analysis of the role of power in fisheries management; Christie et al. (2009) 
in their study demonstrating the importance of local-level governance and institutional 
dynamics in marine ecosystem-based management in the Philippines; Gurran, Norman 
and Hamin (2013) in their examination of local practice in climate change adaptation 
planning in coastal Australia; and Stanley (2016) in her study of climate change 
adaptation in small coastal towns. The following section details the methods employed in 
this study to meet the overall aim of the project. 
3.3 Methods  
Table 3.1 summarises the methods employed to answer each research question. The 
methods are described below. 
It was felt that a case study approach would provide the best insights into the practical 
issues that face the different stakeholder groups whose responsibility it is to manage the 
coast, while nonetheless providing a sound basis for generating new knowledge and 
constructing theory based on empirical evidence (Flyvbjerg 2006). As (Baxter 2010, p. 96) 
states: 
Good theoretical explanations are those that are well rooted in the concrete aspects of the 
case yet sufficiently abstract that others in similar situations can see how they might apply to 




Table 3.1 Aim, objective, research questions and associated methods 
AIM 
To develop a theory explaining why intergovernmental integration is hard to achieve or sustain in 
Australian coastal zone management. 
REFINED OBJECTIVE FOLLOWING LITERATURE REVIEW 
To explore the nature of prevailing political system - federalism - and the nature, functions and relative 
strengths of the local, state and federal spheres of government in the context of coastal management in 
Australia. 
Research Questions Methods Chapter 
1. What is the nature of local government in South Australia? From the 
local government perspective, what are the governance issues posed 
by Australian federalism? 




2. What is the nature of state government in South Australia? From 
the state government perspective, what are the governance issues 
posed by Australian federalism? 




3. What is the nature of the federal government in Australia? How 
does this relate to the local and state spheres? 




4. Considering the nature of Australian federalism, given the findings 
of this study, what are the implications for intergovernmental 
integration and the implementation of integrated coastal 
management in Australia? 
Synthesis 9 
Thus, in this research design, in line with the principles of grounded theory, the case 
studies were undertaken to be ‘theory generating’ rather than ‘theory testing’ (Baxter 
2010, p. 88; Eisenhardt 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007).  
This study employed a variant of multiple case study design, known as spatial cross-case 
comparison, since “multiple case studies provide a broader basis for exploring theoretical 
concepts and explanations of phenomena” (Baxter 2010, p. 90). According to Yin (2009), 
case study selection should provide for literal replication (i.e. similarities between cases) 
and theoretical replication (i.e. differences between cases). The advantage of using 
multiple case studies is that it enables patterns to be more easily discerned, thus 
providing “opportunities to generate or modify concepts and theory so that they explain 
commonalities across cases despite contingencies or context” (Baxter 2010, p. 92). Hence, 
the purpose of this design was to draw out concepts grounded in all of the cases studied, 
independent of place and local governance context, in order to advance academic 
understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. 
3.3.1.1 Setting and participants 
This research project was undertaken in the state of South Australia between August 
2009 and December 2016. In order to obtain a diverse array of opinions about the 
influence of the current governance arrangements for coastal management in South 
Australia, a range of different perspectives were sought. The individuals approached to 
take part in this study were chosen due to their position at each scale of coastal 
governance and management within South Australia: local, regional (NRM) and state. 
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Participants included those administering or overseeing coastal management initiatives 
and policy at a range of management levels within the SA government Department for 
Environment13, NRM Board staff (ranging from managers to on-ground staff)14, as well as 
co-ordinators, decision-makers and elected representatives at the local government level. 
3.3.1.2 Case study sites 
This project utilises a comparative case study approach to observe the coastal governance 
system in South Australia in three coastal NRM regions: Eyre Peninsula (EP) in the far 
west of the state, South East (SE) in the far east, and the Adelaide and Mount Lofty 
Ranges (AMLR) NRM Board covering the metropolitan area and peri-urban areas north 
and south of Adelaide. Within each coastal NRM region, people from three coastal local 
government areas were interviewed. Table 3.2 shows the LGAs selected within each NRM 
region. The three case study regions and the local government areas examined within 
each are described in more detail in Chapter Five.  
Table 3.2 NRM regions and related LGAs 
NR Eyre Peninsula NR South East NR Adelaide & Mt Lofty Ranges 
District Council of Tumby Bay District Council of Kingston City of Port Adelaide Enfield 
City of Port Lincoln District Council of Robe City of Onkaparinga 
District Council of Lower 
Peninsula 
District Council of Wattle Range City of Victor Harbor 
The case study regions were selected on the basis that they have significant sized 
coastlines within their administrative boundaries. Further to this, the three regions are at 
a range of distances from the state’s capital, Adelaide, to represent the diversity of issues 
that may be experienced across the state. The three corresponding local government 
areas chosen to represent each NRM region were selected on the basis of the following 
factors: the importance of their coastline to the community, region or state; experience 
of threats such as substantial population or tourism pressure; presence of or potential for 
significant coastal hazards; and the willingness of invited participants to take part in the 
study. Several of the LGAs are representative of sea change communities, as shown in 
                                                     
13 The governance arrangements for coastal management in the South Australia have been in flux in recent 
history, with the agency primarily responsible for coastal management undergoing several amalgamations 
with other SA government departments since the inception of this project. The ‘Department for 
Environment and Heritage’ (DEH) was restructured to incorporate the Natural Resources section of the 
‘Department for Water, Land and Biodiversity Conservation’ (DWLBC) in 2009/10 to become the 
‘Department for Environment and Natural Resources’ (DENR) and the ‘Department for Water’. A few years 
later, these two agencies merged to become the current ‘Department for Environment, Water and Natural 
Resources’ (DEWNR). Due to these frequent name changes over the course of the project, this institution 
will herein be referred to as the ‘Department for Environment’, or ‘DE’ unless the particular iteration of the 
department is important to the discussion. 
14 One NRM Group member was interviewed in the South East; all other NRM representatives were NRM 
Board staff working for the SA government at the regional scale. 
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Table 3.3 which identifies five categories of coastal communities existing outside of 
capital cities.  
Table 3.3 Typology of sea change communities 
Adapted from Berwick (2007); Gurran, Squires and Blakely (2005). 
Typology Description 
Coastal commuters 
Suburbanised satellite communities in peri-metropolitan locations within easy daily 
commuting of a capital city (e.g. Onkaparinga, SA). 
Coastal getaways 
Small to medium coastal towns within approximately a three-hour drive of a capital 
city for day tripping and easy weekend access to a holiday home (e.g. Victor Harbor, 
SA). 
Coastal cities 
Substantial and predominantly continuous regional urban conurbations beyond the 
state capitals (e.g. Gold Coast, QLD).   
Coastal lifestyle 
destinations 
Predominantly tourism and leisure communities generally more than three hours’ 
drive from capital cities (e.g. Byron Bay, NSW). 
Coastal hamlets 
Small and remote coastal communities which may often be adjacent to protected 
natural areas (e.g. Limestone Coast including Robe, SA). 
Time and resource constraints precluded the inclusion of interviews with other agencies 
at the state government level with a role in coastal management (such as Planning, 
Transport, Primary Industries, EPA and Fisheries, for example) as well as the missing 
spheres of governance (international, federal government, community groups, economic 
associations and other related NGOs). However, the advantages of this research design 
are that it did enable a less complex and more focused comparative study of coastal 
management at the state, regional and local government levels within SA, and further 
interviews could be conducted in the future with representatives from these groups to 
strengthen or test the theory generated from this study. 
3.3.2 Interviews 
Thirty three semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted across the three NRM 
regions and spheres of government between August 2011 and March 2013. Interviews 
were chosen to gain more detailed information about the coastal management process at 
the various levels of government involved. Interviews were undertaken since “interviews 
are an excellent method of gaining access to information about events, opinions, and 
experiences” and, key to the comparative case study element of the research design, 
allow the researcher “to understand how meanings differ among people” (Dunn 2010, p. 
102). Finally, and central to the grounded theory elements of the research design, 
interviews were chosen for their strength in enabling the researcher to “discover what is 
relevant to the informant” (Dunn 2010, p. 103). However, it is recognised that this 
technique affects both the data gathering and the interpretation of results since, as 
Fontana and Frey (2000, p. 662) note:  
Interviews are not neutral tools of data gathering but active interactions between two (or 
more) people leading to negotiated, contextually-based results.  
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The interview schedule used is provided in the appendices (Appendix 3.2), along with the 
research ethics documents (Appendices 3.3-3.5)15. It is noted that within the interview 
schedule and resultant discussions, the use of the terms ‘state government’, ‘local 
government’ and ‘federal government’ is ambiguous and open to interpretation. For 
example, when talking about ‘state government’ it could be interpreted to mean the 
politicians elected to represent the entity; the bureaucracy administering the entity; a 
particular individual deemed important or powerful within the entity; or, the entity as a 
whole. In saying this, care was taken in interpreting the various statements of each 
participant regarding any sphere of government, using the context of the interview 
discussions to discern meaning for each case.     
Of particular importance to the theory-building aspect of this study, interviews were 
conducted in a semi-structured manner in that an interview schedule was used but 
flexibility in the order and manner of questioning was maintained (Dunn 2010). Further to 
this, the interview questions were designed to be broad and open-ended such that 
participants could discuss what was most important to them with regard to the general 
topic.  
The interview schedule also served several other purposes. Firstly, it enabled 
transparency, giving the respondents a clear idea of the issues to be discussed. This was 
especially important given the timing of the study coinciding with the reorganisation of 
the SA government ‘Department for Environment’, and given that some of the topics 
could be perceived to be political and controversial. Secondly, having a clear ‘run-sheet’ 
beginning with simple questions helped to break the ice and allowed the interviewee to 
feel more comfortable and ease into the discussion. This was also important given the 
above point as well as the limited amount of time to establish a relationship with each 
respondent. Thirdly, an interview schedule gave the interview a framework for in-depth 
discussion keeping relevant to the topic. Further, breaking the interview up into general 
sections aided in the analysis of responses, whilst still enabling freedom to discuss issues 
as the conversation progressed. Finally, in most cases many of the topics discussed in the 
latter sections of the interview had already been explored in the introductory section on 
roles and responsibilities. This gave the opportunity for the respondent to elaborate 
further on issues they felt strongly about or gave the researcher the opportunity to press 
further for more detailed information about issues they felt might exist, once the 
respondent had ‘warmed up’ (Dunn 2010).  
Interviews with the majority of the state government ‘Department for Environment’ 
employees were carried out first, followed by interviews with local government elected 
                                                     
15 The interview schedule included questions about horizontal integration with respect to integration 
between different departments within spheres of government. In line with the methodological approach of 
grounded theory, as the interviews progressed it became apparent that vertical integration, specifically 
intergovernmental integration, was going to be the focus of this study and less emphasis was placed on 
aspects of horizontal integration in the interviews. Accordingly issues raised regarding horizontal 
integration will not be presented in this thesis, unless in relation to discussion around vertical or 




members, local government staff and NRM Board staff in each NRM region: first, the Eyre 
Peninsula region, followed by the South East and finally metropolitan Adelaide and the 
Fleurieu Peninsula. All except two interviews were conducted face-to-face. Logistical 
constraints led to one telephone interview, although this participant had already been 
met face-to-face and a rapport built through this interaction. One other respondent was 
unable to meet in person and elected to answer the questions in writing, via email. 
3.3.2.1 Development of interview schedules 
The interview questions were formulated through the processes of literature review, 
informal conversations with established researchers and employees of the SA 
government ‘Department for Environment’, and observations made at the national 
coastal conference in 2010.  
All questions were open-ended and expressed in a neutral way, designed purposefully to 
engage the participant in a non-confronting manner (Dunn 2010) about various aspects of 
coastal governance on the following broad matters: 
1. Roles and responsibilities of local government, NRM Boards and SA government. 
2. Nature of relationships and level of integration between spheres of government. 
3. Impact of financial arrangements for funding of coastal management. 
The use of open-ended questions was fundamental to the purpose of this study, as it 
permitted participants to describe and explain their points of view, encouraging genuine 
responses which could then be analysed to provide a greater insight into the issues 
experienced by each stakeholder group. Furthermore, open-ended questions enable 
answers that may not have been expected by the researcher and hence encourage 
exploration of new knowledge arising from the interview conversation (Dunn 2010; 
Patton 1990) – important elements enabling theory-building from interview data. 
3.3.2.1.1 Pilot testing the interview schedule 
The interview schedule developed for this study was pre-tested by asking four individuals 
with knowledge and experience of coastal management and qualitative research methods 
to check the wording and clarity of the schedules. Subsequently, two pilot interviews 
were conducted: one with an academic with coastal management expertise and the other 
an ex-coastal practitioner. Ambiguities in the questionnaire were identified and questions 
were re-worded and refined accordingly (Dunn 2010). 
3.3.2.2 Identification of interviewees 
Participants were recruited using theoretical sampling and snowballing techniques (Dunn 
2010). During the SA government interviews, which were conducted first, participants 
were asked to recommend five other individuals who would be good to talk to. Many of 
the suggested individuals were followed up and took part in the study. Other 
interviewees were targeted after the selection of the case study sites, based on their 
involvement with the organisations of interest. For all NRM regions, those working 
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directly on coastal management were targeted where possible, and where these roles did 
not exist, the Regional Manager in charge of coastal management for the NRM region was 
pursued. Participants from each stakeholder group are summarised in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 Table of interviewees by region and sphere of government  
Table showing case study participant groups by case study region and sphere of government, where ‘I #’ 
refers to the interviewee anonymity code. 
SA Government: 
(Dept. Environment/ 
Coast Protection Board) 
I 1, I 2, I 3, I 4, I 5, I 7, I 8, I 17, I 18 
Local government  
(state-wide) 




South East  
(SE) 




I 9, I 11, I 13, I 14, 
I 15, I 16 
I 20, I 21,  
I 23  
I 24, I 26, I 27, I 28,  




I 10, I 12 
 
I 19, I 22 
 
I 30, I 31 
The majority of individuals interviewed were working ‘on-the-ground’ in coastal 
management or were managers with direct oversight of on-ground staff, with good 
insight into the processes and practical aspects of coastal management that could 
comment on the strengths and weaknesses of the governance system from their personal 
experience of working within it. For another perspective, and in an attempt to understand 
how the coast is prioritised by decision-makers, the opinions were sought from local 
government elected members and SA government high-level managers responsible for 
decision-making affecting coastal management ‘on-the-ground’ in South Australia.  
3.3.2.3 Making contact 
All interviewees were formally invited to participate in a face-to-face interview via email. 
Some invitees did not respond to their email. Where this occurred, alternative 
participants were identified and contacted in the same way. This technique was 
successful in obtaining interviews with representatives of all stakeholder groups except 
the AMLR NRM region. After emailing attempts failed to obtain an interview with the 
targeted AMLR practitioner, an NRM coastal community event run by the organisation 
was attended to make contact with alternative practitioners face-to-face. This was 
successful in obtaining two interviews with AMLR staff.  
The interview time, date and location were set up via email communication prior to the 
interview taking place. All information, including questions and research ethics 
documents, were sent via email well in advance of the interview (see Appendices 3.1-3.4). 
This gave respondents the opportunity to consider knowingly if they wanted to be 




3.3.2.4 The interview  
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with all but two participants. One participant 
elected to respond to the questions in writing, while the other was interviewed over the 
phone. All interviewees were asked permission to record the interview for later 
transcription and analysis, and all accepted bar one. For this interview, handwritten notes 
were taken. For the telephone interview, the interviewee was on speakerphone and the 
interview recorded via digital voice recorder and transcribed as usual. The interview 
schedule contained roughly 20 questions which took between 30 minutes and 90 minutes 
to answer, depending on the participant’s availability and willingness to converse. Every 
interview was concluded by giving the interviewee an opportunity to discuss anything 
else they felt important to the research.  
3.3.3 Data analysis and presentation 
Interviews from digital recordings were transcribed into MS Word by professional 
transcription companies. In order to ensure that each interview had been transcribed 
accurately, and to begin the process of analysis, each interview transcript was reviewed 
by the researcher listening to each recording and correcting each transcript manually to 
guarantee the discussion had been captured precisely. Once the transcripts were deemed 
accurate by the researcher, they were formally analysed using Glaser and Strauss (1967)’s 
method of constant comparative analysis (Leech & Onwuegbuzie 2007). Constant 
comparative analysis (CCA) is “the method of choice when the researcher wants to 
answer general, or overarching, questions of the data” (Leech & Onwuegbuzie 2007, p. 
576).   
3.3.3.1 Constant comparative analysis of interview transcripts 
There exist many different approaches to qualitative data analysis (Bazeley 2007, 2009; 
Cope 2010; Dunn 2010; Thomas 2009). CCA, also known as coding, is the most common 
type of qualitative data analysis, useful for “utilizing an entire dataset to identify 
underlying themes” to inductively develop theory (Leech & Onwuegbuzie 2007, p. 565).  
Broadly, coding is defined as “a process of identifying and organizing themes in 
qualitative data” (Cope 2010, p. 281). The purpose of coding is data reduction in order to 
extract themes, organisation in order to aid data handling and analysis, and perhaps most 
importantly, coding is part of the data analysis (Cope 2010).  
In this study, coding was used as an exploratory exercise in order to generate theory 
grounded in empirical data. As Dunn (2010, p. 125) explains, “researchers analyse 
interview data to seek meaning from the data. We construct themes, relations between 
variables, and patterns through the data”. Coding involved the following three steps:  
1. Open coding – this involved a first pass through the data to reduce the wealth of 
material into organisable categories. The interview schedule provided the 
overarching themes to begin the coding process, as did basic descriptive codes 
such as geographical and demographic conditions. During this phase, ideas in the 
form of memos were also noted while concepts were being developed.  
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2. Axial Coding – this involved a second pass through the data to build on the 
formative codes, as well as a critical review of the aforementioned categories and 
codes, and further development of key concepts. Categories were refined.  
3. Selective coding – this is the final pass through the data where the main purpose 
was to search for examples where themes are clearly illustrated or contrasted, in 
order to develop a coherent theory (Bazeley 2009; Cope 2010; Corbin & Strauss 
2008; Dunn 2010). 
3.3.3.1.1 NVIVO 10 
Coding of interview data was conducted using a computer-based qualitative data analysis 
software (CQDAS) program, NVIVO 10. One of the main advantages of using a computer 
program such as NVIVO to carry out analysis of such a large and complex qualitative data 
set, is the ease with which the researcher can sort, refine and retrieve data (Wong 2008). 
This program was selected in preference to other similar applications (for example ATLAS) 
as it was available for use at the University, with training courses on the program 
provided to staff and students.  
Following coding, NVIVO 10 was used to compare codes across stakeholder groups and to 
develop over-arching themes. In this way, the software enabled exploration of the 
complex and large data set to build theory (Bazeley 2007, 2009; Bringer, Johnston & 
Brackenridge 2006; Liamputtong 2009; Mills 2010; Salkind 2010; Welsh 2002; Wong 
2008). 
3.3.3.2 Presentation 
Primary data are presented in the form of textual quotations derived from transcribed 
interviews and are used to illustrate the themes and concepts being discussed. 
Interviewees remain anonymous but their sphere of government (SA government: SG; 
NRM Board staff: NRM; local government: LG) and case study region (Eyre Peninsula: EP; 
South East: SE; Adelaide and Mount Lofty Ranges: AMLR) are displayed with each quote. 
Quotes are presented in the thesis text to demonstrate points, problems and perceptions 
of interviewees.  
3.3.4 Document analysis 
Document analysis is a source of empirical data often used to complement interview 
methods in case study research (Bowen 2009). As Merriam (1988, p.118) note, 
“documents of all types can help the researcher to uncover meaning, develop 
understanding, and discover insights relevant to the research problem” (Bowen 2009, p. 
29). The advantage of document analysis is that it provides contextual data and historical 
insight beyond what can be obtained via the interview process (Bowen 2009; Yin 2009). 
Another advantage is that, unlike interviews which involve interaction with the researcher 
and subject, documents offer an ‘unobtrusive’ and ‘non-reactive’ point of view (Bowen 
2009, p. 31).  
The process of document analysis in this study involved a first-pass content analysis to 
gather meaningful and relevant information to provide context to, and enhance 
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understanding of, the case studies to support theory building (Bowen 2009; Corbin & 
Strauss 2008). Information from organisational and institutional documents have been 
used in this study to supplement and scaffold interview data. Such documents have 
included previous studies, background papers, organisational and institutional reports 
and survey data.    
3.4 Verification of research 
The validity of qualitative research is often questioned (Creswell & Miller 2000; Lincoln & 
Guba 1986). This section aims to acknowledge the researcher’s inevitable influence on 
the entire research process, from the understanding of the research problem, framing of 
the research questions, data collection and analysis, through to the interpretation of 
results. As Takacs (2003, p. 31) discerns: 
Knowledge does not arrive unmediated from the world; rather, knowledge gets constructed by 
interaction between the questioner and the world.  
There are several steps that can be taken by the researcher to counter what may be 
argued as a short-coming or criticism of qualitative research, thereby enhancing the 
validity (also known as authenticity, trustworthiness, rigour or credibility) of qualitative 
research (Creswell & Miller 2000; Leech & Onwuegbuzie 2007; Lincoln & Guba 1986). 
According to Creswell and Miller (2000), the choice of validity procedures employed in a 
qualitative inquiry depend on two factors: the lens the researcher brings to the study and 
the paradigm assumptions, or worldviews, of the researcher. Table 3.5 exhibits a matrix 
of validity procedures based on the researcher lens and paradigm assumptions, as 
developed by Creswell and Miller (2000), and summarises the types of strategies that can 
be undertaken to verify research findings. 
The various steps undertaken in this research study align with all three paradigm 
assumptions and most significantly with the lenses of the researcher and people external 
to the study. The latter likely reflects my positivist educational background. Steps taken 
include the triangulation of interview data with other data collected via literature review 
and document analysis (see below); an audit trail via documentation of interview 
transcripts, coding and concept and theory development using notebooks and the CQDAS 
program NVIVO 10; the search for disconfirming evidence during both interview and 
document analyses; thick description of the stakeholder group perspectives through the 
use of direct  quotations throughout the thesis; peer debriefing via research meetings 
with colleagues and presentation of results at state and national conferences; and 
researcher reflexivity.  
With respect to the latter, the validity of the qualitative research undertaken is enhanced 
if the position of the researcher is made explicit (Creswell & Miller 2000). To this end, 
whilst I have a brother working for the SA government ‘Department of Environment’, and 
several close friends working for the state government and the federal government, I 
consider myself to be an ‘outsider’ or a non-member of the groups (i.e. spheres of 




Table 3.5 Validity procedures based on researcher lens and paradigm assumptions 
Adapted from Creswell and Miller (2000, p. 126).     
Paradigm  
Lens  
Post positivist or 
systematic paradigm 
Constructivist paradigm Critical paradigm 
Researcher Triangulation 
Use of multiple and 




Search for disconfirming 
or negative evidence to 
contradict developed 




beliefs and biases that 




Presenting data and 
interpretations to study 
participants for 
confirmation of data and 
interpretation accuracy  
Prolonged engagement in 
the field 
Enables comparison of 
interview data with 
observational data 
Collaboration 
Inclusion of study 
participants as co-
researchers or active 
participants enables 
representation of 







The audit trail 
Established by researcher 
via journal, memo, 
research logs, records of 
data collection chronology 
and data analysis 
procedures  
Thick, rich description 
Detailed description of the 
research setting, 
participants, themes to 
convey the feeling of 
experience to the reader 
Peer debriefing 
Peer review of data and 
research process  to 
challenge assumptions and 
interpretations, providing 
critical reflection of 
research and findings 
The main strategy employed in this study was triangulation, a technique employed by 
social science researchers to overcome the potential for findings to be an artefact of a 
single method, source or investigator bias (Bowen 2009; Lincoln & Guba 1985; Patton 
1990). To this end, the use of multiple methods, theories and sources of data to analyse a 
research problem is a widely accepted practice (Blaikie 1991).  
This thesis uses the following forms of triangulation: (1) Data source triangulation – Data 
was gathered from different sources, times, locations and groups, including interviews, 
policy documents, government reports, websites, legal acts and media sources; 
temporally ranging over one hundred years; with multiple groups at a range of 
governance and geographical scales. (2) Method triangulation – A range of different 
research methods were used including semi-structured interviews, literature review and 
document analysis. (3) Theoretical triangulation – A range of theoretical perspectives 
were employed to construct theory, including concepts from geography, political science, 
public policy and environmental management (Bowen 2009; Flick 1992; Leech & 
Onwuegbuzie 2007). 
3.5 Scope and limitations of research  
As in all research, the scope of the study and the knowledge that was able to be produced 
were limited by a number of factors. As discussed above, given the nature of qualitative 
inquiry it is recognised that the approach to the research imposes several limitations on 
its findings. Secondly, as a project undertaken to fulfil the requirements of a PhD, 
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constraints of budget and time limited the scale of the research. The following section 
serves to delineate what was and was not included in the scope of this research and the 
reasons for the final focus.  
Firstly, it important to clarify that this research did not set out to critique the concept of 
ICM as a model of coastal planning and management, nor to specifically evaluate through 
the use of indicators whether ICM has been successfully implemented in South Australia. 
Accordingly, the assumptions, based on the argument presented in the literature review 
in the previous chapter, are 1) ICM is the current best-practice model for the planning 
and management of coastal areas and resource use, and 2) intergovernmental 
integration, as prescribed by the ICM model, has not been successfully implemented in 
Australia to date.  
Based on these fundamental assumptions, this study seeks to explain why the latter is the 
case. To meet this aim, the research design outlined in this chapter enables exploration of 
the relationship between coastal governance arrangements, federalism and 
intergovernmental integration but is limited to the perspectives of local, regional and 
state spheres of government in South Australia. However, within the paradigm of ICM 
and the prescription for ‘vertical integration’ as described by Vallega (2013), this is a 
relatively narrow exploration of decision-making affecting the management of the coastal 
zone. Thus, this research design clearly limits the consideration of both the international, 
federal government, community and other NGO perspectives.  
Interviews with the community sphere were not sought due to the study’s focus on 
‘intergovernmental integration’ rather than community participation, since there is little 
work focussing on intergovernmental relations and considerable work with respect to 
community participation in coastal management to date – for example, Clarke (2003, 
2008); Harvey, Clarke and Carvalho (2001); Wescott (1998). 
Interviews with the federal sphere of government were not sought due to budget 
constraints preventing face-to-face liaison with federal government decision-makers 
based in Canberra. This was also considered acceptable by the researcher due to the 
desire to ground the research in the governance issues being experienced by those 
spheres of government constitutionally, legally and operationally responsible for the 
majority of landward coastal planning and management, i.e. at the local, regional and 
state scales.    
Similarly, within the paradigm of ICM and the prescription for ‘horizontal integration’, 
consideration of integration across sectors and the land-coast-ocean continuum is 
important. The research design employed in this study focuses on issues affecting state 
government coastal zone jurisdiction, thus marine issues of federal government 
jurisdiction are not directly considered. The researcher acknowledges the existence of 
significant intergovernmental integration issues occurring across the land-coast-ocean 
continuum, and these have been covered previously by Foster and Haward (2003); 




Finally, this study elected to focus on the coastal governance system in one state, South 
Australia, in an attempt to reduce the level of complexity involved in investigating 
governance barriers to integration resulting from the diverse array of legislation, agencies 
and instruments which complicate comparisons between states. The transferability of the 
findings from this case study of South Australia to the rest of Australia is supported 
through analyses of inter-disciplinary literature and other documentation presented 
throughout the thesis. It is the role of future research to test or corroborate the theory 
developed in this thesis.  
Naturalistic inquiry facilitates theory development (through the discovery of grounded theory) 
and provides the "thick description" in terms of which other researchers can further test 
hypotheses or determine the limits of transferability (Lincoln & Guba 1985, p. 32). 
Given this scope and the related assumptions, this study seeks to build on what is known 
about the implementation of ICM in Australia by improving our understanding of factors 
related to coastal governance arrangements and federalism which might impede the level 
of intergovernmental integration, assumed necessary for successful implementation of 
the integrated coastal management model. Thus, this research aims to provide an 
explanation for the previously-reported observed phenomena of poor ICM 
implementation in Australia.  
3.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter has detailed the research design chosen to meet the aim of the study, which 
is to develop a theory as to why intergovernmental integration is so hard to achieve or 
sustain in Australian coastal zone management. The study has embraced a qualitative 
research approach, employing the methodology of grounded theory and the comparative 
case study method to generate theory grounded in empirical data. Semi-structured, face-
to-face interviews were selected to comprise the main data collection technique, with 
interview transcripts coded and analysed using the CQDAS program NVIVO 10. 
Triangulation of these findings via document analysis enhanced the validity of the 
research, and the resultant theory was verified using a range of validation strategies.  
The following two chapters provide the background to the case study: Chapter Four 
describes the coastal governance arrangements in South Australia, outlining the key 
legislation, policies and institutions involved, while Chapter Five describes the three case 
study regions and their coastal management needs, in order to provide context for the 
discussion of the results in the ensuing chapters.  
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 Coastal governance arrangements in South Australia 
4.1 Chapter overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background information necessary to 
understand and contextualise the case study results presented in the subsequent 
chapters. The chapter will provide an overview of the main legislative and institutional 
arrangements for governance of the coast within the state of South Australia. The chapter 
will also provide a brief synopsis covering the strengths and weaknesses of coastal 
governance arrangements in South Australia, and the status of ICM in this regard.   
4.2 Coastal governance arrangements in SA 
As outlined in Chapter Two, state governments have authority over the majority of 
management responsibilities in the coastal zone, including environmental management 
and land-use planning and development. Each state can determine how to meet these 
responsibilities and, consequently, coastal governance arrangements have evolved to 
vary considerably from state-to-state in Australia (Lazarow 2010). The following sections 
provide a brief overview of the governance arrangements for coastal management within 
South Australia, as background information for the case study undertaken. 
In South Australia, there are several pieces of state government legislation which relate 
either directly to coastal management, or influence the way the coastal zone is governed. 
Multiple SA government agencies, as well as local governments across the state, are 
responsible for administering this SA government legislation. This type of institutional 
complexity has been criticised for creating fragmented coastal governance arrangements 
(Harvey & Caton 2010; House of Representatives Standing Committee on Climate Change 
Water Environment and the Arts 2009; Kenchington & Crawford 1993; Resource 
Assessment Commission 1993).  
In South Australia, responsibilities for environmental protection and conservation and 
natural resource management are currently separated from planning and development, 
and integration between these aspects has waxed and waned over the years. At present, 
these aspects of coastal management are governed through the legislation of the Coast 
Protection Act 1972, and the more recent Development Act 1993 and Natural Resources 
Management Act 2004.  
In terms of agency responsibilities, the role of protection, conservation and management 
of the coast is primarily the responsibility of the South Australian government’s 
Department of Environment, Water and Natural Resources (DEWNR)16. Coastal 
development, in contrast, is governed separately through the SA government agency 
responsible for development policy and planning, currently known as the Department of 
Planning, Transport and Infrastructure (DPTI). Responsibilities for local planning and non-
                                                     




major development decisions has been delegated to local governments, which must 
adhere to the SA government planning regulations and be approved by the SA 
government Minister for Planning. The key features of these arrangements will be 
described in this chapter. Other relevant legislation, agencies and policy instruments will 
be listed in Table 4.1. 
4.2.1 Coast Protection Act 1972 
The Coast Protection Act 1972 is “an Act to make provision for the conservation and 
protection of the beaches and coast of this State” (Government of South Australia 2015). 
The Responsible Minister is the Minister for Sustainability, Environment and 
Conservation. The Queensland Beach Protection Act 1968 and the South Australian Coast 
Protection Act 1972 were the first pieces of legislation related to coastal protection in 
Australia (Harvey & Caton 2010). The South Australian Coast Protection Act 1972 was 
established in response to a series of severe storms in the 1960s along the Adelaide 
coastline. Subsequently, it is reactionary in its approach with a focus on protection using 
engineering solutions, rather than sustainable coastal management espoused by ICM 
(Harvey & Caton 2010, p. 196; Harvey et al. 2012, p. 82). Despite the Coast Protection Act 
1972 being under review for decades (Harvey et al. 2012), the legislation remains 
unchanged.  
4.2.1.1 Definition of the coast in South Australia 
The Coast Protection Act 1972 defines the coast as:  
All land that is—  
(a) within the mean high water mark and the mean low water mark on the seashore at spring 
tides; or  
(b) above and within one hundred metres of that mean high water mark; or  
(c) below and within three nautical miles of that mean low water mark; or  
(d) within any estuary, inlet, river, creek, bay or lake and subject to the ebb and flow of the 
tide; or  
(e) declared by regulation to constitute part of the coast for the purposes of this Act 
(Government of South Australia 2015). 
4.2.1.2 Coast Protection Districts 
The Coast Protection Act provides for creation of six Coast Protection Districts: Eyre, 
Fleurieu, Kangaroo Island, Metropolitan, South East and Yorke. Each district has its own 
management plan covering its environmental parameters, coastal geomorphology, 





Table 4.1 South Australian legislation, regulations, agencies and policy instruments related to 
coastal management 
List of South Australian legislation, regulations, agencies and policy instruments relevant to state-wide 
coastal management at the time of writing (2016).  
Legislation and 
Regulations (by year) 
Coast Protection Act 1972  
National Parks and Wildlife Act 1972  
Historic Shipwrecks Act 1989 
Wilderness Protection Act 1992 
Aboriginal Heritage Act 1993 
Harbours and Navigation Act 1993 
Heritage Act 1993 
Development Act 1993 
Environment Protection Act 1993 
Water Resources Act 1997 
Local Government Act 1999  
Aquaculture Act 2001 
River Murray Act 2003 
Natural Resources Management Act 2004 
Adelaide Dolphin Sanctuary Act 2005 
Fisheries Management Act 2007 
Marine Parks Act 2007 
Development Regulations 2008 
Crown Land Management Act 2009 
Crown Land Management Regulations 2010 




Coast Protection Board (CPB) 
Department of Environment, Water and Natural Resources (DEWNR) 
Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure (DPTI) 
Department of Primary Industries and Regions (PIRSA) 
Environmental Protection Authority (EPA)  
Environment, Resources and Development Court (ERDC)  
Regional NRM Boards (7 out of 8 regions have coastline) 
Local government areas with coastline (33 out of 64 have coastline) 
 
Policies, Plans, 
Strategies (by year) 
CPB Policy on Coast Protection and New Coastal Development 1991  
Living Coast Strategy for South Australia 2004-2009 
Coast Protection Board Strategic Plan 2009-2014 
CPB Policy Document – Revised 2012 
State Natural Resources Management Plan South Australia 2012-2017 
Coastal Planning Information Package 2013 
 
4.2.1.3 Coast Protection Board 
Unique to South Australia, the Act provides the basis for a statutory lead agency to be 
known as the Coast Protection Board (CPB), which is subject to the control and direction 
of the Minister (Government of South Australia 2015).  
The Board—  
(a) shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal; and  
(b) shall be capable of acquiring, holding, selling and otherwise disposing of real and personal 
property; and  
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(c) shall be capable of acquiring or incurring any other legal rights and liabilities, and of suing 
and being sued; and  
(d) shall hold its property on behalf of the Crown (Government of South Australia 2015).  
The CPB is responsible for managing the state’s coastline and administering the Coast 
Protection Act 1972. The membership of the Board and its duties, as defined by the Act, 
are shown in Table 4.2. The South Australian government’s Department of Environment 
provides administrative support to the Coast Protection Board.   
Over its history, the CPB has played “a leading role in providing policy advice to the 
Minister for Environment, and financial, technical and policy advice to councils and other 
agencies involved in a wide range of coastal management related activities” (Coastal 
Management Review Committee 1988, p. 1). The CPB is also responsible for developing 
planning policy for the coast in South Australia, and acts as a referral authority on key 
development proposals on the coast (Coastal Climate Change Advisory Committee 2010, 
p. 118). 
Table 4.2 Coast Protection Board membership and duties 
Source: Coast Protection Board (1991, p. 2). 
Membership Duties 
The Director of Planning (or 
nominee) 
The Director of Marine & 
Harbours (or nominee) 
The Director of Tourism (or 
nominee) 
A representative of Local 
Government  
A person with expertise in 
biological processes affecting 
the coast  
A person with expertise in 
physical processes affecting 
the coast 
(a) to protect the coast from erosion, damage, deterioration, 
pollution and misuse;   
(b) to restore any part of the coast which has been subjected to 
erosion, damage, deterioration, pollution or misuse;   
(c) to develop any part of the coast for the purpose of aesthetic 
improvement, or for the purpose of rendering that part of the 
coast more appropriate for the use or enjoyment of those who 
may resort thereto;   
(d) to manage, maintain and, where appropriate, develop and 
improve coast facilities that are vested in, or are under the care, 
control and management of, the Board;   
(e) to report to the Minister upon any matters that the Minister 
may refer to the Board for advice;   
(f) to carry out research, to cause research to be carried out, or to 
contribute towards research, into matters relating to the 
protection, restoration or development of the coast. 
4.2.1.3.1 CPB policies and strategic plans 
The following two Coast Protection Board policies guide management of the South 
Australian coast:  
(1) Policy on Coast Protection and New Coastal Development endorsed in 1991, 
covering coastal development including hazard standards, sea-level rise and 
protection funding (Coast Protection Board 1991). 
(2) Coast Protection Board Policy Document endorsed in 2002 and revised in 2012, 
dealing with the following policy areas: 1. Development, 2. Hazards, 3. Protection 
Works, 4. Conservation, 5. Heritage, 6. Access and Amenity, 7. Partnerships, 
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Integration and Capacity Building, and 8. Research, reporting, monitoring and 
assessment  (Coast Protection Board 2012). 
In 2009, the Board established the Coast Protection Board Strategic Plan 2009-2014, 
which advocates “the sustainable use of the South Australian coast, for the benefit of 
society, the economy and the environment” (Coast Protection Board 2009, p. 1). The 
Strategic Plan set three basic priorities, as outlined in Table 4.3, with defined actions to 
meet these goals (Coast Protection Board 2009). 
At the request of the South Australian government Minister for Sustainability, 
Environment and Conservation, the Coast Protection Board has also prepared the ‘Coast 
Protection Board Position Paper May 2015’ outlining future coastal management 
priorities for the state. The report covers the most important issues facing the South 
Australian coast at present, including the impact of sea-level rise, coastal land-use 
planning, development in hazardous areas and the costs and benefits of protection versus 
retreat (Department of Environment Water and Natural Resources 2015). 
4.2.1.4 Coast Protection Fund 
The Act also provides for a statutory funding mechanism, the Coast Protection Fund 
(CPF), to be maintained by Treasury but applied by the CPB in administering the Act. 
Monies are deposited into the fund from two sources: parliamentary decree, and funds 
recovered by the Board in pursuance of the provisions of the Act. Councils may apply to 
the CPB for funding for protection, restoration or development works. If approved, the 
CPB may grant any amount of funding of up to four-fifths of total cost of works, or any 
amount up to the total cost if works are required as a result of storm damage. In the case 
of funding requests for land acquisition for the purpose of protecting, restoring or 
developing that land, the Board may grant councils any amount up to one-half of the cost 
incurred in acquiring the land. In situations where the Board conducts works within, or 
benefitting, council(s) the Board may recover a contribution of up to one-half for coastal 
facilities, or one-fifth for other works; likewise, for land acquisition, the Board may 
recover up to one-half of the cost incurred by the Board in acquiring the land 
(Government of South Australia 2015). 
4.2.2 Development Act 1993 
The South Australian Development Act 1993 is:  
An Act to provide for planning and regulate development in the State; to regulate the use and 
management of land and buildings, and the design and construction of buildings; to make 
provision for the maintenance and conservation of land and buildings where appropriate; and 
for other purposes (Government of South Australia 2014).  
The objectives of the Development Act 1993 are shown in Table 4.4. The Responsible 
Ministers are the Minister for Planning and the Minister for Urban Development, Planning 





Table 4.3 Coast Protection Board Strategic Plan 2009-2014 









and the impacts 
of climate change 
1.1 Support the implementation of the National Climate Change Adaptation 
Framework 2007, in particular, the acquisition of the national coastal DEM 
and coastal vulnerability assessment.  
1.2 Assist Governments prepare coastal vulnerability assessments and 
adaptation plans.  
1.3 Assist Local Government devise, prioritise and implement protection 
strategies for coastal settlements.  
1.4 Provide advice to the Minister, Government, local government and the 
community on adaptation of coastal development. 
2. Ensure new 
development is 
not at risk from 
current and 
future hazards 
2.1 Ensure that coastal development occurs consistent with the hierarchy of 
adaptation: avoid, accommodate, adapt.  
2.2 Seek increased powers to control development potentially at risk from 
coastal hazards.  
2.3 Maintain the currency and relevance of Coast Protection Board policies, 
including allowances for sea-level rise, by reviewing as appropriate.  
2.4 Seek the Government’s adoption and inclusion of these policies in South 
Australia's development control system.  
2.5 Better engage with the emergency management sector to exploit areas of 
joint interest regarding the impacts of climate change on coastal development  
2.6 Prepare guidance for planning authorities, developers and the community 
on appropriate landscapes and criteria for specific types of development (i.e. 
marinas, ports, boat ramps).  
2.7 Provide advice to the Minister, Government, local government and the 
community on sustainable coastal development. 




adapt to the 
impacts of 
climate change 
3.1 Engage with planning authorities in developing land use frameworks, 
Planning Strategies and Development Plans that recognise and allow for 
adaptation (including retreat and migration) of tide-dependent ecosystems. 
3.2 Ensure that development does not create additional pressures on at-risk 
ecosystems.  
3.3 Provide advice to the Minister, Government, local government and the 
community on sustaining coastal ecosystems 
The Development Act 1993 provides for the states planning system, which comprises 
three tiers: the planning strategy, development plans and development assessment 
(Huppatz 2005). The planning strategy is developed at the state government level, whilst 
development plans and development assessment occur at the local government level 
(unless development is of Major Development status, which is assessed by the SA 
government Development Assessment Commission). As the Development Act 1993 
establishes the legislative framework for planning of land-use and development, the 
development system is critical in determining land-use and development outcomes in the 
coastal zone (Harvey et al. 2012, p. 83). The following sections will outline the role of 




Table 4.4 Objectives of the Development Act 1993 
Source: Government of South Australia (2014) 
Development Act 1993 
The object of this Act is to provide for proper, orderly and efficient planning and 
development in the State and, for that purpose—  
(a) to establish objectives and principles of planning and development; and  
(b) to establish a system of strategic planning governing development; and  
(c) to provide for the creation of Development Plans—  
   (i) to enhance the proper conservation, use, development and management of land 
and buildings; and  
   (ii) to facilitate sustainable development and the protection of the environment; and  
      (iia) to encourage the management of the natural and constructed environment in an 
ecologically sustainable manner; and  
   (iii) to advance the social and economic interests and goals of the community; and  
(d) to establish and enforce cost-effective technical requirements, compatible with the 
public interest, to which building development must conform; and  
(e) to provide for appropriate public participation in the planning process and the 
assessment of development proposals; and  
   (ea) to promote or support initiatives to improve housing choice and access to 
affordable housing within the community; and  
(f) to enhance the amenity of buildings and provide for the safety and health of people 
who use buildings; and  
(g) to facilitate—  
   (i) the adoption and efficient application of national uniform building standards; and  
   (ii) national uniform accreditation of buildings products, construction methods, 
building designs, building components and building systems. 
4.2.2.1 Development Plans  
In South Australia, the state government’s planning strategy guides the formulation and 
reviews of development plans, the statutory instruments against which development 
applications are assessed. Each council must produce a development plan specifying the 
type of development permitted in that local government area.  
In 1994, the CPB policies were incorporated into development plans via a Ministerial 
amendment authorised by the Planning Minister; the Regional Coastal Areas Policies 
Amendment. This amendment provided development plans with policies to cover 
important aspects of coastal management, including environmental protection, 
maintenance of public access, hazard risk minimisation, erosion buffers, land division, 
protection of economic resources and development in appropriate locations (Clarke 2010; 
Coastal Climate Change Advisory Committee 2010; Department of Environment Water 
and Natural Resources 2013; Norman 2009a). Table 4.5 shows the standards applying to 




Table 4.5 Development plan standards for coastal development 
Sourced from Coastal Climate Change Advisory Committee (2010, pp. 119-120). 
Development plan standards for coastal development 
Sea-level rise of 1.0m by 2100 must be taken into account.  
Development permitted only where not subject to, or able to be protected from, coastal hazards. 
Coastal hazards to be minimised by: 
 Site development levels at least 0.3 metres above sea flood levels;  
 Floor levels 0.55 metres above sea flood levels and protected from an additional rise in 
sea-levels of 0.7 metres (including from land subsidence) by 2100; 
 Small scale development set back a sufficient distance to provide for 100 years of coastal 
retreat;  
 Large scale development and township areas set back 200 metres, unless appropriate 
private protection is provided or council protection of the public reserve is to be provided.  
Development can accommodate changes in sea-level during the first 100 years of its life.  
Development will not require public funds for protection in the future.  
Development does not prevent natural coastal processes, including landward migration of 
mangroves, coastal saltmarsh and dune systems.  
Development provides for a 50 metre coastal reserve to maintain public access to the coast.  
Coastal reserves should be increased in width by the amount of any required erosion buffer (see 
above), where the width should be based on: 
 The susceptibility of the coast to erosion; 
 Local coastal processes;   
 The effect of severe storm events;   
 The effect of a 0.3 metres sea-level rise over 50 years thereafter on coastal processes and 
storms;  
 The availability of practical measures to protect the development from erosion caused by 
a further sea-level rise of 0.7 metres per 50 years thereafter.  
No development where essential services cannot be provided and maintained, having regard to 
flood risk and sea-level rise, or where emergency vehicle access would be prevented by a 1 in 100 
year average return interval flood event, adjusted for 100 years of sea-level rise.  
Under Section 30 of the Development Act 1993, the Department for Environment advises 
on council development plan reviews and proposed amendments to ensure consistency 
with Coast Protection Board policy (Huppatz 2005).    
4.2.2.1.1 Coastal Zones  
Coastal zones have been established to serve various purposes, including protection of 
sensitive coastal features, prevention of development in hazardous areas and to ensure 
that development applications in any of the coastal zone categories are referred to the 
Coast Protection Board (Coastal Climate Change Advisory Committee 2010; Department 
of Planning and Local Government 2011). 
Councils must adopt a coastal zone category for land with any of the following coastal 
features: 
• coastal landforms and habitats (including beaches, coastal dunes and cliffs, coastal wetlands, 
tidal estuaries, saltmarsh and mangrove areas);  
• important coastal geological features or other natural features of scientific, educational, 
heritage or cultural importance;  
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• buffer areas for the purpose of separating development from sensitive coastal and marine 
features and habitats;  
• coastal landscapes of high scenic quality;  
• areas exposed to coastal hazards (including flooding, erosion, acid sulfate soils and sand dune 
drift) where there are not adequate provisions to mitigate the hazard (such as a managed 
seawall or levee bank) or confirmed strategies to provide future protection; and  
• coast protection measures such as erosion buffer areas, seawalls and levee banks 
(Department of Environment Water and Natural Resources 2013, p. 21). 
The five coastal zone categories are described in Appendix 4.1. 
4.2.2.2 Development Assessment 
In South Australia, development assessment operates at two levels: local governments 
have Development Assessment Panels (DAPs) and the state government has the 
Development Assessment Commission (DAC). The DAC is reserved for development 
applications falling in the ‘major development’ category, which are considered to be of 
significance to the state. The majority of coastal development decisions fall to the DAP in 
the relevant local government area. DAPs comprise three elected local government 
members and four independent specialists who are appointed to the DAPs by the elected 
members (Beer & Kroehn no date).  
4.2.2.2.1 Referral for development on coastal land 
The Development Regulations 2008 define the Coast Protection Board as the referral 
agency for development applications on coastal land.  
Coastal land is defined as:  
a) land situated in a zone or area defined in the relevant Development Plan where the name 
of the zone or area includes the word “Coast” or “Coastal”, or which indicates or suggests 
in some other way that the zone or area is situated on the coast;  
b) where paragraph (a) does not apply: land that is situated in an area that, in the opinion of 
the relevant authority, comprises a township or an urban area and that is within 100 
metres of the coast measured from mean high water mark on the sea shore at spring tide; 
or ..’ land that is situated in an area that, in the opinion of the relevant authority, 
comprises rural land and that is within 500 metres landward of the coast from mean high 
water mark on the sea shore at spring tide; if there is no zone or area of a kind referred to 
in paragraph (a) between the land and the coast;  
c) an area three nautical miles seaward of the mean high water mark on the sea shore at 
spring tide (Department of Environment Water and Natural Resources 2013, p. 10). 
Schedule 8 of the Development Regulations 2008 determines that the relevant planning 
authority must have regard to the CPB advice. Schedule 8 also provides the CPB with the 
power to direct planning authority decision-making where the development involves 
excavating or filling of land of more than nine cubic metres within 100 metres landward 
or three nautical miles seaward of the mean high water mark, or construction of coastal 
protection works within 100 metres landward or one kilometre seaward of the mean high 
water mark. In these instances, the CPB may impose conditions on the proposed 
development or may refuse the development, and the relevant authority must comply 
(Department of Environment Water and Natural Resources 2013).  
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Figure 4.1 shows the process for the assessment of coastal development applications in 
South Australia. 
 
Figure 4.1 Governance arrangements for coastal development decision-making in South 
Australia 
Flow diagram showing the legislation, policy instruments and institutions relevant to the assessment 
process for coastal development applications in South Australia. 
4.2.3 Natural Resources Management Act 2004 
The Natural Resources Management Act 2004 was enacted in 2005 to replace multiple 
pieces of legislation governing the use and management of natural resources, including 
the Water Resources Act, the Animal and Plant Control Act and the Soil Conservation and 
Land Care Act. The numerous Boards previously in place to oversee catchment 
management, animal and plant control and soil conservation were replaced by eight, 
regionally-based NRM Boards (Hitchcock 2006). Since 2014, after the integration of 
the NRM Boards with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) 
and the Department for Water (DfW), NRM Boards and their operational branches have 
been part of the reorganised Department of Environment, Water and Natural Resources 
(DEWNR). The key organisations involved in the implementation of this Act are outlined 
below. 
4.2.3.1 NRM Council 
The NRM Council is the body responsible for the implementation of NRM in South 
Australia, providing advice to the Minister for Sustainability, Environment and 
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Conservation and preparing the statewide NRM Plan (Eyre Peninsula Natural Resources 
Management Board 2013a).  
4.2.3.2 NRM Boards 
NRM Boards comprise community, state and local government members. Their goal is to 
work closely with the community, industry and all levels of government “to manage the 
environment to achieve a balance between our collective need for resources and the 
needs of the environment” (Eyre Peninsula Natural Resources Management Board 2013a, 
p. unpaginated). The main responsibility of NRM Boards is to manage investment in NRM 
on a regional scale, by prioritising the spending of NRM levy funding in line with the 
respective regional and state NRM Plans (South East Natural Resources Management 
Board 2010).  
4.2.3.3 NRM Levy 
Historically, NRM was funded through the collection of catchment levies and 
contributions for animal and plant control by councils. Since the enactment of the NRM 
Act 2004, a new funding mechanism has been established. The Act stipulates that a 
regional NRM levy may be collected by local government as a separate rate and paid to 
the relevant NRM Board17. In 2006, the existing catchment levies and council 
contributions for animal and plant control were replaced by a single, regional NRM levy to 
be collected by local government and paid to the NRM Board. The NRM Act set out six 
different options for NRM Boards to calculate the levy, and from these options only two 
are being used: the value of rateable land, and a fixed charge on all rateable land. 
Councils are able to recover costs associated with collecting the levy from the NRM Board 
(Hitchcock 2006).  
4.3 Chapter summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide background information on the governance 
arrangements for coastal management in South Australia, as a preface to the exploration 
of the issues raised in the case study and discussed in the subsequent chapters.  
The next chapter will introduce the case study sites examined in this research to provide a 
sense of the coastal systems and values of each case study region, as well as the 
demographic and economic characteristics and coastal management issues facing each 
local government area. The main coastal management issues identified by interview 
participants in each NRM region will also be presented. 
                                                     
17 Further complicating governance, since the administrative boundaries of local government areas and 
NRM regions are not aligned, some local government areas span more than one NRM region. 
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 Case study sites: Key characteristics and coastal 
management issues 
5.1 Chapter overview 
The purpose of Chapter Five is to describe the case study sites and the types of coastal 
management issues within each case study region. The chapter briefly describes the 
demographic, economic and coastal characteristics of each case study local government 
area (LGA) and NRM region, and presents the key coastal management issues as 
perceived by local government and NRM representatives interviewed in this case study of 
South Australia.  
5.2 The South Australian coast 
According to Geoscience Australia, South Australia’s mainland coast extends over 3,816 
km, with islands adding 1251 km (Bourman, Murray-Wallace & Harvey 2016, p. 2). The 
coastal zone comprises diverse coastal landforms, including “cliffs, rocky outcrops and 
shore platforms, mangrove woodlands, mudflats, estuaries, extensive sandy beaches, 
coastal dunes and coastal barrier systems, as well as numerous nearshore reefs and 
islands” which have “developed under the influence of a range of tidal conditions and 
wave regimes, varying from high energy on exposed open ocean coasts (for example, the 
west coast of Eyre Peninsula) to low energy in protected shorelines with high tidal ranges 
(such as in the northern gulfs)” (Bourman, Murray-Wallace & Harvey 2016, p. 2). 
Approximately half (47 per cent) of the SA coastline comprises sandy beaches, with the 
majority of these backed by soft-sediment plains; as a result, sea level rise and associated 
shoreline recession and foredune destabilisation pose significant risk (Australian State of 
the Environment Committee 2011). Table 5.1 shows the length of coastline and the types 
of coastal landforms featured in each of the NRM case study regions. 
Table 5.1 Land area, coastline length and landforms by NRM region 
Data sourced from: Adelaide and Mount Lofty Ranges Natural Resources Management Board (2013); Caton 
et al. (2011); Caton et al. (2011); Twidale and Bourne (2010). 
 NR Adelaide & Mt Lofty Ranges NR Eyre Peninsula NR South East 
Total land area (ha) 1.12 million 8 million 2.8 million 
Length of coastline (km) 333 2,475 427 
Cliffs and bayhead beaches    
Beaches and backing dunes    
Mangroves   - 
Approximately 80 per cent of South Australia’s population reside in the coastal zone 
(LGASA 2003). As with coastal zones around the world, the South Australian coastal zone 
is an area of high environmental, social and economic value, subject to multiple 
competing uses and under increasing pressure from internal migration and climate 
change (Nursey-Bray 2011). Sea level rise has ranged from two to seven millimetres per 
year in Southern Australia since the 1990s; a sea level rise of 1.1 metres would risk 
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between 25,200 and 43,000 residential buildings valued in the range of AU$4.4 to 
$7.4 billion (Australian State of the Environment Committee 2011, p. 881).  
The case study sites comprised three NRM regions in South Australia: Eyre Peninsula (EP) 
in the far west of the state, South East (SE) in the far east, and the Adelaide and Mount 
Lofty Ranges (AMLR) covering the metropolitan area and peri-urban areas north and 
south of Adelaide. Within each NRM case study region, people from three coastal local 
government areas were interviewed. The location of the NRM regions and local 
government areas included in the case study are shown in Figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1 Map of South Australia showing case study sites 
The state of South Australia has eight NRM regions, delineated in this figure by different colours. The three 
coastal NRM regions used as case study sites are the Eyre Peninsula region, in far west of SA (green); the 
South East, which stretches from the Murray Mouth south-east of Adelaide along the coast towards the 
eastern border with Victoria (pink); and the Adelaide and Mount Lofty Ranges region, comprising 
metropolitan Adelaide and the peri-urban Fleurieu Peninsula south of Adelaide (yellow). 
The next sections provide an overview of each of the case study regions and their 
associated representative LGAs. The main coastal issues described by representatives of 
local government and NRM within each case study region are also presented.  
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5.3 Case study sites  
5.3.1 Region 1: Natural Resources Adelaide and Mt Lofty Ranges (NR AMLR) 
The Natural Resources Adelaide and Mt Lofty Ranges (NR AMLR) region was chosen due 
to its metropolitan and peri-urban location. As noted by Bourman, Murray-Wallace and 
Harvey (2016, p. 14), “this section of coast, which occurs in the most populated part of 
South Australia, provides an excellent example of intense human use of coastal resources 
and also illustrates problems arising from urban development without due care for 
coastal processes”.  
The administrative jurisdiction of the NR AMLR region encompasses Adelaide, the capital 
city of South Australia, and stretches north to Mallala and the Barossa Valley, eastward to 
include the western Mt Lofty Ranges, west to cover the metropolitan coastline and 30 km 
into marine waters, and south of Adelaide to include the Fleurieu Peninsula (Adelaide and 
Mount Lofty Ranges Natural Resources Management Board 2013). The Fleurieu Peninsula 
is located approximately 70 km from Adelaide and can be described as a peri-urban area, 
with some residents commuting to the metropolitan area for work, but predominantly a 
popular sea change community and second home location for Adelaide locals.  
The population of the NR AMLR region is estimated at 1.3 million –80 per cent of South 
Australia’s population. The total area is approximately 1,120,000 hectares, of which 59 
per cent comprises land and 41 per cent marine waters. The NR AMLR region sustains 
multiple uses, including urban areas, remnant bushland, agriculture, horticulture and 
viticulture, as well as popular beaches and notable marine environments (Adelaide and 
Mount Lofty Ranges Natural Resources Management Board 2013). There are two National 
Parks and 44 Conservation Parks in the region (Paul 2015).  
Significant coastal and marine ecosystems in the region provide substantial economic and 
social value to the state (Adelaide and Mount Lofty Ranges Natural Resources 
Management Board 2013, p. 24). From extensive mangroves forests and samphire 
marshes in the north, broad sandy beaches, dunes and coastal seagrass meadows in the 
metropolitan area, to reefs, cliff top and sandy beach communities in the south; these 
ecosystems provide critical habitat, nursery and feeding grounds for a wide range of 
aquatic and terrestrial plants and animals (Adelaide and Mount Lofty Ranges Natural 
Resources Management Board 2013, p. 24). 
A map of the NR AMLR region is shown in Figure 5.2. The three LGAs examined within this 
region are the City of Port Adelaide Enfield (northern end of Adelaide sub-region) and the 
City of Onkaparinga (southern end of Adelaide sub-region), and the City of Victor Harbor 
(southern edge of Fleurieu sub-region). The range of population densities and growth 





Figure 5.2 Map showing the subregions of NR Adelaide and Mt Lofty Ranges 
Source: Paul (2015).  
 
Table 5.2 Population density and growth rates of local government case study sites in NR AMLR 
region 
Table comparing population density and growth rates of local government areas in the NR AMLR case study 
region. Data source: ABS (2016d). 
 Population Land Area (ha) Density Population Growth 2005-2015 (%) 
City of Port Adelaide Enfield 122205 9412 12.98 18.57 
City of Onkaparinga 167659 51829 3.23 11.12 
City of Victor Harbor 14938 38510 0.39 24.54 
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5.3.1.1 City of Port Adelaide Enfield 
The City of Port Adelaide Enfield (see Figure 5.3) is located in the north-western suburbs 
of Adelaide, located eight to fifteen kilometres from the CBD (ABS 2015b; City of Port 
Adelaide Enfield 2015a). The City of Port Adelaide Enfield is one of the biggest in 
metropolitan Adelaide, with an area of about 94 square kilometres from the River Torrens 
westward to Outer Harbor, and the third highest resident population in SA totalling over 
120,000 (City of Port Adelaide Enfield 2015c). The City's population has been steadily 
growing (17 per cent since 2003), and is forecast to continue to grow, albeit at a lower 
rate of under ten per cent by the 2021 Census period (ABS 2015b; City of Port Adelaide 
Enfield 2015d). 
 
Figure 5.3 Map of City of Port Adelaide-Enfield local government area  
Map showing City of Port Adelaide-Enfield local government area boundary, and its vicinity relative to 
Adelaide (inset). Source: (ABS 2016f). 
The City of Port Adelaide Enfield was formed after the amalgamation of two diverse 
councils in 1996: the City of Port Adelaide – a coastal council containing Adelaide’s major 
port and harbor and significant to the development of the state – amalgamated with the 
inland City of Enfield. The Port Adelaide area is rich in history, having been “formed in 
parallel with the City of Adelaide … [and] central to the colonisation of South Australia … 
[as] the gateway for settlement, trade, shipping, commerce and (until the 1960s) 
immigration in the State” (City of Port Adelaide Enfield 2015c). The Enfield area was, up 
until the 1940s, an agricultural area due to the fertile soil of the River Torrens (City of Port 
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Adelaide Enfield 2015c). The main industry of employment in the city of Port Adelaide 
Enfield by far is manufacturing, which accounts for over 25 per cent of employment in the 
area (ABS 2016c). Within the City of Port Adelaide Enfield, the highest population 
densities are found along the coast (ABS 2015b; City of Port Adelaide Enfield 2015d).  
Figure 5.4 shows an aerial image of the Le Fevre peninsula, where the City of Port 
Adelaide Enfield’s highly modified coastline extends from Semaphore South, northward 
along the Le Fevre Peninsula and then eastward to the industrial and port-dominated 
area of Outer Harbour and the Port River. The northern and north-eastern protected 
sections of tidally-dominated coastline originally comprised mangroves and samphire, 
and small patches remain; southward, from North Haven to Semaphore South, is 
characterised by low wave energy beaches and dunes (Bourman, Murray-Wallace & 
Harvey 2016; Clarke & Simpson 2010; Twidale & Bourne 2010). The majority of this 
stretch of foreshore has been developed as passive recreation areas, including open lawn, 
barbecues, a shared bicycle/pedestrian path, boardwalks and landscaped areas (City of 
Port Adelaide Enfield 2015b; Clarke & Simpson 2010). The area also benefits from a 
relatively large buffer zone of vegetation-covered foredune in the area from Largs Bay to 
Taperoo (City of Port Adelaide Enfield 2015b), visible leading up to the North Haven 
marina in Figure 5.4. 
 
Figure 5.4 Aerial photograph of City of Port Adelaide Enfield 
Largs Bay and Le Fevre Peninsula, 2013. Image: me1406067; Source: Coast Protection Board (Department 
for Environment Water and Natural Resources 2016). 
5.3.1.2 City of Onkaparinga 
The City of Onkaparinga is the largest metropolitan council in South Australia, with an 
area of 518 square kilometres and population of over 167,000 residents (ABS 2016e). The 
council comprises 21 elected members with a staff of 600 (City of Onkaparinga 2010a). 
The City of Onkaparinga is located on the southern fringe of metropolitan Adelaide, 
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between 25 and 40 kilometres from the CBD (ABS 2016e). The landscape ranges from the 
hills to the coast and includes rural farmland, suburban blocks, light industrial uses and 
vineyards (City of Onkaparinga 2010c). The main sources of employment include retail 
trade, manufacturing and healthcare and social assistance (ABS 2016b). The population is 
forecast to grow to 212,275 by 2036, an increase of over 25 per cent (ABS 2015a).  
Figure 5.5 depicts the boundaries of the City of Onkaparinga, while Figure 5.6 shows an 
aerial image of a section of the City of Onkaparinga’s coastline.  
 
Figure 5.5 Map of City of Onkaparinga local government area  
Map showing City of Onkaparinga local government area boundary, and its vicinity relative to Adelaide 
(inset). Source: ABS (2016a). 
The City’s coastline is one of the longest and most diverse in the AMLR region extending 
over 31 kilometres from O’Sullivan Beach to Sellicks Beach (Clarke & Simpson 2010). The 
diverse coastline offers open sandy beaches, reefs, dunes, the Onkaparinga estuary and 
steep cliffs (Bourman, Murray-Wallace & Harvey 2016; Clarke & Simpson 2010). The City 
of Onkaparinga also has the only Marine Park on the Adelaide metropolitan coastline, 
comprising Aldinga Reef, Port Noarlunga Reef and Onkaparinga Wetland. Recreational 
activities include swimming, surfing, sailing, walking, snorkelling, beachcombing, diving, 
fishing, paddling and boating (City of Onkaparinga 2010b). Popular dive sites are Port 
Noarlunga reef and the Aldinga ‘drop-off’, home to the endemic leafy sea dragon (City of 
Onkaparinga 2010b). In contrast to other metropolitan Adelaide councils, the City of 
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Onkaparinga permits vehicle access on some beaches during the day in summer; access is 
prohibited on sand dunes, pebble banks and the high beach area (City of Onkaparinga 
2010b).  
 
Figure 5.6 Aerial photograph of City of Onkaparinga coastline 
Witton Bluff, Christies Beach, 2014. Image: me1405322; Source: Coast Protection Board (Department for 
Environment Water and Natural Resources 2016). 
5.3.1.3 City of Victor Harbor 
The City of Victor Harbor is located 80 kilometres south of Adelaide on the shores of 
Encounter Bay. The council covers an area of 38,648 hectares, and is one of the fastest 
growing seaside towns in South Australia. The residential population of the City of Victor 
Harbor is approximately 14,000, plus an additional estimated 2,000 visitors or holiday 
home owners at any given time. In addition, the population doubles during the summer 
peak tourist season, swelling to approximately 30,000 from December to February (City of 
Victor Harbor 2011; Harvey, Rudd & Clarke 2008).  
The community can be classified as ‘coastal getaway’ sea change community (Gurran, 
Squires & Blakely 2005) as described in Table 3.3, as it is a small to medium coastal town 
less than a two hour drive from the capital city. Accordingly, it is popular for day tripping 
and has easy weekend access for holiday home owners. It is also known for its retiree 
population, as well as an increasing number of lifestyle migrants and commuters who 
choose to live in Victor Harbor and travel to metropolitan Adelaide for work (City of Victor 
Harbor 2011; Harvey, Rudd & Clarke 2008). Furthermore, Victor Harbor is subject to 
increasing coastal development pressure, evidenced by a doubling of median house 
prices between 2000-2005 (Huppatz 2005). Victor Harbor is the regional centre for the 
southern Fleurieu, and the town provides wide-ranging retail, commercial and public 
service facilities. The main sources of employment include health and community 
services, primary production, retail, hospitality and tourism, construction and building, 
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education, light manufacturing and business services (ABS 2016g; City of Victor Harbor 
2011).  
Figure 5.7 depicts the boundaries of the City of Onkaparinga, while Figure 5.8 shows an 
aerial image of the highly modified coastline. 
 
Figure 5.7 Map of City of Victor Harbor local government area 
Map showing City of Victor Harbor local government area and its vicinity relative to the capital city of 
Adelaide (inset). Source: ABS (2016g). 
In terms of coastal attributes, the City of Victor Harbor’s diverse coastline features a 
floodplain, rugged cliffs, granite islands and headlands, shore platforms and reefs, dunes, 
pocket beaches and medium to high energy long sandy beaches (Bourman, Murray-
Wallace & Harvey 2016, p. 18; Clarke & Simpson 2010). The coastal zone is highly 
modified in places due to urbanisation (Clarke & Simpson 2010). As noted by Bourman, 
Murray-Wallace and Harvey (2016, p. 106), human impacts on the coast are marked, 
where: 
Foredunes have been levelled and built over, beach sediment supply impacted by inland 
farming practices, river mouths entrained by engineering works and wave approaches 
influenced by breakwater construction. 
Victor Harbor is widely known for its coastal attractions, which the town capitalises on 
through tourism. Many of the main attractions revolve around the coastline, for example: 
the coastal Encounter Bikeway, Heysen Trail and Rosetta Head (or The Bluff); the South 
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Australian Whale Centre and whale watching during winter; the Encounter Coast 
Discovery Centre; the horse-drawn tram to Granite Island; and surf beaches at Waitpinga, 
Parsons and Dump Beach (City of Victor Harbor 2013). 
 
Figure 5.8 Aerial photograph of City of Victor Harbor coastline 
Victor Harbor township, 2016. Image: fl1605205; Source: Coast Protection Board (Department for 
Environment Water and Natural Resources 2016). 
5.3.2 Region 2: Natural Resources Eyre Peninsula (NR EP) 
The Eyre Peninsula region was selected due to its relatively remote rural location, small 
towns with low population densities, sprawling coastline and reliance on coastal 
industries including fishing, aquaculture and tourism. The region comprises an expansive 
eight million hectares, and extends from the western edge of the upper Spencer Gulf, 
across the southern edge of the Gawler Ranges, westward to the edge of the Nullarbor 
Plain, and southward to the southernmost tip of the peninsula, Port Lincoln (Eyre 
Peninsula Natural Resources Management Board 2013b). A map is shown in Figure 5.9. 
The area’s population of approximately 55,000 relies heavily on the natural resources of 
the region, in particular the 2,475 km coastline which comprises almost half of South 
Australia’s entire coast length (Eyre Peninsula Natural Resources Management Board 
2013b). Over 50 per cent of the region is farmed, with native vegetation covering 45 per 
cent (of the pre-European amount, or 2,187,560 hectares). Almost half of this area is 
protected as National Parks or Conservation Parks, with a total of 75 parks in the region 





Figure 5.9 Map of NR Eyre Peninsula region 




The region has two main urban centres; Whyalla and Port Lincoln, where more than half 
of the population reside (Eyre Peninsula Natural Resources Management Board 2015, p. 
6). The predominant economic drivers of the region are agriculture, in particular cereal 
farming and wool, as well as the commercial wildcatch fishing industry, especially tuna. 
Today, aquaculture provides an important source of productivity for the region, with 
tuna, oysters and other shell and finfish species farmed for export. Other important 
sectors to the area include tourism, mining and services (Eyre Peninsula Local 
Government Association 2014b; Eyre Peninsula Natural Resources Management Board 
2015, p. 12). 
A large part of the NR EP region economy is tourism, with over 350,000 visitors per 
annum (Eyre Peninsula Natural Resources Management Board 2009). Coastal areas face 
substantial visitor population increases over summer (Department of Planning Transport 
and Infrastructure 2015; Natural Resources Eyre Peninsula 2015). A significant drawcard 
for tourists to the EP region is the coastal and marine environment, which offers 
recreational fishing; camping; swimming with sea lions, sharks and tuna; aquaculture 
activities like the seafood trail; coastal parks and reserves; surf, and sheltered beaches 
(Eyre Peninsula Natural Resources Management Board 2009).  
As shown in Figure 5.10, the Eyre Peninsula region comprises eleven local government 
authorities (Eyre Peninsula Natural Resources Management Board 2015, p. 6).  
 
Figure 5.10 Map of Eyre Peninsula region showing local government areas 
Map showing Eyre Peninsula region with eleven local government areas, eight of which are coastal. Their 
vicinity to Adelaide shown in the upper right image. LGA case study sites in the NR EP region were the three 
southern-most councils: City of Port Lincoln, District Council of Tumby Bay and District Council of Lower 




The three LGAs examined (City of Port Lincoln, District Council of Tumby Bay and District 
Council of Lower Eyre Peninsula) comprise ‘sub-region 5’ of the NR EP region, known as 
‘Southern Eyre’ (Natural Resources Eyre Peninsula 2015). The Southern Eyre sub-region 
comprises approximately 650,000 hectares, 21,500 people and over 700 km of coastline 
(Natural Resources Eyre Peninsula 2015).  
The range of population densities and growth rates in the case study LGAs of the NR EP 
region are shown in Table 5.3. A brief description of each local government area follows.  
Table 5.3 Population density and growth rates of LG case study sites in NR EP region 
Table comparing population density and growth rates of local government areas in the NR EP case study 







City of Port Lincoln 14452 3036.7 4.7 6.94 
District Council of Lower Eyre 
Peninsula 
4731 472119 0.01 15.40 
District Council Tumby Bay 2706 266906 0.01 2.38 
5.3.2.1 City of Port Lincoln 
The City of Port Lincoln is the primary service centre to and economic hub of the vast Eyre 
Peninsula region, with a population of approximately 14,000 in a relatively small land 
area of approximately 3037 hectares (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016; Natural 
Resources Eyre Peninsula 2015). The economy of the city is largely based on fishing, 
aquaculture and seafood processors, supported by retail, health and community services, 
education, tourism and construction (Natural Resources Eyre Peninsula 2015). The City of 
Port Lincoln asserts itself as the “home of aquaculture” and “the seafood capital of 
Australia” (City of Port Lincoln 2016).  
Figure 5.11 shows an aerial photograph of the Port Lincoln coast. The City of Port Lincoln 
has a short coastline relative to the adjacent local government areas in the region. 
Significantly, it is host to a deep water port with facilities for grain storage and bulk 
handling to support the region’s agricultural exports (Natural Resources Eyre Peninsula 
2015). Port Lincoln also hosts many of the region’s tourists, attracted to the area for a 
range of coastal activities including diving with sharks, sea lions and tuna, fishing boat 
charters, nearby national parks, beaches and the world-renowned seafood (Natural 






Figure 5.11 Aerial photograph of City of Port Lincoln coastline 
Port Lincoln, 2013. Image: ep1304204; Source: Coast Protection Board (Department for Environment Water 
and Natural Resources 2016). 
5.3.2.2 District Council of Tumby Bay 
The District Council of Tumby Bay comprises 266,906 hectares and a resident population 
of approximately 2,706 which, like many coastal towns, swells during the summer school 
holidays (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016; District Council of Tumby Bay 2007c). 
Located on Southern Eyre Peninsula, the main industries are cereal cropping, sheep and 
beef, supported by fishing and tourism. The main sources of employment for district 
residents are farming, Vittera (a grain storage and handling company), fishing and 
teaching (District Council of Tumby Bay 2007a).  
Figure 5.12 shows an aerial photograph of the township and coastline of Tumby Bay. The 
coastline of DC Tumby Bay is characterised by relatively low wave energy beaches due to 
its position on the sheltered Spencer Gulf (Bourman, Murray-Wallace & Harvey 2016). 
The district “is noted for its outstanding coastal scenery along the Spencer Gulf, which 
contains habitats for waterfowl and other wildlife, and a diversity of natural scenery” 
(Department of Planning Transport and Infrastructure 2015, p. 10). The main towns of 
Tumby Bay and Port Neill have recreational jetties and community built boat ramps for 
boating and fishing (District Council of Tumby Bay 2007b), and their scenic coastal 
caravan parks and holiday accommodation attracts national and international tourists 





Figure 5.12 Aerial photograph of District Council of Tumby Bay coastline 
Tumby Bay, 2013. Image: ep1303343; Source: Coast Protection Board (Department for Environment Water 
and Natural Resources 2016). 
5.3.2.3 District Council of Lower Eyre Peninsula 
The District Council of Lower Eyre Peninsula has a resident population in the region of 
4,700 and an expansive land area of approximately 472,119 hectares. Lower Eyre 
Peninsula has seen the highest population growth of the Southern Eyre region, 
attributable to the areas fringing Port Lincoln and the Coffin Bay township, and is 
projected to grow to 2026 (Natural Resources Eyre Peninsula 2015, p. 5). The growth of 
Lower Eyre Peninsula (LEP) may be able to be explained by industrial growth in Port 
Lincoln which has increased demand for residential land and resulted in population 
growth within Port Lincoln itself as well as the expansion of peri-urban settlements 
surrounding Port Lincoln (Natural Resources Eyre Peninsula 2015). 
The District Council of Lower Eyre Peninsula boasts an extensive and diverse coastline of 
709 km (District Council of Lower Eyre Peninsula 2016). The district is “renowned for its 
magnificent rural and pristine coastal scenery, as well as thriving agricultural, fishing and 
tourism industries” (District Council of Lower Eyre Peninsula 2016). Figure 5.13 shows an 
aerial photograph of the township of Coffin Bay in the Lower Eyre Peninsula, known for 





Figure 5.13 Aerial photograph of Lower Eyre Peninsula coastline 
Coffin Bay, 2013. Image: ep1306072; Source: Coast Protection Board (Department for Environment Water 
and Natural Resources 2016). 
5.3.3 Region 3: Natural Resources South East (NR SE) 
The NR South East region was selected on the basis of its high dependence on the coastal 
zone as a popular tourist destination, fishing and aquaculture industries and high 
vulnerability to sea level rise (Department of Climate Change 2009). The region covers an 
area of approximately 2,800,000 hectares and is located in the south eastern corner of 
South Australia, abutting the Victorian border to the east, Southern Ocean to the south 
and the southern part of the Coorong lagoon and wetland system to the northwest 
(South East Natural Resources Management Board 2010).  
The climate, soils and high quality underground water of the region, also known as the 
‘Limestone Coast’, have created a highly productive area, contributing $5 billion per 
annum towards the South Australian economy and the agricultural sector accounting for 
more than 30 per cent of the state’s GDP (South East Natural Resources Management 
Board 2010). The region’s natural resources contribute significantly to the successful 
industries of the area, which comprise plantation forestry, viticulture, agriculture, dairy, 
potatoes, fishing and aquaculture (South East Natural Resources Management Board 
2010). Tourism is also a significant industry in the Limestone Coast region “because of the 
coastal location, woodlands and national parks” (South Australian Centre for Economic 
Studies 2012a, p. 1). There are a total of 57 parks in the South East region, comprising 
two National Parks and 55 Conservation Parks; making up approximately one fifth of the 
total parks in South Australia. Two marine parks have also been proclaimed (Caton, 
Quinn, et al. 2011).  
At the time of this case study, the South East Region was divided into three NRM groups: 





Figure 5.14 Map of NR SE region, sub-regional NRM Groups, and Local Government Areas 
Map showing the South East NRM Groups; Northern, Central & Southern, as well as the District Council 
areas of Kingston, Robe and Wattle Range. Prominent coastal towns of the region - Kingston, Robe and 




Each ‘group’ is managed by formal sub-committees of the Board called NRM Groups 
(South East Natural Resources Management Board 2013) 18. The NR SE Board connects to 
the respective communities through these NRM Groups, who “facilitate information and 
knowledge transfer about their particular areas directly to the Board” and vice versa, as 
well as “assist the Board by monitoring, coordinating and undertaking specific functions 
involved in the implementation and development of regional NRM programs and plans” 
(South East Natural Resources Management Board 2010). NRM Group members comprise 
members of the community within the relevant geographic area, and possess a history of 
land management or other relevant experience specific to the geographic area (South 
East Natural Resources Management Board 2010).  
The NR SE coastline extends for approximately 427 km, equating to roughly 10 per cent of 
the South Australian coastline (Caton, Quinn, et al. 2011). Significant coastal attributes of 
the region include a series of stranded dunes that rise between 20-50 metres above 
interdunal plains, internationally-recognised wetlands including the Ramsar-listed Bool 
and Hacks lagoons, and part of the Coorong and Lower Lakes wetland system (South East 
Natural Resources Management Board 2010).  
The range of population densities and growth rates in these LGAs is shown in Table 5.4. A 
brief description of each local government area follows. 
Table 5.4 Population density and growth rates of local government case study sites in NR SE 
region 
Table comparing population density and growth rates of local government areas in the NR SE case study 





Population Growth 2005-2015 
(%) 
District Council of Kingston SE 2,407 333,979 0.007 -1.71 
District Council of Robe 1,387 109,161 0.01 2.37 
District Council of Wattle 
Range 
11,669 392,634 0.03 -6.45 
5.3.3.1 District Council of Kingston 
Situated on the low energy coast of Lacepede Bay, Kingston is located approximately 300 
km from Adelaide on the South East coast of South Australia. The area, with a population 
of around 2,400 and land area of almost 334,000 hectares, markets itself as the entrance 
to the Limestone Coast region (District Council of Kingston 2011, 2015). The economy and 
lifestyle of the area is highly dependent on the coastal zone, with significant lobster, 
aquaculture and fishing industries and recreational activities such as fishing (beach, boat 
and jetty), sailing, diving, kite surfing and safe swimming beaches supporting a strong 
tourism industry, especially during the summer months. Other key industries include 
agriculture, forestry and viticulture (District Council of Kingston 2011).  
                                                     
18 NR SE has since been re-organised into two areas (the Upper South East and the Lower South East) 




Figure 5.15 shows an aerial photograph of the township and coastline of Kingston. The 
District Council of Kingston is well-known for its safe beaches, coastal recreational 
activities such as fishing and diving, and national parks including the world-renowned 
Coorong (District Council of Kingston 2015). Cape Jaffa, located on the southern tip of 
Lacepede Bay approximately 20 km south of the Kingston township, is a commercial 
southern rock lobster fishing port and popular tourist destination due to the marina 
development and wine region (District Council of Kingston 2011). 
 
Figure 5.15 Aerial photograph of District Council of Kingston coastline 
Kingston, 2016. Image: se1604077; Source: Coast Protection Board (Department for Environment Water 
and Natural Resources 2016). 
5.3.3.2 District Council of Robe 
The District Council of Robe, covering an area of 109,161 hectares, is located 
approximately three and a half hours drive from Adelaide and five hours from Melbourne. 
The township of Robe, located on Guichen Bay, was founded as a seaport and village in 
1846. The first active port in the South East, it was also the site of several shipwrecks. 
Robe has the highest number of ‘historically important’ buildings recognised by the 
National Trust in South Australia, and the township of Robe is listed in the South 
Australian government’s Heritage Conservation Master Interpretation Plan (District 
Council of Robe 2016b). The increasing demand for residential development in Robe is 
evidenced by increasing median property prices; from AU$195,000 to $328,000 in just 
two years from 2003-5 (Huppatz 2005). 
Figure 5.16 shows an aerial photograph of the township and coastline of Robe. The 
District Council of Robe is characterised by freshwater lakes and estuaries, coastal dunes, 
rugged cliffs and sandy beaches (District Council of Robe 2016a). The district is known for 
its prime agricultural and viticultural land, and as a popular coastal destination for 




population of approximately 1,400 swells to around 16,000 during summer with tourists, 
holiday home owners and seasonal workers (Campbell Page 2010; District Council of 
Robe 2016a). 
 
Figure 5.16 Aerial photograph of District Council of Robe coastline 
Robe, 2016. Image: se1603299; Source: Coast Protection Board (Department for Environment Water and 
Natural Resources 2016). 
5.3.3.3 District Council of Wattle Range 
The District Council of Wattle Range is situated in the southern Limestone Coast region 
and, abutting the Victorian border, is located half way between Adelaide and Melbourne. 
The main towns, Millicent and Penola, are located inland, but Beachport and Southend 
are popular coastal towns (Campbell Page 2010; District Council of Wattle Range 2016a).  
The land area of the district comprises approximately 392,634 hectares and a population 
of 11,669 residents (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016). The economic base of the area 
include the Coonawarra wine region, plantation timber forests, horticulture and crops, 
fishing, power generation, government service delivery, education, hospitality, and 
tourism (Campbell Page 2010; District Council of Wattle Range 2016a; Wattle Range 
Council 2014). Emerging industries include processing of seaweed for food additives, 
renewable power generation through wind farms and geo-thermal technology, and gas 
and oil exploration (Wattle Range Council 2014). 
Figure 5.17 shows an aerial photograph of Beachport, a vulnerable section of the DC 
Wattle Range coastline. The scenic coastal towns of Beachport and Southend and the 
Canunda National Park and Rivoli Bay are popular coastal destinations for visitors and the 





Figure 5.17 Aerial photograph of District Council of Wattle Range coastline 
Beachport, 2016. Image: se1603113; Source: Coast Protection Board (Department for Environment Water 
and Natural Resources 2016). 
5.4 Coastal management issues: Results from this case study 
The results from interviews in this case study of South Australia revealed that the coastal 
management issues being experienced at the local and regional (NRM) level can be 
attributed to two main drivers: population pressure and climate change.  
I think the climate change issue and just increasing population adjacent to our coastline and 
just the thin strip that it is, you’re getting this impact from the coastal side, potential wave 
impact and erosion, but then you’ve got the amount of people that are being drawn to the 
coast and wanting to use the coast, it’s just... it’s under pressure and under siege [I27 LG 
AMLR]. 
Development. They’re the same issues everywhere, its development, inappropriate access - 
the network of informal tracks is quite astounding. Yeah and I guess, feral plants and 
animals. Yeah, and climate change, yeah [I12 NRM EP]. 
Councils, local governments sorry, are under a lot of pressure to develop and increase their 
rate revenue whereas sometimes it’s not the best results for the coast, as well as a whole 
range of I guess activities that impact on it through stormwater and a whole lot of things … 
The other most significant one down here is visitor impact, so how it is ‘used and abused’ if 
you like. And I guess overarching all of that is climate change [I19 NRM SE].  
With respect to population pressure, the main coastal management issues revolved 
around impacts of increased growth and visitation, access and inappropriate coastal 
development. With respect to climate change, the main coastal management issues 
included erosion, sea-level rise and inundation. It is interesting to note that, while the 
management issues varied depending on region and locale, the drivers of the issues – 




The following sections provide a sense of the types of coastal management issues being 
experienced in each case study region as a result of population pressure and climate 
change, as described by the local government and NRM representatives interviewed. The 
interview data is triangulated with secondary data from government reports and 
independent studies, thus verifying this study’s findings. 
5.4.1 Population pressure  
The AMLR region has the highest average population density and growth rate of the three 
case study regions examined. Such population pressure places direct stress on the 
integrity of coastal ecosystems (Government of South Australia 2008). Specific coastal 
management issues related to population pressure in the AMLR region include new and 
historic coastal development in vulnerable or hazardous locations; pressure for access to 
beaches, from driving on beaches, to shared-use paths through sensitive coastal habitat 
along the foreshore and illegitimate pathways through dunes; high visitation pressure in 
summer months; pollution and water quality issues related to urbanisation and 
stormwater management; and recreational over-fishing.  
Aldinga … always had cars on the beach, people using the beach, but it was for a seasonal 
time when holidays were on. Now the population has increased it’s just constant pressure 
[I27 LG AMLR]. 
A significant issue within the metropolitan coastal zone is the impact of stormwater run-
off on subsequent water quality and aquatic life, highlighting the importance of 
integrated management of the catchment-coast-marine continuum.   
The people pressure that we’re putting on … in terms of things like stormwater and water 
quality. We don’t have the open spaces we used to have, the backyards we used to have 
where you’d actually drain a lot of that water so we’re ending up with super highways of 
stormwater going out. Particularly in Adelaide we’re in a real problem that we’ve developed 
so much that we don’t have anywhere to store it before it goes out, which means that we 
have this pull the plug effect where everything goes out and gets to the coastal area and it’s 
you see the big brown plume but you don’t really think about it, you go “We can’t swim for 
a couple of days”. So a lot of the offshore effects are ‘out of sight, out of mind’ and that’s a 
real problem if you’re in charge of trying to actually manage that or have something to do 
with it [I30 NRM AMLR].  
This is a well-recognised problem, with several studies having been conducted into the 
impacts of stormwater on seagrass meadows and water quality in the metropolitan 
coastal zone.  
Dominant habitats in near shore subtidal waters they are generally seen as being in poor 
condition. A system in poor condition can lead to not only loss of ecological value but economic 
losses as well. Consistent with the findings of other similar large–scale studies, the Adelaide 
Coastal Waters Study (Fox et al. 2007) identified modification and degradation of Adelaide’s 
coastal marine environment as a result of many years of near-continuous inputs of nutrient 
rich, turbid and coloured water and wastewater … The Adelaide Coastal Waters Study 
generated a unique historical record of nitrogen (and other pollutant) loads to coastal waters, 
coupled with a long series of observations of seagrass cover in Adelaide coastal waters. 
Analysis of this historical loading trend (coupled with the realisation of long time lags in this 




widespread after the loads increased to about half the present levels (Adelaide and Mount 
Lofty Ranges Natural Resources Management Board 2013, p. 30) 
Other types of coastal issues exacerbated by increasing population pressure include loss 
of stabilising vegetation and erosion of dunes through inappropriate access; as well as the 
loss of habitat, biodiversity and ecological connectivity as a function of interrupting 
natural coastal ecosystems through coastal development, increased human access, and 
introduced species of both flora and fauna. 
Impact of growth, and buildings that are related to that growth, but also the visitations that 
are related to that growth, are having a huge effect on biodiversity impacts on the coast I 
think [I26 LG AMLR]. 
In the metropolitan LGAs of Port Adelaide Enfield and Onkaparinga, the desire to live in 
what is known as the ‘coastal strip’ and have easy access to the beaches are major issues. 
A legacy of inappropriate coastal development, inappropriate access to beaches, pressure 
to allow driving on beaches, and the building of shared-use paths through sensitive 
coastal areas are relevant examples.  
The peri-urban LGA of Victor Harbor experiences different kinds of population pressure to 
the metropolitan councils, in the form of the sea change phenomenon. As outlined in 
Table 3.3, there exists a typology of coastal communities experiencing the sea change 
phenomenon (Gurran, Squires & Blakely 2005). The City of Victor Harbor is classified as a 
‘coastal getaway’, that is, a coastal town within a three-hour drive of a capital city popular 
for day trips and holiday homes. This type of population pressure is perceived to be a 
problem for a relatively small council like Victor Harbor due to their low capacity to 
provide the infrastructure and services the ‘city-dwelling sea changers’ are used to and 
demand.  
Forty percent of our population... er, our land owners are non-resident. Um, the large part 
of that forty percent are Adelaide people who have a home in Victor Harbor as a second 
home, and come down here, you know, every weekend. Um, so in population terms what... 
you know, we talk about Victor Harbor having a population of fourteen and a half 
thousand, um, and with the visitors, with the visitors on weekends it could be twenty-four, 
twenty-five thousand every weekend. 
Despite the low population densities in the NR EP region, population pressure was 
perceived to be a significant coastal issue for local government and NRM Boards alike, 
reportedly due to population growth and increased visitation. The population of the EP 
region as a whole grew by over five percent between 2001-2010, and is projected to grow 
by almost five percent from 2011-2026 (South Australian Centre for Economic Studies 
2012b, p. 2). Table 5.3 shows that population growth over the last ten years have 
increased in all three LGAs studied: Lower Eyre Peninsula showing the largest growth at 
approximately 15 per cent, followed by Port Lincoln (seven per cent) while Tumby Bay’s 
growth was relatively minor in comparison (two per cent). Participants felt that, in terms 
of population growth and increased visitation, the biggest problem for small councils is 
the provision and maintenance of services and infrastructure.       
We’re starting to be recognised as a good place to be, to visit and to live. And that will then, 




the other thing for council is how to provide those facilities for, once again, either the 
services for the people or the services for the visiting tourists. I think they’re the main issues 
[I14 LG EP].   
Coastal areas were perceived to face substantial impacts of visitor population increases 
and recreational use.  
I guess recreational or tourism impacts are pretty big. We’re getting visited more and more 
from all sorts of fronts, whether it’s fisherman or grey nomads or just people coming to see 
Eyre Peninsula so… particularly in the last five or six years it’s gone from being a slow 
increase to a fairly rapid one [I10 NRM EP]. 
A more direct coastal impact would be illegal camping and access through the dunes and 
things like that, which… camping is one thing we don’t mind that, but when they start four-
wheel-driving over sensitive dune systems and things like that, we have problems. From a 
council perspective we can only manage that as best we can by blocking those access 
points, and the NRM is the re-vegetation [I13 LG EP]. 
For the LEP LGA, this is no mean feat with over 700 km of coastline. Issues resulting from 
increased visitation include demand for coastal infrastructure; increased demand for 
facilities such as toilets, car parks, trails, camping areas, boat ramps and moorings; and 
off-road vehicles, trail bikes and bush camping (Eyre Peninsula Natural Resources 
Management Board 2009).  
Likewise, population pressure was perceived to be a significant coastal issue in the NR SE 
region, mostly in relation to visitation and the impact of off-road vehicles on beaches. 
Towns such as Kingston, Robe and Beachport are sea change communities of the ‘coastal 
hamlet’ typology (Gurran, Squires & Blakely 2005). In South Australia, the regulations 
regarding off road vehicles on beaches are enacted by councils, who are responsible for 
the management of local government land, and “may include the installation of gates and 
signs, the creation of codes of conduct, creation of by-laws permitting/prohibiting ORV 
use, opening and closing of roads or trails and numerous other functions” (Local 
Government Association of South Australia 2011, p. 11). Beach driving is permitted by the 
coastal councils of the NR SE region. Participants recognised the proximity of this region 
to Victoria, where beach driving is not permitted, to be an issue specific to the NR SE 
region. This issue has also been noted by others; “Victorian ORV users are known to travel 
interstate to Robe, eastern South Australia to drive on beaches” (Sargent et al. 2012, p. 
10).  
Yeah the population pressure, but particularly because one of the things about Robe is you 
can drive on the beach for a start … a lot of people come from Victoria because it is quite 
close there and that is increasing as well … Long Beach is very popular beach here, you 
know, people come here over the summer because of the beach and really they wouldn’t be 
coming otherwise. The fact that you can drive on the beach is a real boom for this town … It 
is sort of a compelling problem, the more people you get there, you’ve got less resources to 
handle it, more prospects of damage being caused... So we try to manage it as best we can 
we try and do our bit to make sure that people do the right thing and maintain that 





5.4.2 Climate change 
Some representatives of local government and NRM regions in this study referred to 
climate change in general as one of the main coastal management issues facing their local 
government area or NRM region. Others referred to specific hazards posed in the coastal 
zone as a result of climate change, including sea-level rise, storm surge, inundation, 
erosion and cliff instability. Many respondents also raised governance-related issues 
pending the impact of climate change. For example, issues included the dilemma of how 
to afford to maintain and protect infrastructure and assets; appropriate decision-making 
regarding new development in vulnerable areas; and a lack of financial resources or 
information available to enable effective decision-making; as well as the risk of liability 
and the need for an unpopular policy of retreat.  
In the NR AMLR region there are a high number of assets and infrastructure at risk from 
the impacts of climate change (Department of Climate Change 2009; Department of 
Climate Change and Energy Efficiency 2011). Each of the local government areas in the 
coastal NR AMLR region described instances of urban development in hazardous areas 
which are already vulnerable to erosion or inundation, where vulnerability will only 
increase with the effects of climate change.  
For example, a significant feature of the City of Onkaparinga coastline are the cliffs at 
Witton Bluff, which are unlike the more erosion-resistant cliffs elsewhere in the LGA due 
to the outer surface being soft clay and sandstone overlaying limestone (Bourman, 
Murray-Wallace & Harvey 2016). Ongoing exposure to rain, wind and waves has resulted 
in erosion and cliff instability, providing an ongoing risk to local government assets such 
as the main road on top of the cliff, as well as risks to the public (Clarke & Simpson 2010). 
As a result, extensive rock protection has been installed (Bourman, Murray-Wallace & 
Harvey 2016).  
In my area I guess cliff stability, coastal erosion… at the moment it’s not serious but it is 
directly affecting council infrastructure and also a lot of the amenity, you know, and natural 
values that we have got along the coast. Um, so part of the long-term planning is to protect 
these areas, try and enhance them at the same time... And really looking at climate change 
as well, as a part of that, the impact of that on those. Um, they’re the main issues and they 
are big dollar items and not, yeah, sort of 50-100 thousand dollar fixes there. It’ll be in the 
millions, tens of millions sort of thing [I28 LG AMLR]. 
According to Caton (2007), the cliffs and beaches are the most susceptible to the threat 
of climate change; cliff and beach erosion will become more intense as sea level rises, and 
the Onkaparinga Estuary will experience more frequent marine flooding. Furthermore, 
dune systems will recede or destabilise due to a combination of sea-level rise and 
increasing aridity impacting dune vegetation (Caton 2007). 
The City of Port Adelaide Enfield is at significant risk of inundation, due in part to the on-
going issue of subsidence around the Port River Estuary owing to a combination of 
tectonic subsidence and groundwater removal since European settlement (Bourman, 
Murray-Wallace & Harvey 2016). This will be exacerbated by rising sea levels. In 2009, the 




identified the western region of Adelaide as being one of the most vulnerable areas in the 
nation. The City of Port Adelaide Enfield was found to be particularly vulnerable:  
23 per cent of residential buildings in the City of Port Adelaide Enfield could be affected by sea-
level rise by 2100. A recent study of seawater flooding risk to Port Adelaide identified that the 
estimated costs from flooding damage from the combined effects of sea-level rise (50–88 
centimetres) and local land subsidence during a 1-in-100 year storm tide event could increase 
from $8–28 million for a current day event to $180–310 million under future scenarios 
(Department of Climate Change 2009, p. 110). 
Hence, the need to maintain and protect existing assets and infrastructure in this area is 
high on the council’s priority list.  
Well, there will be inundation from king tides. Because the gulf is fairly shallow out from our 
coastline… certainly I see our biggest threat is a major king tide or a number of major king 
tides which could inundate very large areas of the [Le Fevre] Peninsula and Port Adelaide 
and that would cause significant damage [I32 LG AMLR]. 
Exacerbating the population pressure in the region, climate change will have serious 
impacts for the City of Port Adelaide Enfield. 
We manage stormwater management. Sea-level rise is going to be a huge impact on 
stormwater management because, particularly in these areas of flat, we get sea-level rise 
and stormwater can’t get out. So we’ve got serious problems [I33 LG AMLR].  
For the smaller seaside council of the City of Victor Harbor, of foremost concern in the 
context of climate change were the issues of sea-level rise and inundation, how to plan 
for the future, and concerns over council’s liability in terms of development approval. 
According to the National ‘First Pass’ Assessment Report: Climate Change Risks to 
Australia’s Coast: 
Victor Harbor [has] a significant number of buildings located within 110 metres of ‘soft’ coast… 
between 240 and 320 residential buildings within 110 metres of ‘soft’ shoreline. In the absence 
of coastal protection measures or other adaptation responses, these buildings may be at risk of 
increased erosion with sea-level rise and storm surge due to their location and the nature of 
the shoreline (Department of Climate Change 2009, p. 111). 
The City of Victor Harbor was struggling with the feasibility of a ‘protect versus retreat’ 
policy.   
First there is a planning matter that council needs to consider seriously: where do we go 
medium to long-term with regard to planning our zoning provisions within our development 
plan? And how do we address, you know, what’s in existence already? You know, how do 
we protect, you know, it’s either protect or retreat... and we need to decide, what are the 
best strategies for each particular area. Because our lower-lying areas are probably the 
oldest and either highly populated or commercial retail areas, we’re probably looking at 
protection rather than retreat. So that’s a challenge [I24 LG AMLR]. 
Participants also felt strong concern regarding council’s legal liability over development in 




The liability aspects are a challenge for council … what planning responsibility do we have 
to take with regard to any potential claims that might be forthcoming? What decisions have 
council made that have potentially exposed us to future liability? [I24 LG AMLR] 
Local councils require a greater protection from legal liability where they provide advice or 
make a decision in good faith relating to coastal planning and the impact of climate change 
[I29 LG AMLR]. 
Climate change also figured as a significant coastal issue in the perceptions of the 
participants from the EP region, despite the fact that the level of scepticism regarding 
climate change impacts was arguably higher among local government representatives 
than it was in the other regions.  
One we need to look at, the climate change issues that we need to look at, you know, with 
low lying land and all of those things [I14 LG EP].  
In this area here it’s definitely climate change issues with sea level rise [I15 LG EP]. 
In line with the issues described in the NR EP Board report, ‘State of our resources: 
Recognising the state of natural resources of the Eyre Peninsula’ (Eyre Peninsula Natural 
Resources Management Board 2009), low lying areas and historical development in 
hazardous coastal locations were perceived to be of concern in this region. 
Probably the biggest one for us is protection of - well actually we’ve probably got two big 
ones: protection of existing development. There’ve been townships have been allowed to be 
built in what we consider inappropriate areas and now we need to protect them. We’ve got 
Tulka down south which, there’s shacks within 10 meters of the water and it’s eroding, so 
we’ve got a sea wall along a portion of it, and we’ve got to build another one to protect 
that. And the other one is development, or new development in inappropriate areas [I13 LG 
EP].  
In NR SE, climate change was largely accepted as being in progress by the local 
government and NRM representatives spoken to. Although some respondents may have 
been sceptical as to the anthropogenic source of climate change, or were certainly aware 
of their community’s scepticism, the changes they were seeing on the coast for 
themselves were sufficient for them to accept that protection and adaptation along their 
coast was a priority.  
Whether you believe in climate change or not, I think there’s definitely a change in coastal 
processes, whatever brings that about. And I think that we’re actually going through a 
phase… once upon a time we used to be building beaches, and now we’re actually losing 
beaches [120 LG SE]. 
Ah look, the most significant issue really is the, well we call it ‘climate change’, whatever 
you want to call it… But, you know, the threats that come from the potential change in 
climate. We’re not a council that tries to debate the ins-and-outs of what coastal change is. 
We, we’re a fairly conservative council so we try to go down the line that, you know, like 
any other business activity, there’s a risk in terms of managing coastal environment and we 
need to understand those risks. So for us, obviously coastal environment issues of potential 
sea-level rises, yeah, stronger storm surge issues, you know, and the erosion and those 




The most noticeable climate change impacts observed in the SE region were increasing 
erosion of beaches due to storm surges and high tides in the area.  
We certainly have noticed here in the last, well the short time that I’ve been here; I’ve been 
coming, even though I’ve only been working here four years, I’ve been coming to Robe, 
regularly for forty years, so I am pretty familiar with the place, and one thing we have 
noticed is the erosion of beaches, from storm surges and high tides over the winter/spring 
months [I21 LG SE]. 
These perceptions are corroborated in two reports. Firstly, a report on the Limestone 
Coast prepared for the economic progression association, Regional Development 
Australia, which states that:  
The DC of Robe has identified climate change as an issue citing more frequent and destructive 
storm surges causing damage to infrastructure, beach erosion and king tides as major 
concerns. Sea-level rise will be a problem for coastal councils impacting on storm water 
drainage, sewage disposal and coastal infrastructure in general; these impacts will affect 
several aspects of council operations including but not limited to: infrastructure, parks and 
gardens, the provision of community services and liability and risks associated with insurance 
and legal obligations (South Australian Centre for Economic Studies 2012a, p. 14). 
Secondly, the First Pass National Assessment of Climate Change Risks to Australia’s coast 
revealed that the SE townships of Kingston and Robe have the highest proportion of ‘at-
risk dwellings’ in South Australia. This number would likely be higher if storm tides were 
included in the inundation analysis:  
While the total number of buildings at risk may be relatively small, between 40–70 per cent of 
residential buildings in Kingston … and between 40–50 per cent of residential buildings in Robe 
may be affected by sea-level rise by 2100 (Department of Climate Change 2009, p. 109). 
As a result of this vulnerability, the ‘maintain and protect’ approach was favoured. 
I just think it’s actually the loss of beaches and that’s actually eroding into sand dunes and 
that sort of dune formation, and once they’re gone I don’t think you’re gonna get them back 
because, you know, some of those are heavily vegetated and that sort of stuff so what 
you’re gonna get back is gonna take a long time – if it does come back – it’s gonna take a 
lot of time to re-establish itself. So for us it’s actually trying to work on slowing down the 
processes or shifting them away from public and private infrastructure as a way of trying to 
protect that investment [I20 LG SE].  
Concerns related to climate change were also often associated with the uncertainty 
around it. The lack of data, decision-making information and guidance from other levels 
of government were raised as significant issues.  
Well, I think climate change is the big ticket item, and no one really knows and there are 






5.5 Chapter summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide a rich description of the case study sites 
selected for this study, and the types of coastal management issues facing them, in order 
to assist with transferability and generalisability of these case study results to other 
regions across South Australia and Australia.  
Analysis of interview transcripts revealed that population pressure and climate change 
are the principle drivers of the main coastal management issues raised by local 
government and NRM representatives across each region. While there were nuances in 
the specifics of the coastal issues in each region which reflected the geographic and 
demographic make-up of that region, it is interesting that irrespective of the 
metropolitan or rural character of the case study region, the main coastal management 
issues being faced at the local and regional level could be attributed to either population 
pressure or climate change.  
The consistency of these main coastal issues across case study regions underscores the 
significance of these twin pressures for local government and NRM managers alike. In 
terms of coastal management, both of these pressures can be better managed through 
improved coastal governance. However, the pervasiveness of these issues, as evidenced 
by the interview data as well as the secondary data cited, implies that their management 
is not yet under control.  
This background information serves as a preface to the exploration of the governance 




 Coastal governance issues for local government: 
Results of a South Australian case study  
6.1 Chapter overview 
The purpose of Chapter Six is to address the first research question, in the context of 
coastal management:  
What is the nature of local government in South Australia? From the local 
government perspective, what are the governance issues posed by Australian 
federalism? 
Thus, this chapter focuses on coastal governance issues by examining the roles, 
responsibilities and capacity of local government in the context of the Australian 
federation. Specifically, the chapter explores the local government representatives’ 
perceptions of what constitute the main coastal governance issues with respect to 
integrated coastal management.  
6.2 Local government: Coastal management roles & responsibilities  
As outlined in Chapter Two, local government is regarded as an integral part of the 
Australian system of government due to its significant role in municipal governance, 
planning, community development, service delivery, asset management and regulation 
(Australian Local Government Association 2012; Department of Infrastructure and 
Regional Development 2015). Since local governments are enacted by state government 
legislation, their responsibilities are delegated by their respective state governments 
(Sansom 2009).  
With respect to coastal governance and operational management, local government has 
been delegated many state government responsibilities, including development planning, 
development assessment, public land management, stormwater management and 
drainage. Local government is also responsible for the day-to-day maintenance of beach 
access and facilities in their jurisdiction; in many cases this includes significant 
infrastructure such as jetties and boat ramps, as well as stormwater and sewerage 
infrastructure (LGASA 2003). In terms of climate change adaptation, local government’s 
role in land-use planning and development decision-making in the coastal zone is a critical 
one (Harvey & Caton 2010).  
These roles and responsibilities, and local government’s capacity to fulfil them, are 
explored in the following section. The results of interviews with local government 
representatives in response to questions regarding the governance arrangements for 
coastal management in Australia are synthesised with secondary data to enhance our 




6.3 The local government perspective: Results from a South Australian 
case study 
Several prominent themes emerged from the interviews with local government 
representatives regarding the roles and responsibilities of the spheres of government 
involved in coastal management in Australia. These themes included (i) a strong discourse 
around local government’s lack of financial resources to cope with their coastal 
management responsibilities; (ii) local government’s lack of autonomy from state 
government; (iii) the problem of state government cost-shifting to local government; and 
(iv) local government’s lack of recognition in the Australian Constitution. Each of these 
themes will be discussed in turn below.  
6.3.1 Lack of financial resources 
The main governance issue raised in this case study related to local government’s coastal 
zone management responsibilities was a perceived lack of financial resources to 
effectively manage the coast, including to maintain and protect existing assets and 
infrastructure, especially in the face of impending climate change impacts. 
The thing that ties all of this together is the fact that there are assets. And people. And so I 
think the biggest risk for councils in coastal areas is existing assets within risk zones. And 
how to juggle the breadth and width of the risk with the limited resources... and, the 
problem of having something built in that space, it kind of limits their options, you know. So, 
I think the biggest risk is around what we’ve already got in place, and, with the continual 
creep effect of erosion, but also the ongoing increase in incidence and strength of 
inundation in some of our low lying areas as well [I25 LGASA]. 
I don’t think there’s anywhere near adequate resourcing to do the job that needs to be done 
[I26 LG AMLR]. 
Lack of funding restricts the capacity of councils to defend their planning decisions when 
these are challenged before appeals tribunals or land environment courts. Lack of funding 
also affects the capacity of local councils to undertake adaptation works in the interests of 
reducing their community’s potential exposure to climate change risks [I29 LG AMLR]. 
A lack of resources to adequately manage coastal management issues within their 
jurisdiction was a concern in all councils. Despite the strong rate bases of the large 
metropolitan councils of the City of Onkaparinga and the City of Port Enfield, concern 
over a lack of financial resources to deal with coastal issues still featured as a significant 
issue.  
In my area I guess cliff stability, coastal erosion … at the moment it’s not serious but it is 
directly affecting council infrastructure and also a lot of the amenity, you know, and natural 
values that we have got along the coast. So part of the long-term planning is to protect 
these areas, and try and enhance them at the same time. And it’s really just a matter of 
prioritising, going through a prioritising process to try and get some of these areas repaired 
and fixed um, around, yeah... And really looking at climate change as well, as a part of that, 
the impact of that on those. They’re the main issues and they are big dollar items and not, 
yeah, sort of 50-100 thousand dollar fixes there. It’ll be in the millions, tens of millions sort 




A lack of financial resources was also a major issue facing the smaller, non-metropolitan 
councils.  
I think the one thing local government does really well though is it gets the problem solved. 
And it gets into it. But a lot of the stuff we’re grappling with is way and above our resource 
levels [I23 LG SE]. 
Local government representatives also spoke of the financial constraints at the state 
government level, which they perceived to be severely limiting to what local government 
is able to do in terms of coastal management and protection. 
We’ll certainly be seeking some state government help but I think we’ll be unlucky, I’ll think 
we’ll be very lucky if we’re going to get it, they’re not handing it out [I21 LG SE]. 
We’ve got a significant area of erosion we’re dealing with, we’ve had some recently good 
outcomes with DENR and the Coastal Protection Board. But it’s spasmodic. I don’t think it’s 
properly funded. They are, the organisations themselves aren’t properly funded [I23 LG SE].   
Unfortunately we’re relying on Coastal Protection Board for support funding for those 
programs and, you know, we’re now looking at a state-wide call upon their purse, and 
sometimes we get a knockback and can’t continue with the program, you know, for a one or 
two year period that we put in place. So the, you know, the state government needs to look 
at that issue in terms of adequately resourcing those grant funding programs that we’re all 
trying to tap into [I24 LG AMLR]. 
Local governments, rural and metropolitan alike, were looking to state and federal 
governments for the provision of either data or funding assistance to enable detailed 
local mapping and risk assessment, in order to understand the likely impacts of climate 
change in their area.  
So we really need some drivers and some assistance coming from those federal and state 
levels. You know, around mapping projects, around, you know, modelling projects, around 
risk assessments, all those sorts of things that come with understanding infrastructure 
impacts, liveability impacts, those types of things [I23 LG SE]. 
Often we just find it difficult to apply development plan provisions about the coast because 
we don’t have information ... an example is, there’s a whole lot of new development plan 
provisions about sea-level rise that have just come into all councils’ development codes … So 
they say things like ‘if a development application comes in that is within a coastal zone or 
within 100 metres of the coast, then you must make sure that it can deal with what 2100 or 
2070 sea-level rise is going to be and you also have to take into account erosion and provide 
for a buffer. And, you know, also include subsidence and storm surge’. So our development 
assessment guys would say “well okay, what does that mean? How high is that going to 
mean? How wide is a buffer going to be? How far is erosion going to go?” It’s going to be 
different in different areas, depending on the type of topography and so on. Does a 
developer go out and do sea-level rise modelling for one development? Of course not. And 
we shouldn’t even expect them to. Should local government do it? Okay, maybe, maybe … 
but most councils wouldn’t have any and would, and no way would have the funds to do it. 
Is it a state government thing? Well, some state governments in Australia do certainly have 
it, have started doing that, high resolution sea-level rise modelling that can be used for 




For the more isolated LGAs of the rural west and east of SA, a lack of resources to manage 
coastal issues may have reflected several factors; the low rate base of these LGAs, the 
expansive land and coastline area under local government responsibility, and the 
unwillingness of LGAs to raise rates in fear of discouraging population growth of the area 
or potentially losing votes in the next local election (Sansom 2009).  
So, um, look, some of our coastal councils are, regional councils, are literally just trying, you 
know, scratching to keep up with the day-to-day business of running a council [I25 LGASA]. 
Local governments are empowered via state government legislation to raise revenue 
through council rates on property, user fees and charges, interest fines and other 
penalties, and developer charges and contributions (Productivity Commission 2008). Local 
government rhetoric is that local governments are in a position of limited fiscal capacity. 
This is exemplified by the LGASA’s current rates campaign, shown in Figure 6.1.  
 
Figure 6.1 LGASA Rates Campaign 2016 
Source: LGASA (2016).     
The reality is that, according to the 2013-14 figures shown in Table 6.1, councils raise on 
average 92.8 per cent of their own revenue with grants and subsidies making up the 
remaining 7.2 per cent. In South Australia, own-source revenue amounted to 92.4 per 
cent of local government expenditure. However, state and national averages mask the 
fact that the local government’s ability to raise revenue varies considerably depending on 
their location (urban versus rural), population size, rating base and ability to levy user 





Table 6.1 Local government revenue sources by jurisdiction 2013–14 
Percentage figures show the proportion of ‘revenue derived from each source’ out of the ‘total revenue of 
the state’. Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Government Finance Statistics, Australia, 2013–14, ABS 
cat. no. 5512.0 in Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (2015, p. 5). 
 
The majority of local government own-source revenue is raised through taxation via rates 
applied to property. According to Table 6.2, in 2013–14, the national average of local 
government revenue from rates was 38.2 per cent; South Australia had the highest 
percentage at 63 per cent of own-source revenue (Department of Infrastructure and 
Regional Development 2015). This figure indicates the high dependence of local 
government own-source revenue on rates applied to property in South Australia. In the 
rural EP and SE regions, the practical implications of local governments’ reliance on own-
source revenue, and the need to grow revenue streams to meet future needs, was in the 
forefront of interviewees’ minds. 
We’ve got miles and miles of space. We’re desperate for any sort of activity, whether it’s 
industrial or whether it’s commercial or whether it’s residential development [I9 LG EP]. 
We need to be able to grow, so we can support our schools and our hospitals, ‘cause if we 
don’t do that… we can’t stay static ‘cause that will not, that will not retain our hospitals and 
our teachers, you know. I know we can now, but you know what it’s like … we need to have 
some sort of growth … We need to be able to have some sort of growth, and that needs to 
be promoted but in a sense, um, so we need to encourage development but we need to also 
be, also aware that we need to be careful about how we do it [I14 LG EP]. 
Now local government, um, you know, the, they’re interested in rates, development, and 
they don’t see ecology as being important. Develop at any cost [I22 NRM SE]. 
Despite the variance in own-source revenue-raising capacity across councils, there are 
options open to local governments looking to fund coastal initiatives and infrastructure. 
Options relevant to coastal councils include increasing council rates, stipulating developer 
charges and contributions for developments in the coastal zone, and special service and 




been suggested that local government is in a good position to source finance for 
infrastructure through borrowing due to their very low net debt (Productivity Commission 
2008; Sansom 2009). It should be noted that, due to “state government restrictions on 
the level of borrowings or the purpose or the source of borrowings”, this would require 
state government approval (Productivity Commission 2008, p. 22).   
6.3.2 Lack of autonomy from state government 
Many local governments feel insecure about their place in the federal system (Australian 
Local Government Association 2012; Megarrity 2011; Wild River 2006). This is because 
local government is not recognized in the Australian Constitution, and – despite being 
“granted varying degrees of recognition and protection under state Constitutions” – the 
format of local government can be altered relatively simply through changes to state 
legislation (Sansom 2010, p. 180). Since councils can be “created, dismissed and directed 
as the states wish” (Sansom 2002, p. 2), their place at the bottom of the ‘pecking order’ 
was felt strongly by local government representatives interviewed in this case study, in 
particular the elected representatives. 
Everything I see in South Australian local government just indicates that state doesn’t trust 
local government to make the right decisions, so they bring in big brother with an overview 
to say yes or no. Every development application needs to be referred to a whole raft of 
government agencies that either comment or refuse or say “no” or generally make it more 
difficult for us. And they don’t, they don’t… To me, it’s as if they don’t trust local 
government to make reasonable decisions, whether it’s about protecting the environment 
or developing further industrial land or whatever [I9 LG EP]. 
… if push comes to shove and the local community want to do something and the state 
doesn’t want to do it, the state wins [I9 LG EP]. 
I think local government in a lot of cases is the last person on the end of the chain. We’ve 
got a lot of people telling us, setting the rules and regulations and we’re trying to meet 
some, and basically, you know, like our council, we’ve got six-hundred-and-something 
kilometres of coastline and we’re a small council. There’s no way we’re going to be able to 
do everything that is put down. But, look, a lot of our planning comes down from state 
government and, the coastal um, they’re trying to bring in a coastal conservation zone, and 
that has stalled at the moment but I’ve got no doubt it will be picked up again, and the 
Coast Protection Board, the state government one, has a lot to say what we can and can’t 
do along the coastal area. The NRM also have their say. So, as I see it, we’re on the end of 
the chain [I14 LG EP]. 
It’s not helped by overzealous state government agencies who, who want to just shut 
people out without trade-offs [I15 LG EP]. 
Even the decisions that local government makes in terms of by-laws, development 
assessment plans… are all potentially overridden, even though their local decisions made in 
consultation with local people, can be vetoed by state government. So at the end of the day, 
I’d go so far as to say local government exists as a whim of the state government because 
we exist because of their act of parliament, and I think we are treated accordingly. I think 
we are - it’s very much a servant/master relationship, it’s not a collaborative, join hands 
and go in partnership, it is definitely, in my view from all of the experience that I’m talking 




I have seen similar things happen where the government – this goes to state government – 
may not be necessarily happy with the direction a council might be taking on an issue, so 
they'll establish a Working Party Group. All of a sudden this ‘group’ will come in and be 
trying to do things that really, the state government and the local council should have got 
their heads around years ago. So why establish another group? And is that just so that that 
group can actually give the government the decisions and answers they want, and therefore 
cut out the true representation of the people, which is the local government? Local 
government’s been elected to perform the role. Now, either that local government is 
empowered to do that or the state government wipes them out. You don't bring in other 
little focus groups, and I'm sure if we were to try that with either the state or federal 
government they'd be very annoyed [I32 LG AMLR]. 
At the heart of this dissonance is what Wild River (2002) refers to as the local-state 
antinomy: the reality that local governments’ perspective on the role of local government 
differs from the state government’s perspective, where both are equally valid points of 
view. That is to say, since local governments are in fact constituted under state 
government legislation, accordingly, state government perceives local governments’ role 
as one of service delivery to the local area on behalf of the state government. Conversely, 
since local government councilors are democratically elected by the constituents of the 
local government area, and since local governments have formal legislative roles within 
that area, the local government perspective is that they are autonomous, and their role is 
to serve their local constituency. As Wild River (2006, p. 4) articulates: 
The simultaneous but contradictory views of the local governments as creatures and servants 
of the state and the local are both valid in historical, legal and practical terms. The results of 
this conflict cause considerable frustration among officials working in both local and state or 
territory spheres, since their expectations of one another are rarely met (author’s own 
emphasis).  
Compounding the discord resulting from this local-state antinomy is the pressure on local 
government to provide an increasing array of services and an unwillingness to raise 
further revenue through increasing rates or other means of revenue-raising. This issue is 
covered in the next section.  
6.3.3 Cost shifting 
A consistent source of tension from the local government perspective, raised in 
interviews with both local government staff and elected representatives, was the 
problem of state government cost shifting.    
Cost shifting is primarily a state phenomenon – a mix of devolution without funding (‘unfunded 
mandates’), legislation that imposes new functions or compliance requirements but without 
matching revenue, levies on local government to help fund state services, and restrictions on 
local government rates and charges (Sansom 2010, p. 192). 
Local government’s role has expanded significantly over the last 50 years, while their 
revenue base has not grown as substantially as that of the federal and state 
governments’ revenue bases over this period (Kelly, Dollery & Grant 2009; Megarrity 




I think there’s a power imbalance between the state and local government… because I think 
there’s too much concentration of power at the state level and expectation at the local 
level, so states have the power to create an expectation that local can deliver, and not 
funded accordingly. So I think there’s a bit of a weakness there in that it allows a group to 
have power but not to fund the group they expect to deliver adequately [I26 LG AMLR]. 
A lot of things are put onto local government because we're the bottom end of the tier, so 
we can't offload it to anyone else. So things have been flowing on to us, local government 
for years, but we're not necessarily getting any additional funding and experienced people 
to guide us through it [I32 LG AMLR].  
Cost shifting to local government is a well-recognised intergovernmental relations issue in 
Australia. In 2002, the federal government called for an inquiry into cost shifting, to be 
conducted by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Finance 
and Public Administration (HORSCEFPA). The HORSCEFPA report found five factors 
contributing to an increase in local government functions:  
1. Devolution, where another sphere of government gives local government 
responsibility for new functions;  
2. Raising the bar, where another sphere of government increases the complexity or 
standard of local government services; 
3. Cost shifting, whereby either:  
a. local government performs the services of another sphere and funding 
associated with this is later reduced or stopped; or,  
b. local government elects to take on a function that has been ceased by 
another sphere;  
4. Increased community expectations, whereby the community demands improved 
services;  
5. Policy choice, whereby individual local governments expand service provision by 
choice (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics Finance and 
Public Administration 2003; Kelly, Dollery & Grant 2009; Wild River 2006, p. 12). 
Recognising the significant influence of intergovernmental financial relations on local 
government roles and responsibilities, the SCEFPA report concluded that cost shifting is 
widespread and “is, ultimately, a symptom of what has become dysfunctional governance 
and funding arrangements” (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics 
Finance and Public Administration 2003, p. 139).      
With regard to coastal management, cost shifting was raised by several interviewees as 
an issue in terms of the significant resources required to manage large tracts of coastal 
Crown Land.  
Yeah, it’s a handball from the government, they own it and they say… ‘We own it, we want 
a say on what happens on it development-wise and things like that, and works, but that’s 
all your responsibility’ and they don’t like to come to the party very often with any sort of 
funding assistance either… We see that as a handball, a big handball because they want to 




These quotes illustrate the disempowering effect of the cost shifting issue in terms of 
local government being given responsibility without corresponding capacity, often in the 
form of financial capacity.  
Another source of tension related to cost shifting more broadly surrounded the collection 
and distribution of the state government-imposed NRM levy. As mentioned in Chapter 
Four, the NRM levy is paid by rate payers and collected by councils via their council rates 
notices on behalf of NRM Boards. Despite being provided an administration fee for 
collecting the levy, this was commonly perceived to be another form of cost shifting from 
state to local government. Furthermore, the NRM levy was effectively perceived as the SA 
government devolving their expenditure responsibility (that is, the funding of NRM) to 
the community. This was a source of considerable tension.  
And yet we're contributing so much to all these things, our ratepayers are contributing so 
much. Are we getting value for money? Is it like a River Murray Levy? Who knows? It's just 
money that you never see again [I32 LG AMLR].  
In addition to this, there was a lack of clarity on the role of NRM, and the value being 
obtained from the NRM levy was questioned.  
The NRM. I don’t know what they do. All I know is that there’s a levy that funds them… and I 
don’t know what they do. I don’t know what they do [I9 LG EP]. 
These observations suggest that a perceived lack of financial resources at the local 
government level is having a significant effect on intergovernmental relations between 
local and state government spheres. Reportedly, relations between coastal councils and 
the CPB were a lot more positive when the CPB had substantially more funding to assist 
local governments with their coastal management responsibilities (Caton 2011 pers 
comm). Considering this, and in light of the fact that the biggest concern for local 
government was their lack of resources to cope with their coastal management 
responsibilities, intergovernmental financial relations appear to contribute considerably 
to the state of intergovernmental relations.  
Supporting this idea, as evidenced by this quote reflecting a rural local government 
perspective, the opportunity to receive funding can be a strong driver of more positive 
intergovernmental relations.   
Well I think the state, South Australian state government, historically is poor in what they 
do. The amount of funding they put into NRM is poor. They’re talking about pulling out of 
RDA funding in 2013. Um, you know, just simple things like their road funding compared to 
other states, the state government is low. They’re poor. That’s why the Commonwealth 
government is so, the Commonwealth sector is so important to us because they bring a lot 
of funds in. And the NRM bring a lot of federal funds. The RDAs bring a lot of federal funds 
[I14 LG EP]. 
The evolving relationship between the local and federal government spheres, arguably 





6.3.4 Constitutional recognition of local government 
Local government associations across Australia are campaigning for the formal 
recognition of local government in the Australian Constitution (Australian Local 
Government Association 2012). At the heart of the most recent19 push for constitutional 
recognition is the drive for securing funding direct from the federal government without 
having to pass through state governments. 
The primary reason for seeking that constitutional recognition is so that we can establish a 
direct link, a legally-recognised direct link to federal government funding [I24 LG AMLR]. 
According to Sansom (2009, p. 20), “the single most important source of external funding 
for local government are the federal financial assistance grants first introduced in the 
mid-1970s and maintained or increased under bipartisan policies ever since”. These 
federal financial assistance grants (FAGs), also known as untied grants, are unconditional, 
providing recipient local government with significant independence in terms of their 
expenditure priorities.  
However, in line with constitutional law, federal FAGs are administered via state 
governments through their local government grants commissions. In 2006, FAGs were 
worth over US$1.4 billion (AUD$1.8 billion) per annum (Sansom 2009). Around two thirds 
of this grant funding is allocated to non-metropolitan councils with limited fiscal capacity, 
although this remains insufficient for such disadvantaged councils to reach average 
capacity for service delivery (Sansom 2009).  
The federal government also provides funding directly to local government in the form of 
Special Purpose Payments (SPPs). For example, an extra US$300 million (AUD$400 
million) per annum was allocated for the Roads to Recovery program in 2000, which 
funded “local road improvements and ‘strategic’ regional roads managed by local 
councils” (Sansom 2009, p. 21). Although local government has been receiving SPP 
funding directly from the federal government, this form of funding is challengeable in the 
High Court due to the fact that local government is not recognised in the Constitution 
(Sansom 2009). Consequently, local government remain anxious that such valuable future 
federal funding streams cannot be guaranteed. Constitutional recognition would enable 
local government to be able to legally receive funding directly from the federal 
government without having to go through the states (Australian Local Government 
Association 2012; Megarrity 2011).  
As noted by the interviewees, the ability of the federal government to fund local 
governments directly has mutual benefits for both parties:  
The federal government’s just got a lot more of it. Of the funds… And they, they actually like 
funding local governments directly because they don’t have to go through the state filtering 
and process [I33 LG AMLR]. 
                                                     
19 Referendums were held in 1974 and 1988 as to whether local government should be recognised in the 




This viewpoint is maintained in the Australian Local Government Association’s (ALGA) 
campaign material, The case for change: Why local government needs to be in the 
Australian Constitution (Australian Local Government Association 2012, p. 2), which 
claims that local governments cannot be expected to provide “the increasing range of 
services expected by the community” owing to limited resources. Furthermore, the 
Australian Local Government Association (2012, p. 2) states: 
Because most of the tax paid by Australians goes to the Federal Government (more than $4 out 
of every $5 in tax is collected by the Federal Government) it is important that the Federal 
Government can provide funding directly to councils to meet local community needs. 
The ALGA’s proposed change to the Constitution relates to Section 96, which at present 
refers to the federal government’s ability to fund state governments. According to the 
Australian Local Government Association (2012, p. 7), Section 96 of the Constitution 
should be amended (see italics) to read: 
During a period of ten years after the establishment of the Commonwealth and 
thereafter until the Parliament otherwise provides, the Parliament may grant financial 
assistance to any State, or to any local government body formed by a law of a State, on 
such terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit.  
It is important to note that local governments’ current quest for constitutional change is 
regarding their financial recognition only, in order to be able to access federal 
government funding; it does not affect democratic recognition, which would alter the 
states’ powers over the establishment of local governments (Australian Local 
Government Association 2012). This is in contrast to the last referendum of local 
government constitutional recognition, which reportedly failed to carry due to strong 
opposition from state governments (Sansom 2009).  
The campaign material for local governments’ financial recognition in the Australian 
Constitution argues that this is the only way to secure existing and future federal 
government funding (Australian Local Government Association 2012). Whilst stating that 
receiving funding directly from the federal government was the most efficient option, it 
was not clear why funding could not continue to be simply diverted to local government 
through the states. The interview data sheds light on this, as there was a strong 
impression from the local government perspective that federal government funding 
passing through the state government before being transferred to the local level was 
ineffective.  
Every time we go through state government, more money comes out, you know, they, they 
just strip money out of it and like it’s like putting it through a sieve you know, some sticks to 
the state government [I20 LG SE].  
Direct funding to local councils is a far more effective way of implementing climate change 
adaptation measures and other coastal planning issues, as there is no guarantee that 
Commonwealth funds distributed to local councils through state governments will be 




This opinion has also been supported in the academic literature. Sansom (2010, p. 193) 
notes that state governments sometimes intercept or offset federal government funding 
designated for local government initiatives:  
Local government does not always receive its fair share of Commonwealth special purpose 
payments made to and through the states, and in some cases states have offset increased 
federal grants by reducing their own assistance to councils. 
These issues are important contributors to the lack of autonomy, and hence local 
governments’ overall feeling of disempowerment, within the Australian federal system. 
Furthermore, these examples of local governments’ distrust of state governments reflects 
yet another symptom of local-state tension and poor intergovernmental relations. These 
issues underpin local governments’ previous and current campaign for recognition in the 
Australian Constitution.  
6.4 Key findings 
The local-state intergovernmental relationship is “undoubtedly coloured by Australia’s 
Constitutional framework [whereby] local government is not recognised in the federal 
Constitution and is legally totally subservient to the states” (Sansom 2002, p. 2). The 
examples provided above offer a glimpse into the poor shape of local-state 
intergovernmental relations currently playing out in the practice of coastal management 
in South Australia.  
It appears that previous coastal management literature has not focused on the tension 
between local and state governments in the context of coastal management. Thus, these 
issues are worthy of further exploration. The attitudes of local government 
representatives towards the SA government consistently reflected feelings of 
disempowerment, distrust and resentment in the face of their delegated responsibilities. 
The observed acrimony was greatest around the subject of local government’s roles and 
responsibilities within the federal system with regard to two related issues:  
1) High responsibility versus low capacity, whereby local government lacks the 
financial resources to carry out delegated responsibilities, and lacks the fiscal 
capacity to raise sufficient revenue for their substantial expenditure needs. This 
issue is exacerbated by on-going cost shifting from state to local government.  
2) A lack of autonomy, whereby local government perceives their position as a 
creature of the states conflicts with their legislative role to serve their local 
constituency.  
Both of these issues are fundamentally a function of asymmetrical power relations with 
the state government which, ultimately, disempower local government and lead to the 





6.5 Chapter summary 
In this South Australian case study of coastal management in a federal system, the results 
presented in this chapter reveal the local government perspective. The main coastal 
governance issue raised by local government representatives was a lack of financial 
resources to deal with various aspects of coastal management, particularly in the face of 
population pressure and impending climate change impacts, and ongoing cost shifting 
from state government. These asymmetries in responsibility versus capacity are coupled 
with a lack of autonomy from the state government and a lack of recognition as a 
legitimate sphere of government in the Australian Constitution. Thus, the overall sense of 
the position of local government in the Australian federal system is one of 
disempowerment.  
The next chapter examines the state government perspective, presenting perceptions of 
the main issues with respect to coastal governance arrangements for integrated coastal 







 Coastal governance issues for state government: 
Results of a South Australian case study 
7.1 Chapter overview 
The purpose of Chapter Seven is to address the second research question, in the context 
of coastal management: 
What is the nature of state government in South Australia? From the state 
government perspective, what are the governance issues posed by Australian 
federalism? 
Thus, this chapter focuses on coastal governance issues by examining the roles, 
responsibilities and capacity of the state government in the context of the Australian 
federation. Specifically, the chapter explores the state government representatives’ 
perceptions of what constitute the main coastal governance issues with respect to 
integrated coastal management.  
7.2 State government: Coastal management roles & responsibilities  
In terms of the Australian Constitution, authority over any powers that were not 
exclusively centralised at the federal level remain with the states. Hence, planning and 
management responsibilities in the coastal zone reside with the states (Harvey & Caton 
2010; Haward 1995b). All states have enacted a range of legislation or other instruments 
to manage activity within the coastal zone (Clarke 2010; Harvey 2016). Consequently, 
coastal governance arrangements in Australia vary considerably on a state-by-state basis.  
The specific coastal governance arrangements in South Australia are outlined in 
Chapter Four. These roles and responsibilities, and the state government’s capacity to 
fulfil them, are explored in the following sections. The results of interviews with SA 
government representatives in response to questions regarding the governance 
arrangements for coastal management in Australia are synthesised with secondary data 
to enhance our understanding of the state government perspective. It should be kept in 
mind that the state government perspective presented here represents that of the 
Department for Environment (DE) and the Coast Protection Board (CPB), and does not 
include any other SA government agencies or elected members. 
7.3 The state government perspective: Results from a South Australian 
case study 
Three prominent themes emerged from the interviews with state government 
representatives regarding the roles and responsibilities of the spheres of government 
involved in coastal management in Australia. These themes were (i) a lack of financial 
resources to provide and maintain coastal protection works across the state; (ii) a lack of 
autonomy in terms of federal government intervention in matters of state government 
jurisdiction; and (iii) a lack of power for the Coast Protection Board to direct development 




7.3.1 Lack of financial resources 
A resounding issue, raised by local, NRM and state government representatives alike, was 
a lack of financial resources at the state government level. The perceived decline of the 
SA government CPB fund, which is used to assist councils to fund projects to maintain and 
protect existing coastal assets, natural or built, was highlighted.  
Well they don’t have the money. They don’t have the money… In terms of works, it’s about 
$400,000 at the moment. Well, that’s about $4 million less than they need to spend at even 
a cursory glance, so, they obviously don’t have the money. So the answer to your question is 
no the state of South Australia does not have the money [I1 SG]. 
The Coast Protection Board is struggling with limited funding.  We’ve got an ever growing 
list of unfunded applications for protection works that we just can’t help councils with. 
We’ve got to really cherry pick the highest priority ones year-by-year [I2 SG].  
I mean, the Coast Protection Board doesn’t have a great deal of money and so it’s pulled 
back what it funds down to really core things, things that have an influence on human life, 
property and assets, so that’s where its money goes [I2 SG]. 
For South Australia, I think it would be good to have more funding available at state level. 
You know, in regards to coast protection decisions, some money needs to be spent. We are 
seeing, I suppose, an increasing number of requests for fix-up works along the coast, for 
ongoing erosion particularly, and the Coast Protection Board is not funded sufficiently to do 
that work, to provide all the support that various councils will need now and ongoing [I3 
SG].  
At this stage it's probably a whole series of smaller things: fix-ups of sea walls, erosion hot 
spots, increasingly causing issues. Mostly adjacent to settlements. They might be public 
areas, and they may be shack settlements which is quite a legacy here as well. So it just 
seems to be an increasing number of requests from councils for fix-up type work ... again, 
the councils probably don't have the resources of their own, or rates base, to really fund the 
works properly [I3 SG]. 
This issue was also highlighted in the CPB Position Paper: 
Coastal protection works are expensive to construct and both the Board and local government 
have limited capacity to fund the necessary works. For example, under current funding 
arrangements, the Board is able to provide grants totalling approximately $350,000 each year 
for coastal management projects in South Australia. Given that the cost to construct a typical 
seawall is in the order of $5,000 per lineal metre, this means that the Board’s annual grant 
budget can fund a total of approximately 100 metres of seawall construction across the entire 
state each year (Coast Protection Board 2015, p. i). 
In line with the principle of subsidiarity, as followed in the division of responsibilities 
between spheres of government determined by the Australian Constitution, state 
governments have considerable expenditure responsibilities. The expenditure priorities 
of state governments must be considered in the context of their overall constitutional 
responsibilities, which include significant outlays for health, education and transport. Of 
the many considerable funding pressures facing state governments, public hospital 
funding is the most significant. Eccleston (2008) provides evidence of the substantial, and 




A significant trend in Australian public finance in recent years has been for the States to fund a 
greater proportion of Australia’s public-hospital system despite the fact that the States have 
the weakest revenue base. This is particularly significant given that health-care costs are 
growing faster than either GDP or revenue across the developed world … The growing revenue 
needs of public hospitals alone consumed 90 per cent of the GST growth dividend [2004-05 and 
2005-06] and growth in hospital costs (12 per cent per annum) has exceeded GST revenue 
growth (8.9 per cent per annum) over the past year by 3 per cent per annum (Eccleston 2008, 
p. 44). 
The practical reality of these competing priorities for state government funding was 
raised in interviews. 
Well, the real dilemma for the state is that it carries the responsibility for the hospital 
system. The medical system is in large part is funded by the Commonwealth through the 
Medicare arrangements, but the hospital system is not and it’s the greatest drawer on the 
funds of the states, and it is an area, if you said “why has the funding for environment 
diminished over the last ten years?” it is largely due to the cost of the health services. Not 
entirely but largely it is about that … the state doesn’t exercise the discipline around health 
spending that it needs to, but that is a very difficult area because people don’t like to die … 
we see it in our budgets [I7 SG]. 
As outlined in Chapter Two, state governments have significant expenditure 
responsibilities relative to their own-source revenue, as compared to the other spheres of 
government in the Australian federation. Figure 7.1 shows this vertical fiscal imbalance 
between the spheres of government in the Australian federation, and supports the 
argument of Eccleston (2008) that the fiscal position of the state governments is the 
weakest of all three spheres when their revenue base is considered in relation to their 
expenditure responsibilities. 
 
Figure 7.1 Revenue versus expenses of the spheres of government in the Australian federation 




One factor contributing to this predicament is the limited fiscal capacity of the states. 
State government have limited means of raising revenue to meet their expenditure 
responsibilities. Sources of revenue for state governments, on average across all states, 
are depicted in Figure 7.2. 
 
Figure 7.2 Source of state own-source revenue (national average 2013-14) 
Source: Australian Government Tax White Paper (Australian Government 2015, p. 143). 
The limited means by which state governments can raise revenue is recognised to be 
inefficient and not in line with the principles of effective federalism; specifically the 
principle of financial subsidiarity, which espouses that revenue-raising capacity should 
match expenditure responsibilities and not limit the government’s ability to finance new 
spending decisions (Henry et al. 2008).  
The manifestation of issues related to the limited fiscal capacity of the states and the 
fiscal primacy of the federal government is expanded on in the next section.  
7.3.2 Lack of autonomy from federal government 
The federal government’s spending power in contrast to that of the state government 
was commonly raised among state government representatives. This issue comprises two 
dimensions: (i) a lack of revenue to fund expenditure, and (ii) a reliance of federal 
government transfers.  
As explained in Chapter Two, the asymmetry in spending responsibility versus revenue-
raising capacity, known as vertical fiscal imbalance, means that state governments do not 
have sufficient own-source revenue to fund their expenditure responsibilities, thus 
requiring intergovernmental financial transfers from the federal government. This is 





Figure 7.3 Vertical fiscal imbalance: State expenses vs State own-source revenue (2013-14) 
“Own-source tax revenue includes stamp duties on conveyances, land tax, other property taxes, and payroll 
tax, among other state taxes”. Source: Australian Government (2015, p. 153). 
The comparative lack of financial resources at the state level is disempowering to the 
states because it enables the federal government, through their financial primacy, to 
have influence in areas of state government jurisdiction.  
The feds have limited powers but they have lots of resources and so, do get involved with 
grant schemes and funding schemes. There are some specifically for local government, 
others where the state is expected to get involved as well. The feds are trying to influence 
and get consistency across the country on climate change issues, [pause] and I’m not quite 
sure that they fully appreciate local or regional factors in trying to do that [I2 SG]. 
We see the federal government taking something of an interest in coastal development and 
policy, at a very broad level, and again they have the money. Greater resources as far as 
money, so greater capacity to spend [I3 SG].  
As depicted in Figure 7.2, there are various means by which state governments can raise 
revenue to cover their expenditure responsibilities. Figure 7.4 illustrates how these 
revenue streams relate to a government’s level of fiscal autonomy. Own-source revenue 
provides state governments with the greatest degree of fiscal autonomy, as they have the 
power to determine how they raise and spend their revenue. At the other end of the 
spectrum, providing the least degree of fiscal autonomy, are tied grants which deliver 
funding from the national government, only under certain conditions determined by the 
national government, whereby state governments do not control how these funds are 





Figure 7.4 Fiscal autonomy spectrum of revenue sources for sub-national governments in 
federal systems 
Source: Henry et al. (2008, unpaginated). 
From the state government perspective, exacerbating the lack of fiscal autonomy and 
adding to the tension between the state and federal spheres is the experience of the 
federal government not consulting with the states, and actively bypassing the states by 
introducing mechanisms to fund local and regional bodies directly. 
They tried to get together the National Elevation Data Framework, you know, for example, 
to get a nationwide coastal DEM. It fell in a heap. They’ve got the coastal portal; they’ve 
done that First Pass Vulnerability Assessments which were of limited value. And one of the 
major problems is they just go off and do this stuff without reference to either state or local 
government, and then wonder why state and local government is underwhelmed by the 
result [laughs]. They seem to be slow learners in that sense ... They seem to have trouble 
communicating on a reliable basis [I2 SG]. 
The previous federal government actively bypassed the states in many coastal issues. Not 
just coastal issues but NRM issues. Money straight to regional, trying to bypass the states 
on that. But I think in coastal management, there’s not a lot of expertise floating around, 
and in a state like South Australia I think a central critical mass of expertise that can keep 
each other current and keep up with the latest, is in my view, the best way to go. But then 
again you could also say that I’m hopelessly biased in that area, because that’s where I am 
[laughs] [I2 SG]. 
Over recent years we have probably seen the propensity of federal governments wanting to 
fund that at the local and regional level, rather than through the states. So it seems to me 
that in South Australia, you know, the economies of scale; we see some distribution of 
monies that are, as far as the state priority list, perhaps don't make perfect sense. Those 
regions that are better prepared and better resourced to make bids for funds might be more 
successful, but it might not be the best priorities, I think. So the spending power is with the 
Commonwealth, the implementation is at the local level, and the state has some sort of role 
in between, but often limited financial resources to implement its policy it seems to me [I3 
SG]. 
I suppose over a period of five years maybe there's been that greater propensity for the 
Commonwealth to want to spend at that local and regional level, you know, perhaps for 
noble reasons. You know, bypassing the states quite deliberately. Which has the effect of 




there needs to be some priority setting that would best happen, I think, at state level [I3 
SG]. 
We see the federal government taking something of an interest in coastal development and 
policy, at a very broad level, and again they have the money. Greater resources as far as 
money, so greater capacity to spend [I3 SG].  
I don’t think there is any doubt that the federal government has got stronger, it is more 
centralist, it has avoided states, you know, it has exercised far greater authority in the last 
20 years [I7 SG]. 
The inherent weakness in our system though is one around taxation and who has the 
financial muscle, and so what we have observed over the last 20 years is the 
Commonwealth government, because it’s got the taxing powers, collects the money in large 
part, and it has tried to in the natural resource management area to avoid the states by 
going directly to regional bodies and local government to fund things and that’s crazy 
because you in fact miss the value the state brings in terms of better priority setting and 
better organization. You know, it needs to be inclusive and you can’t exclude one level of 
government [I7 SG]. 
The phenomenon of the federal government instigating mechanisms to fund at the local 
and regional level rather than through the states is well-recognised in the academic 
literature. Often referred to as ‘regionalisation’20 (Farrelly 2005; Kelly, Dollery & Grant 
2009), federal funding and partnerships have been criticised for hindering the political 
authority of state governments (Eccleston 2008).  
The results of this case study demonstrate that regionalisation has created tension 
between the state government and the federal government by effectively disempowering 
the state government and disrupting their strategic goals. With respect to 
intergovernmental integration for integrated coastal management, the concern is that 
regionalisation has led to a piecemeal, ad hoc and fragmented approach to coastal 
management within the state.  
7.3.3 Lack of power to direct coastal development decisions 
A third theme prominent in discussions with SA government Department for Environment 
representatives revolved around the related issues of (i) existing vulnerable coastal 
development, and (ii) the lack of Coast Protection Board powers to direct coastal 
development decision-making in the coastal zone.  
As described in Chapter Four, the SA government establishes legislation, institutions and 
the overarching policy, strategies and programs to direct decision-making. However, the 
majority of local land-use planning decisions are delegated to local government. From the 
perspective of SA government staff, the legacy of past coastal development and the 
limitations of the Coast Protection Board to prevent poor decision-making in the future 
was intertwined with their perceived imperative for stricter coastal development control, 
considering the impending impacts of climate change. 
                                                     
20 Farrelly (2005, p. 396) differentiates regionalisation (government-imposed) from regionalism (citizen-




There’s a lot of existing hazards and issues with the coastal zone, whether its ensuring that 
development infrastructure is properly located. I guess there’s a few things there; one is 
that it’s not going to be impacted by coastal hazards or two that it’s not going to have an 
impact on coastal processes [I2 SG].  
From our perspective it's dealing with that coastal development, the ongoing sea change 
stuff, you know, further residential development basically. And dealing with that in the face 
of, sort of, the changing nature of the coast, ongoing erosion mostly, particularly in regards 
to climate change impacts of sea-level rise. So we have a legacy of existing development 
built close to the coast, that’s under some ongoing threat. But also that ongoing pressure of 
further development occurring along the coast [I3 SG]. 
I think for the overall South Australian coast, I think protection of development is going to 
be a key matter. Certainly going into the future with erosion of beaches, whether that’s 
climate change induced or ongoing aspect of our sandy coasts. It seems to be one that’s 
been worldwide, so I would think that is one of our major issues [I18 SG]. 
These perceptions align with the state’s governance responsibilities, whereby the 
Department for Environment is responsible for supporting the Coast Protection Board in 
administering the Coastal Management Act 1972 and providing coastal development 
advice in accord with the Development Act 1993.  
Despite the SA government’s ultimate authority over land-use planning and natural 
resource management in the state, the perspectives of the DE representatives 
interviewed revealed a sense of powerlessness in the face of increasing demand for 
coastal development. The lack of power to direct coastal development decisions by the 
expert body, the Coast Protection Board, was perceived to be a major barrier to effective 
coastal governance in the state in terms of development control.  
I think that our planning controls have been pretty poor in that we have allowed a fair bit of 
development along the coastline, especially in rural areas where, in my view, we should 
have kept it in townships and we have not, we’ve allowed it to spread … you have 
essentially got settlement all the way … so you have got all of those impacts on the 
biological integrity of the coastline and something that is severely impacting [I7 SG]. 
If you look at South Australia, there are some good examples of the spread of urban 
development from Victor Harbor to Goolwa - could have been avoided.  We could have had 
township development well-controlled rather than strip development uncontrolled, so you 
have got that massive length of coastline severely affected. And it’s funny, if you go into the 
South East, if you went down south of Mount Gambier you will find this similar, not similar 
in scale but there are poor decisions about what people can do on the coastline that 
essentially changed the character of those areas. I just don’t think we have looked after the 
planning of the coast as well as we could have [I7 SG]. 
We have attempted here to try and get, because we have got a Coast Protection Board with 
some stewardship responsibilities for the coast, we have tried to increase their reach and 
influence in the local government planning. We haven’t been that successful in extending 
that reach, you know, they have got certain powers but they are largely around protecting 
the physical integrity of the coast from a structural or engineering perspective rather than 




I think the other issue is in fact ensuring that the Coast Protection Board has enough 
strength in terms of its advice and direction to the planning authorities [I18 SG].  
While coastal development applications must have regard to the state government’s 
Coast Protection Board advice, local development decision-makers (Development 
Assessment Panels, or DAPs) may still grant development approval in conflict with this 
advice. Around 15 per cent of development applications in the coastal zone are eligible 
for CPB direction; the remaining 85 per cent of applications planning authorities need 
only have regard to CPB advice (Coast Protection Board 2013). Huppatz (2005, p. 13) 
reported that in 2004, 19 per cent of development applications reported by planning 
authorities were approved despite being ‘not in accord’ with CPB advice. The CPB Position 
Paper states that: 
… the Board is particularly concerned with development being approved against the Board’s 
advice in regards to unaddressed coastal hazards. Previous efforts to improve that via the 
power of direction have not been successful. From 2004 to 2013, 276 dwellings and 126 extra 
allotments have been approved at odds with the Board’s advice regarding coastal hazards 
(Coast Protection Board 2015, p. 13).   
Significantly, the issues of inappropriate coastal development occurring in South 
Australian, which results in ‘incremental creep’ and the ‘tyranny of small decisions’, 
ultimately places “individuals and the wider community at increased risk of incurring 
future costs associated with coastal hazards” (Coast Protection Board 2015, p. iii).  
The CPB’s lack of power to direct, by default, thus provides local government DAPs a 
critical role in development decision-making in the coastal zone. As described in the 
previous chapter, local government’s main source of revenue is property rates, and there 
is considerable pressure to adopt a pro-development approach.  
I think the issue is that some of the local councils are poorly resourced in making those 
decisions, um, often limited planning expertise within council. And also they're dealing with, 
often the smaller councils have a development imperative. They want to see further 
development in their area and that's often likely to occur by way of coastal development, 
and those councils are perhaps sometimes poorly equipped to deal with those decisions [I3 
SG]. 
However, the pressure to develop is not only felt at the local level. When asked why 
planning controls weren’t tighter, the explanation put forward by a high level executive 
within the Department of Environment was resistance from other pro-development state 
agencies.  
The state government has the power and authority, it just doesn’t exercise it. So when there 
is a vacuum that is filled by local government, they will behave in a way that they see fit 
because the state doesn’t exercise the power and authority it has … The Coast Protection 
Act was made in 1972 so it has not been amended since then. There has not been a lot of 
change. And I know that from a development planning perspective the state authorities 
have resisted efforts to tighten that up. So it is about that. [I7 SG]. 
This perception is corroborated by the work of Higgins-Desbiolles (2011, p. 553), which 
implicates the South Australian state government as trading in a “death by a thousand 




off’ in the pursuit of tourism development and the income and employment it provides”. 
Narrating the governance and development approval process of an ecotourism venture, 
the Southern Ocean Lodge (SOL), in the heart of pristine coastal wilderness on Kangaroo 
Island, Higgins-Desbiolles (2011, p. 567) highlights the implications of “an era of reduced 
government funding and forced public–private sector partnerships in our current 
neoliberal context”. Having major development status, thus bypassing the local DAP 
process, the SOL case exemplifies the lack of horizontal integration in state governments, 
where economic imperatives always appear to trump environmental ones.   
Key provisions intended to secure  conservation  in  environmental  legislation  can  be  
overturned  by  other  legislation focused on facilitating development. These trade-offs seem to 
only work one way in our current situation of the market economy – in favour of development 
at the expense of the environment. Assessing the position of bodies such as the [Department 
for Environment] and [Native Vegetation Council], it is clear that agencies focused on 
environmental protection can be compelled to accept limits to their capacities in a time of 
tighter budgetary constraints, and this limits their impact in the policy debates with their 
colleagues in the economic agencies of government. It is clear in such circumstances that 
environmental conservation will be slowly undermined  as  ecological  interests  are  traded  off  
in  the  interest  of  promoting  economic development (Higgins-Desbiolles 2011, p. 567).  
Eccleston (2008) shows that even with the erosion of the state tax-base, taxation from 
state-based instruments had to increase last decade, and this was mainly achieved 
through increases in property taxation – states saw an opportunity to capitalise on the 
property boom being experienced and increased taxes such as land tax and conveyancing 
charges on real-estate transactions accordingly (Eccleston 2008).  
With economic growth the foundation of GST revenue and property taxation remaining 
one of the few state-based revenue streams available, state governments are compelled 
to encourage population growth and property development within their state – a state of 
affairs that is having major consequences for Australia’s coast. These arguments are not 
new. As Walker (1999, p. 31) contends,  
States depend on Canberra for the bulk of their revenue, and among the few sources of 
discretionary income capable of rapid expansion is natural resources. Thus, States tend to 
favour their exploitation, even at the expense of good husbandry. 
And Crowley (1999, p. 59) concurs: 
The best that liberal democratic states have managed is a rhetorical commitment to 
sustainable development, all the while remaining ‘committed above all else to the pursuit of 
economic growth’. 
Thus, the disempowerment of the state government through their limited control over 
spending of incoming tied grant revenue, coupled with a limited capacity to generate 
own-source revenue, creates a vicious cycle whereby they are compelled to make the 
most of the revenue-raising mechanisms they do have. 
7.4 Key findings  
From the perspective of SA government representatives, there were three main coastal 
governance issues: (i) a lack of financial resources; (ii) a lack of autonomy from the federal 




lack of power to direct coastal development decision-making in the face of pro-
development agendas at local and state government levels.  
Each of these issues ultimately reflect the position of the state government as having 
responsibility without matching capacity – either fiscal or legal. With respect to the latter, 
the SA government DE representatives interviewed are disempowered in the face of pro-
development agendas, both at the local and broader state government level. These issues 
are underpinned by a lack of autonomy, in terms of both fiscal capacity and fiscal 
autonomy. The fiscal superiority of the federal government enables intervention in areas 
of state government jurisdiction.  
Furthermore, this study’s findings are unique in suggesting that the impact of insufficient 
funds for coastal management at the state government level exceeds the practical 
problem of not being able to provide funding for maintenance and protection. In 
addition, it significantly impacts intergovernmental relations between the local and state 
spheres by (i) hindering the possibility of more positive relations with local government, 
since funding of local government appears to be a driver of a more positive 
intergovernmental relationship, (ii) straining relationships with local government due to 
state government cost-shifting, and (iii) exacerbating the disempowerment of the states’ 
by motivating local government to partner with federal government in funding 
relationships. Moreover, this situation hinders the political autonomy and authority of 
state governments. According to Eccleston (2008, p. 45):  
The political authority of State governments has increasingly been constrained … where they 
either require direct funding and/or cooperation from the Commonwealth. This has both 
eroded political accountability in Australia’s federal system and has forced State governments 
to accede to Commonwealth demands in areas where States have traditionally had jurisdiction.  
The implications of this will be explored in subsequent chapters.  
7.5 Chapter summary 
In this South Australian case study of coastal management in a federal system, the results 
presented in this chapter reveal the perspective of the SA government Department for 
Environment representatives interviewed. The main coastal governance issue raised by 
the SA government representatives were (i) a lack of financial resources to maintain and 
protect existing coastal assets, both natural and built; (ii) a lack of autonomy from federal 
government intervention in matters of state government jurisdiction; and (iii) a lack of 
power to direct coastal development decision-making in the face of pro-development 
agendas at local and state government levels. These issues reflect an asymmetry in 
responsibility versus capacity, coupled with a lack of fiscal and political autonomy which 
has been enabled by the federal government’s financial primacy. Thus, the overall sense 
of the position of state government in the Australian federal system is one of 
disempowerment.  
In light of the case study findings discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, the next chapter 
examines the role of the federal government over the history of Australia’s federation, 
and relates this to the asymmetries in responsibilities versus capacity and the overall 




 The role of the federal government in coastal 
governance and intergovernmental relations in Australia 
8.1 Chapter overview 
The purpose of Chapter Eight is to address the third research question: 
What is the nature of federal government in Australia? How does this relate to the 
local and state spheres? 
The analysis in this chapter complements the empirical evidence generated through the 
case study fieldwork by contrasting the theoretical basis of federalism, as outlined in 
Chapter Two, with the practice – or ‘career’ – of Australian federalism over the century 
since federation. In this way, Chapter Eight serves to enhance our understanding of the 
evolving role of the federal government in Australia, and how its financial relationship 
with the local and state spheres underpins many of the tensions described in the previous 
two chapters. 
8.2 Australian federalism, in practice 
The previous two chapters illustrated the types of coastal governance issues being 
experienced at the local and state levels in this case study of South Australia. The analysis 
revealed that the manifestation of two prominent themes – intergovernmental tension 
and disempowerment – is driven by two fundamental problems at both the local and 
state government levels. The first is a sense of frustration regarding asymmetries in 
responsibility versus capacity. Related to this, and arguably underpinning it, is a lack of 
autonomy. As touched on in Chapters Six and Seven, these issues can be related to the 
practice of federalism in Australia.  
To understand the foundations of the intergovernmental tension and disempowerment 
observed at the local and state level in this case study, it is useful to contrast the 
theoretical basis of federalism with Australian practice. As outlined in Chapter Two, in 
theory, federalism is a system of two recognised jurisdictions; the federal jurisdiction and 
the constituent units of the federation. The intention is that neither jurisdiction is 
superior to or more powerful than the other (Blank 2010; Parkin 2003; Summers 2006; 
Ward 2010). However, as Blank (2010, p. 531) notes:  
Simply stating that a system is federal hardly tells one what the exact legal arrangements are in 
any specific governmental function. What matters more is the way these legal (and political) 
mechanisms and structures operate in a concrete setting, how they are interpreted, and how 
they are adjudicated. And while it is crucial to observe the status quo from which it emerges … 
it is more important to see the "career" of the scheme afterwards. 
Thus, the tensions described in Chapters Six and Seven can be better understood by 
considering how the Australian federation has evolved since its inception and, in 
particular, the ways in which power has become more and more centralised at the 




Australia is recognised as having one of the most centralised federal systems in the world 
(Petchey & Shapiro 1994) with one of the highest VFIs of any federal state in the OECD 
(Twomey & Withers 2007, p. 37). Due to the power imbalance created by such a high VFI, 
critics posit that Australia’s practice of federalism “runs contrary to the federalist ideal” 
(Eccleston 2008, p. 45).  
Kay and Lester (1997) previously noted the importance of historical political and legal 
changes affecting Australian coastal management since federation. The next section 
builds on this description, seeking to explicate some of the key events in the political 
history of Australian federalism to demonstrate how power has become concentrated at 
the federal government level.  
8.3 Key centralising events in the political history of Australian federalism 
To demonstrate the trend towards centralisation in the Australian federation, this 
analysis will focus particularly on the evolution of fiscal federalism. Fiscal federalism is 
concerned with understanding: 
… which functions and instruments are best centralised and which are best placed in the 
sphere of decentralised levels of government … and the ways in which [spheres of government] 
relate to one another through such instruments as intergovernmental grants (Oates 1999, p. 
1120). 
8.3.1 To federate or not to federate? Fiscal federalism is the question… 
Immediately prior to federation, the geographical land mass now known as Australia was 
made up of six British colonies: New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, 
Western Australia and Tasmania. Towards the end of the 19th century, a series of 
conventions and referendums were held by the colonies regarding whether or not they 
should form a federation.  
For the colonies, the attraction of the federation was the opportunity to reduce barriers 
to inter-state trade in terms of tariffs on goods crossing borders. Pre-federation, the 
majority of the colonies’ revenue comprised customs and excise. Federating would mean 
that this lost revenue must be made up from tariffs imposed by the federation on the rest 
of the world (McLean 2004) and transferred back to the states. Consequently, “taxation, 
tariffs and fiscal federalism occupied a great deal of time in the Australian constitutional 
conventions” (McLean 2004, p. 4).  
The framers of the Australian Constitution deliberated extensively and carefully over 
what was known as the ‘Braddon clause’, now part of Section 87 of the Constitution, 
which deals with the return of customs and excise revenue made by the federal 
government back to the constituent states. In order for the colonies to be willing to cede 
any powers to a federal government, especially their main source of revenue, it was 
crucial that they be guaranteed a return of this revenue. The Braddon clause directed 
that ¾ of federal customs and excise revenue would be returned to the constituent 
states. However, as the Colony of New South Wales (NSW) was already economically 
powerful and other colonies were not as exposed to the world economy, this draft of the 




Critically, in order to pass the referendum for the federation, the Premiers of Victoria and 
NSW brokered a deal “to restrict the operation of the Braddon clause to ten years, and to 
insert a new clause (now s.96) empowering the Commonwealth to make grants to the 
States” (McLean 2004, p. 5). As will become apparent through this brief political history, 
this was a significant event in enabling federal financial dominance and thus 
disempowerment of the constituent states. Significantly, “all the action in Australian fiscal 
federalism now takes place under this clause” (McLean 2004, p. 5).    
8.3.2 Federation 
In 1901, the six British colonies united to form a federation called the Commonwealth of 
Australia. As noted in Chapter Seven, the residual powers that remain with state 
governments – as determined by the Australian Constitution – correspond to significant 
expenditure responsibilities since state government powers largely reflect the principle of 
subsidiarity (Australian Treasury 2008). As stated in Chapter Two, subsidiarity is an 
important principle of government which says:  
‘Governments need to delegate their powers, authorities, and duties to the smallest (or to the 
closest-to-the-citizens) jurisdiction that can efficiently perform them’ … or ‘action should be 
taken at the lowest level of government at which particular objectives can adequately be 
achieved’ (Blank 2010, p. 533). 
Given the significant expenditure responsibilities of the states, sustainable sources of 
revenue are required (Australian Treasury 2008). Therefore, fiscal federalism and the 
issue of asymmetries in fiscal responsibilities versus fiscal capacity will be a major focus of 
this analysis.   
8.3.2.1 Vertical fiscal imbalance 
Vertical fiscal imbalance has been a feature of the Australian federation from the 
beginning. This was a direct result of the unification which provided the Commonwealth’s 
exclusive power over customs and excise, the main source of revenue (McLean 2004). 
Figure 8.1 depicts the evolution of VFI since federation. At the outset, it can be seen that 
the Commonwealth government was responsible for providing almost 40 per cent of 
state government revenue via intergovernmental transfers.  
In 1908, the federal government passed legislation to create trust funds in which to divert 
their ‘surplus’ revenue, thus reducing the amount that could be transferred to the states. 
This legislation was challenged in the High Court in the Surplus Revenue Case, but the 
High Court found that “the money has been duly appropriated and was no longer surplus 
revenue” (Finlay 2012, p. 84). This is the first of several examples of “the Commonwealth 
deliberately circumventing the federal balance envisaged by the drafters of the 
Constitution”, and of the High Court’s role in increasing the centralisation of power 
through its interpretations of the constitutional validity of federal government actions 





Figure 8.1 Vertical fiscal imbalance since federation 
VFI, measured as Commonwealth grants as a percent of total state revenue. Source: Commonwealth of 
Australia (2012, p. 171). 
8.3.3 World War II and the Uniform Income Tax Scheme 
World War II (WWII) was the basis for another critical moment in the history of fiscal 
federalism in Australia, producing the largest increase in VFI in the history of the 
Australian federation, when the Commonwealth broadened their tax base by 
implementing a uniform income tax scheme (see Figure 8.1: 1941).  
Section 51(ii) of the Constitution provides for the Commonwealth government to make 
laws regarding taxation, although this is a power shared with the states. Since 1915, the 
Commonwealth had levied concurrent personal income taxes along with the states. 
During WWII, the states rejected the Commonwealth’s request to cease levying income 
taxes for the duration of the war in return for financial compensation. In response to this, 
the Commonwealth enacted legislation to impose income tax at a level approximately 
equal to that of the Commonwealth and states combined (Finlay 2012, p. 84). 
When States tried to reassert their power to tax, the Commonwealth legislated to reduce its 
grants dollar for dollar to any State that did so. The High Court, whose judgements on these 
matters have been consistently pro-Commonwealth, upheld the constitutionality of the de 
facto Commonwealth monopoly of the income tax base (McLean 2004, p. 8).   
Keeping in mind that the Constitution gives precedence to Commonwealth laws over 
state laws, the Commonwealth also legislated that priority be given to the payment of 
Commonwealth income tax over state income tax. In addition, the Commonwealth 
offered financial grants to any state not imposing their own income taxes, with the added 
disincentive of transferring state resources used in the collection of income taxes to the 
Commonwealth (Finlay 2012).      
Despite the unanimous opposition of the scheme by the Premiers of the state 




Uniform Tax Case, the scheme was upheld as constitutionally valid and continues to this 
day.  
The effects of the uniform taxation scheme were profound. By the fiscal year 1948/49, the 
Commonwealth were collecting 88 per cent of all taxes levied in Australia, compared to 8 per 
cent by the states and 4 per cent by local governments (Dollery 2002, p. 35). 
As Kay and Lester (1997, p. 268) reflect: 
In the post-war years, Australian political life adjusted to the federal government collecting 
taxes and then distributing those taxes back to the States through a complex grants system.  
Henceforth, a significant level of vertical fiscal imbalance is an entrenched feature of 
Australian federalism. 
8.3.4 New Federalism 
Another significant period in the centralisation of power at the federal government level 
began with the Whitlam era of ‘new federalism’. Gough Whitlam, a Labor Prime Minster, 
was elected in 1972 and the federal government proceeded with a policy to intervene in 
areas of state government responsibility through the use of Special Purpose Payments 
(SPPs), also known as tied grants. SPPs targeted areas such as education, urban 
development and urban planning, transport, hospitals, community health and legal aid 
(Kay & Lester 1997; Stilwell & Troy 2000; Summers 2006). “Whitlam argued that many 
problems facing Australian society could be solved only at a national level with 
Commonwealth finance” (Summers 2006, p. 142). Accordingly, the use of SPPs increased 
during Whitlam’s three year reign from 30 to 49 percent of federal government grants to 
state governments (Summers 2006, p. 142).  
As Figure 7.4 depicts, SPPs reduced the fiscal autonomy of the state governments, thus 
contributing further to their disempowered status in the federal system. Furthermore, 
during the era of ‘new federalism’ which continued beyond the Whitlam years, VFI 
peaked with federal government grants accounting for over 60 per cent of state 
government revenue (Commonwealth of Australia 2012, p. 171).  
The Whitlam government was dissolved by the Governor General in 1975 during the 
"Constitutional crisis", partially attributed to Whitlam’s heavy use of tied grants (Gillespie, 
1994, cited by Kay and Lester (1997, p. 268). Despite the newly elected Prime Minister, 
Malcolm Fraser, vowing to “institute tax-sharing arrangements and scale down the use of 
SPPs … the Coalition government … produced little or no increase in the financial 
autonomy of the states” (Summers 2006, p. 142). As noted by Court (1994, p.8) cited in 
Kay and Lester (1997, p. 269) “tied grants provide a means by which the federal is able to 
achieve its own policy objectives in areas of State responsibility while restricting the 
budget flexibility of the States”.  
As portrayed in the examples discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, whilst the states are 
further disempowered through the federal government’s increased use of tied grants, 
local government are a grateful recipient of federal finance. However, as the HORSCEFPA 




Representatives Standing Committee on Economics Finance and Public Administration 
2003). As a result of their broadened tax base, councils diversified their activities to 
include “quality of life issues and general considerations of community well-being. Local 
initiatives such as child care, tourism, urban renewal and recreation became a part of the 
functions of many councils” (Marshall 1997, p. 4). The broadening of responsibilities at 
the local government level was not always matched by sustained financial assistance, and 
often increased community expectations of local government.  
This has played a role in the asymmetries in responsibility versus capacity observed in this 
case study, thus exacerbating disempowerment at the local government level. 
Furthermore, as described in the previous chapters, the use of SPPs to bypass state 
governments has exacerbated the disempowerment of state governments within the 
Australian federal system. Thus, this type of intervention from the Commonwealth 
government is arguably the catalyst for many of the local-state intergovernmental 
tensions described in this case study.  
Finally, Fraser’s government introduced a tax-sharing arrangement with local government 
to ensure that councils received “a fixed percentage of the financial cake” (Marshall 1997, 
p. 4). In this way, the federal government managed to institutionalise both competition 
for federal finance between state and local governments, and local-state 
intergovernmental tension. 
8.3.5 Regionalisation 
The 1990s heralded the start of a watershed era in terms of the Commonwealth’s 
influence in the realm of natural resource and environmental management. Beginning 
with the establishment of the National Soil Conservation Program in 1983, and followed 
by the One Billion Trees program in 1989 and the National Landcare Program (NLP) in 
1992, the federal government have provided funding to community groups at the local 
level (Farrelly 2005; Hajkowicz 2009; Robins & Kanowski 2011).  
In 1997, John Howard’s conservative Coalition government privatised Australia’s publicly-
owned telecommunications asset, Telstra, to fund the largest environmental spending 
program in Australia’s history, the Natural Heritage Trust (NHT). The NHT was intended 
“to stimulate significant investment in the conservation, sustainable use and repair of 
Australia’s environmental, agricultural and natural resources” through allocating funds, 
and generating matching funds and in-kind resources (Crowley 1999, p. 255). Following 
on from this, the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality (NAPSWQ) was 
established in 2001 to “motivate and enable regional communities to use coordinated 
and targeted action” (Farrelly 2005, p. 395).  
The first phase of NHT from 1996/7 to 2000/1, known as NHT I, principally funded local 
environmental community groups. The worldwide trend towards the regionalisation of 
environmental and natural resource planning and management influenced the second 
phase, known as NHT II, from 2000/1 to 2007/8. NHT II focused its funding to regional, 
community-based, natural resource management groups for the development and 




government NRM funding was incoming Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s Caring for our 
Country (CfoC) program, which commenced in 2008.  
The regionalisation of federal government NRM programs is depicted by Hajkowicz (2009) 
in Figure 8.2. The regionalisation era has seen the federal government expand their reach 
by spending upward of $6.5 billion on environmental and natural resource management 
initiatives direct to the local and regional level and according to federal government 
priorities (Hajkowicz 2009, p. 472). Due to their lack of resources, state governments have 
been compelled to partake in these federally-driven programs (Robins & Kanowski 2011), 
and have thus been further disempowered in terms of their political authority.      
 
Figure 8.2 Regionalisation of NRM programs since the 1990s through major federal government 
funding initiatives 
Source: Hajkowicz (2009, p. 472). 
8.3.6 Franchise fees forgone 
In 1997, state governments’ own-source revenue bases were again limited by a High 
Court decision affecting Australia’s practice of fiscal federalism. The Commonwealth 
challenged states’ use of franchise fees, claiming they were a form of excise which is an 
exclusive power of the Commonwealth. The High Court ruled in favour of the 
Commonwealth, deeming franchise fees a form of excise on alcohol and tobacco. To 
replace the loss of state revenue, the Commonwealth “agreed to increase its excise taxes 
and return the proceeds to the states” (McLean 2004, p. 8).  
However, this once again increased in VFI and resulted in a loss of own-source revenue, 
thus reducing the fiscal autonomy of the state governments. With the state governments 
at the mercy of the Commonwealth for approximately 45 per cent of their total revenue, 
and their scope for own-source revenue-raising become more limited, the loss of 






8.3.7 The GST: ‘A New Tax System’ 
In 1999, another major development in Australian fiscal federalism had the effect of 
simultaneously limiting the state government’s own-source revenue base, and once again 
increasing VFI (see Figure 8.1). Prime Minister John Howard’s Coalition government 
introduced a goods and services tax (GST), which was sold to the states as a means of 
providing them with more financial security and guaranteed untied revenue to ensure 
secure funding of the states’ essential services and infrastructure (Eccleston 2008; Finlay 
2012). In effect, the GST was presented to the states a guaranteed ‘growth tax’ that 
would reliably increase state government revenue in line with economic growth 
(Eccleston 2008; Finlay 2012).  
Branded as ‘A New Tax System’, the federal government’s perspective was that this new 
system was a means of reducing VFI (Eccleston 2008; Finlay 2012; McLean 2004).  
In addition to their own revenue sources, the States received around $40 billion in GST revenue 
from the Australian government. The GST is an Australian government tax, with all revenue 
provided to the States to compensate them for — among other things — the removal of a 
range of inefficient state taxes, the loss of revenue replacement payments (originally levied in 
place of franchise fees) and the loss of financial assistance grants. The Australian government 
distributes the GST to the States as an untied grant based on the principle of horizontal fiscal 
equalisation (HFE21), which takes into account the relative revenue raising capacity and 
expenditure needs of each of the States (Australian Treasury 2008, p. 297). 
However, the GST package replaced some indirect state taxes and some existing federal 
government transfers. Whilst federal government rhetoric is to the contrary, scholars 
argue that the GST simply replaced one form of general revenue assistance with another 
and it is thus not a true method of tax-base sharing (Finlay 2012; Twomey & Withers 
2007; Warren 2006).  
Furthermore, in abolishing several state-based taxes, the capacity of the states to raise 
own-source revenue was further restricted (Finlay 2012; Twomey & Withers 2007; 
Warren 2006). This is evidenced by state-based own-source taxes accounting for 40 per 
cent of total operating income pre-GST, compared to 33 per cent post-GST (Eccleston 
2008; Koutsogeorgopulou & Tuske 2015). In this way, as illustrated in Figure 8.1, the 
introduction of the GST both increased VFI and reduced the fiscal autonomy of the state 
governments (Eccleston 2008; Finlay 2012; Koutsogeorgopulou & Tuske 2015; Twomey & 
Withers 2007; Warren 2006). In this way, the GST further contributed to the 
disempowerment of state government in the Australian federal system.  
Moreover, according to the Commonwealth, the establishment of the GST system was 
intended to provide financial security to the states. However, Hamill (2006, p. 75), cited 
by Eccleston (2008, p. 40), argues that the GST does not provide an adequate funding 
base for the states. If fact, the states are no better off financially after the introduction of 
the GST (Eccleston 2008; Koutsogeorgopulou & Tuske 2015; Twomey & Withers 2007). 
                                                     
21 The system of HFE will not be discussed in this thesis. However, due to the equalisation process taking 
into account tied grants received by the states before calculating GST dividends to each state, the impact of 




The grants received by the States from the Commonwealth in 2006 amount to 5.5 per cent of 
GDP – exactly the same percentage as in 1996. Indeed, the (net) payments to the States over 
the entire post-GST period remain at levels below the pre-GST average of 6 per cent of GDP for 
the whole period of the 1980s and 1990s. During the same period, the Commonwealth’s 
revenue rose by a further 2 per cent to 20 per cent of GDP. This is a $20 billion windfall for the 
Commonwealth well ahead of State and Territory gains both absolutely and proportionately 
(Twomey & Withers 2007, p. 26). 
This is important to note, since the Commonwealth rhetoric regarding the GST is one of 
financially independent states. As Twomey and Withers (2007, p. 26) highlight, this 
discourse provides the Commonwealth with an avenue to encroach upon areas of state 
government responsibility: 
The argument is often made that the States, despite having been given financial security 
through the revenue from the GST, have failed to fulfil their responsibilities, so the 
Commonwealth is obliged to intervene and assume or oversee State responsibilities in the 
interests of the Australian people. 
By increasing VFI and limiting state government fiscal capacity, the Commonwealth have: 
… ensured that the States remained dependent upon Commonwealth funding. It is 
disingenuous to suggest that the States are failing in their responsibilities because they require 
Commonwealth funding and that the Commonwealth should therefore take over State policy 
functions, when this is the system that the Commonwealth deliberately created (Twomey & 
Withers 2007, p. 26).  
According to Winer and Hettich (1997, p. 2), “history suggests … the choice of and among 
tax instruments has always been largely a political decision”. Considering the political 
history of Australian federalism outlined above, this would certainly appear to be the 
case. 
8.4 Fiscal centralisation and disempowerment in the Australian 
federation 
Intergovernmental conflict in the Australian federation has previously been attributed to 
VFI because the states face a considerable expenditure burden and limited means for 
revenue-making (Eccleston 2008). However, the Australian Treasury (2008) maintains 
that vertical fiscal imbalance is not necessarily a problem for state governments. This 
would be true if:  
1) Significant and unconditional transfers from federal to state were guaranteed (as 
would have been the case if the Braddon Clause had endured and the Surplus 
Revenue Case not been upheld);  
2) If the federal government were to only channel unconditional funding through the 
states; and,  




However, a high level of VFI is an issue in Australia’s case due to the architecture of fiscal 
federalism, which ultimately undermines the fiscal autonomy – and hence the political 
autonomy and authority – of the states.  
8.5 Key findings 
This chapter has demonstrated that, despite the Commonwealth government having few 
exclusive powers over the management of coastal land and resources in Australia, it 
exerts considerable influence through its financial clout. The analysis presented in this 
chapter supports this contention, as previously described by multiple scholars in the 
coastal management literature reviewed in Chapter Two (Harvey 2016; Harvey & Caton 
2010; Haward 1995b; Kay & Lester 1997).  
Given the prominence of the themes disempowerment and intergovernmental tension 
which emerged from the interviews with local and state government representatives, it is 
important to appreciate how the federal balance has been skewed to create a dominant 
federal sphere. The predicaments at the local and state government levels outlined in 
Chapters Six and Seven have evolved along with the federal government’s financial 
dominance within the Australian federation. This financial dominance has been 
significantly aided by the Commonwealth’s legislative dominance, which is largely 
determined by the Constitution (since Commonwealth laws take precedence over state 
laws) but has been enhanced considerably by the interpretations and rulings of the High 
Court over the years. The above analysis depicts the specific ways in which fiscal 
centralisation serves to disempower state governments. This thesis also contends that 
Australia’s operationalisation of fiscal federalism is a major source of intergovernmental 
tension underpinning many of the issues described by local and state government 
representatives.  
8.6 Chapter summary 
Fiscal centralisation in Australia is characterised by a high vertical fiscal imbalance and a 
reduction in fiscal autonomy of state governments. As demonstrated by this brief political 
history of Australian federalism, fiscal centralisation and an accompanying sense of 
federal superiority have become entrenched in the practice of Australia’s federal system.  
With respect to the finding of this case study, the issue with fiscal centralisation in South 
Australia is twofold. Firstly, VFI and limited fiscal capacity render local and state 
governments under-resourced to meet their coastal management responsibilities. 
Secondly, fiscal centralisation contributes to the intergovernmental tension observed in 
this case study by disempowering local and state governments and undermining their 
autonomy.  
The next chapter will expand on the implications of fiscal centralisation, and the 
subsequent disempowerment of sub-national levels of government, for 
intergovernmental relations and the implementation of ICM in the Australian federation. 
Based on the analyses presented in chapters six, seven and eight, Chapter Nine will 
explicate the theory generated by this study to explain Australia’s difficulty achieving 




 A theory on Australian federalism, intergovernmental 
integration and ICM  
9.1 Chapter overview 
The purpose of Chapter Nine is to address the fourth and final research question in order 
to meet the overall aim of this study: 
Considering the nature of Australian federalism, given the findings of this study, 
what are the implications for intergovernmental integration and the 
implementation of integrated coastal management in Australia?   
Thus, Chapter Nine considers the predominant themes emerging from the interviews 
with local and state government representatives as outlined in the previous three 
chapters to develop a theory to explain the difficulty implementing ICM in Australia to 
date. The implications for the future of coastal management and ICM implementation in 
Australia are also discussed. 
9.2 Australian federalism: An adversarial system 
As determined in Chapters Six and Seven, the intergovernmental tension observed 
through this case study of coastal management in South Australia is attributable to 
problematic governance arrangements at the local and state levels. These governance 
issues comprised asymmetries in responsibility versus capacity (both fiscal and legal) and 
asymmetries in power (essentially, a lack of autonomy).  
At both the local and state level, interview results indicated a sense of frustration 
regarding a lack of financial capacity to meaningfully promote coastal protection, 
management and climate change adaptation in the coastal zone. Related to this, and 
arguably underpinning it, was the issue of disempowerment created by 
intergovernmental power imbalances. From the local government perspective, the 
experience of disempowerment stemmed from (i) a desire to be autonomous from the 
state government, (ii) the increasing trend in cost-shifting from the state to local 
government, and (iii) a lack of recognition in the Australian Constitution. From the 
perspective of SA government representatives, the experience of disempowerment 
stemmed from (i) their lack of capacity to prevent poor coastal development decision-
making, and (ii) a lack of autonomy from the federal government, related to significant 
and increasing SA government budget restraints and increasing federal government 
intervention in areas of state government jurisdiction – for example, the direct funding of 
local and regional coastal programs. Figure 9.1 illustrates these findings in a flow diagram. 
Chapter Eight enhanced our understanding of the case study experiences by exploring the 
increasingly centralised role of the federal government in Australia, arguing in particular 
that fiscal centralisation has significantly affected relationships with and between the 
local and state spheres. It is contended that this particular aspect of Australian federalism 





Figure 9.1 Flow chart depicting case study findings 
The flow chart depicts the relationship between (i) the coastal governance issues being experienced at the 
local and state government levels, (ii) the foundations underpinning these issues (i.e. asymmetries in 
responsibility and capacity, and a lack of autonomy), (iii) the impact of these foundations on local and state 
government discourse, and (iv) the impact on intergovernmental relations in South Australian coastal 
management. 
The findings of this case study are consistent with the arguments of Sansom (2002, 2010). 
Any action of the state government which is perceived to impinge on local government 
autonomy is particularly detrimental to local-state relations. As Sansom (2010, p. 201) 
notes: 
The quality of relationships varies markedly from state to state and time to time… 
Relationships tend to deteriorate sharply when states move to amalgamate councils, impose 
additional functions or cost burdens, restrict local government revenues or powers, or make 
significant decisions that are seen to impact adversely on councils and their communities.  
As evidenced by the perspective of local government representatives illustrated in the 
results of this case study, and supported by the findings of the HORSCEFPA Inquiry into 
cost shifting (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics Finance and 
Public Administration 2003), it is in this way that local-state relations are often strained. 
Furthermore, as Chapters Six and Seven highlighted, “the activities and futures of state 
and local governments are inextricably linked, but … this is rarely manifested in … shared 
priorities” (Sansom 2010, p. 200).  
While Chapter Six focused on the perspective of local government representatives, it is 
revealing to consider the local-state relationship from the perspective of the SA 
government representatives interviewed. In contrast to the local government 
perspective, local-state government relations were not as volatile from the state 
government perspective. Often, state government representatives openly acknowledged 




having increasing responsibilities accompanied by limited capacity, and were largely 
sympathetic to local government’s position. 
I suppose at the local government level we see that much of the responsibility for the on-
ground implementation and the immediate development assessment decisions are made by 
councils, often with an imposed system, I suppose, on them as far as the planning controls, 
say where the, you know, the ultimate authority for the development plan policy, for 
example, rests with the Planning Minister at that state level. Likewise with the planning 
strategy [I3 SG]. 
I think the relationship with local government hasn’t changed that much, apart from it 
probably cops it because, you know, it feels like it has to take on this cost shifting from state 
to local. If you spoke to anybody in local government they would say that is what is 
happening, that we’ve got greater responsibilities and it’s probably true, I think it’s 
probably true, and there’s not much that they can do about that [I7 SG]. 
The basis of two key sources of tension that were prominent in interviews with local 
government representatives (i.e. a lack of autonomy and cost shifting) are represented in 
this quote from a SA government representative: 
Researcher: And the local government, how come they have ended up with these 
extra responsibilities? 
I7: Because they don’t have any authority at all. 
Researcher: But why is the state government giving… 
I7: Because they cannot afford to, essentially. 
Researcher: It’s a resource issue? 
I7: Yeah it’s a resource issue. So the local government has the capacity to raise its 
own revenue through rates, and whilst those rates are capped to some degree, 
what the state has done is it has pushed greater responsibility on to local 
government to fund through the rate base. You will see it in other areas as well, and 
faced with an inability to fund environmental issues, it’s introduced an NRM levy, 
it’s got a waste levy, and it has been far more conscious of recovering costs of 
natural resource management. 
While the CPB once had significant funds to dedicate to protection, rehabilitation 
(including land acquisition) and facilities along the South Australian coastline, subsequent 
funding constraints have severely restrained provision of grants for facilities (Coastal 
Management Review Committee 1988, p. 4). It appears that significant state government 
budget cuts continue to do so. As mentioned earlier, local-state intergovernmental 
relations were reportedly better when the SA government had a much higher budget for 
its CPB fund (Caton 2011 pers comm).  
The absence of comparably negative attitudes from the SA government perspective 
towards the local government was perplexing. However, re-visiting the SA government 




revealed a relatively negative discourse towards the federal government in general. This 
discourse was found to resemble the disempowerment and discord observed in the local-
state relationship. As depicted in Figure 9.1, the lack of fiscal capacity at the state 
government level, combined with the lack of autonomy from federal government 
intervention, contribute to an overall feeling of disempowerment at the state 
government level.  
In this study, the relative lack of hostility towards local government from the SA 
government perspective has been interpreted to be due to the SA government’s general 
position of power over local government. Ironically, the more positive perspective of local 
government towards the federal sphere, taken to be indicative of better 
intergovernmental relations, is a strong contributor to the feeling of disempowerment 
observed in state government representatives – this is attributed to the direct funding 
relationship between the local and federal spheres.  
The literature on intergovernmental relations in Australia clearly associates actions of the 
Commonwealth with the state of intergovernmental relations in the Australian federal 
system (Dollery 2002; Dollery, Stewart & Worthington 2000; Kelly, Dollery & Grant 2009; 
Sansom 2002, 2010; Worthington & Dollery 1998). Several authors argue that Australia’s 
practice of fiscal federalism leads to adversarial state-federal relations since VFI 
undermines the federalist ideal of autonomy (Bowditch 2014; Broschek 2014; Eccleston 
2008; Finlay 2012; Gallop 2012; McQuestin & Woods 2010). As expressed by Finlay (2012, 
p. 82), 
The result has been the transformation of the States over the past century from financially 
independent colonies to “institutionalized beggars” dependent on Commonwealth handouts… 
The fiscal dominance of the Commonwealth Government has important implications for the 
federal balance as with fiscal power comes policy power … Thus fiscal dominance within a 
federal system brings with it the ability to skew the federal balance.     
Further, some scholars have argued that VFI is “the root cause of intergovernmental 
conflict in the Australian federation” (Eccleston 2008, p. 39). This is supported by Sansom 
(2010, p. 180) who declares that “intergovernmental relations in Australia are dominated 
by vertical fiscal imbalance”.  
Sansom (2002, 2010) asserts that local-state relationships are highly dependent on how 
the federal system is playing out. The findings of this study concur. This thesis argues that 
the damage to intergovernmental relations caused by Australia’s practice of fiscal 
federalism is not limited to the state and federal spheres. In fact, VFI has a ripple effect 
which cascades through the entire governance system and impacts significantly on local-
state relations in the coastal management context in two main ways.  
1) Firstly, it is contended that VFI contributes to the compulsion for state 
government to cost shift to local government due to its inability to raise its own 
sufficient revenue, damaging relations from the local government perspective.  
2) Secondly, VFI enables the federal government, through their financial dominance, 
to undermine state jurisdictions by intervening in areas of state government 




These ideas will be further explained in the next section. 
9.3 Theory on Australian federalism, intergovernmental integration and 
ICM 
The well-known maxim in Australian government circles, ‘The feds have the money, the 
states have the power and local government has the problems,’ (Kay & Lester 1997) is an 
often-quoted representation of the above-mentioned issues within the Australian 
federation. Figure 9.2 depicts this conceptualisation, whereby – as opposed to the 
political theory of federalism depicted in Figure 2.1 - the Australian federation resembles 
a hierarchy with the federal government at the pinnacle.  
 
Figure 9.2 Theory on the impact of Australia’s adversarial federal system on intergovernmental 
relations and intergovernmental integration in Australian coastal management 
A visual representation of the maxim in Australian government circles, ‘The feds have the money, the states 
have the power and local government has the problems’, and of the theory being developed in this thesis, 
whereby fiscal centralisation results in intergovernmental tension and is ultimately anti-integrative as 
opposed to cooperative. 
The conceptualisation of the federal government being superior to the local and state 
spheres reflects the findings of this case study and has important consequences for 
intergovernmental relations. The state government feels largely subjugated by the 
federal government due to its lack of fiscal autonomy, and threatened by the evolving 
relationship between local government and the Commonwealth. Equally, local 
government feels subjugated by the state government, and this – along with the 
attraction of federal government funding – drives a more positive relationship with the 
federal government. In this respect, the intergovernmental tension observed in the case 
study can be attributed to the way fiscal federalism is operationalised in Australia.  
This theory provides for an understanding of the difficulty in achieving intergovernmental 
integration in Australia, as prescribed by the ICM model. In terms of intergovernmental 




is adversarial, and therefore anti-integrative. While cooperative federalism has been a 
useful rhetorical tool from the federal government perspective, the reality is that 
cooperative federalism is not possible in practice as long as such a significant structural 
imbalance exists in the form of vertical fiscal imbalance (McQuestin & Woods 2010). This 
is simply because the Commonwealth and the states are not equals. As McQuestin and 
Woods (2010, p. 1) writes, 
Intergovernmental negotiations in Australia have been primarily driven by the financial 
dependency of the states on the Commonwealth, rather than by shared policy interests or 
concurrent responsibilities. This asymmetry in bargaining powers ensures the Commonwealth 
is able to achieve many of its objectives in areas of concurrency or state jurisdiction, with or 
without the cooperation of the states.   
Thus, Australian federalism is at the heart of the consistent failure to effectively 
implement ICM in Australia. This thesis contends that the intergovernmental tension 
observed in this case study is an inherent part of the Australian federal system due to 
Australia’s practice of fiscal federalism. Fiscal federalism in Australia is characterised by 
fiscal centralisation, comprising a high level of VFI and a lack of fiscal autonomy at the 
sub-national levels. Thus, fiscal centralisation hinders intergovernmental integration for 
successful implementation of ICM.  
As the findings of this case study demonstrate, Australia’s practice of fiscal federalism 
makes intergovernmental integration difficult because it causes discord between the 
spheres of government. Furthermore, due to their limited fiscal capacity, local and state 
governments are not empowered to deliver their own visions for the coast. Therefore, 
one of the biggest problems facing coastal management in Australia is the reality of the 
disparity in fiscal capacity between federal, state and local governments and the 
implications this has for cooperative governance and accountability. Shared interests are 
hard to achieve in an adversarial federal system, especially shared interests that prioritise 
the environment over development. 
Ultimately, cooperative federalism can only work when the States and the federal have shared 
interests. When these interests differ, the nature of the VFI on the Australian federation and 
the system of tied funding which it yields will inevitably result in cost shifting, accountability 
problems and intergovernmental conflict (Eccleston 2008, p. 48). 
The following section suggests some significant implications of fiscal centralisation for 
coastal management in Australia, in general. 
9.4 Implications of fiscal centralisation for coastal management in 
Australia 
In terms of the implications of fiscal centralisation for coastal management in Australia, 
Kay and Lester (1997), Wescott (2009), and multiple Commonwealth inquiries into coastal 
zone management (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Climate Change 
Water Environment and the Arts 2009; Resource Assessment Commission 1993) have 
previously associated VFI with restricting the states’ ability to provide the services and 




The division of powers between the spheres of government in Australia, largely shaped 
by the Australian Constitution, reflects to some extent the principle of subsidiarity — that 
is, that decisions should be taken as close as possible to the citizens by the lowest level of 
government possible (Australian Treasury 2008). However, this means that the states 
have significant expenditure responsibilities and need sustainable sources of revenue to 
fund this expenditure. Fiscal centralisation, as is the case in the Australian system, is 
converse to the principle of financial subsidiarity, where both spending and taxation 
decisions should be devolved to the level of government closest to the citizens (Eccleston 
2008). As Bowditch (2014, p. 2) argues: 
The Federation was originally about strengthening diversity through interstate commerce; not 
imposing uniformity for its own sake. To that end, the Federation should empower the states 
to deliver public services that are fit for purpose for their jurisdiction; anchored with access to 
efficient state taxes to fund these expenditures.  
This study has found that the implications of VFI are much broader than have been 
previously identified in the Australian coastal management literature. In addition to 
limiting the capacity of sub-national governments to fulfil their coastal management 
responsibilities, this study has identified that fiscal centralisation has major implications 
for intergovernmental relations and theorises that it significantly hinders 
intergovernmental integration for ICM.  
Further to this, this thesis contends that the lack of fiscal autonomy being experienced at 
both the local and state government levels is having a significant impact on the 
development of Australia’s coasts. This is because a lack of fiscal autonomy has a range of 
significant theoretical, financial, political and economic repercussions (Eccleston 2008).  
According to Dafflon (2006, p. 289), the principle of financial subsidiarity should be 
employed in order to improve spending efficiency, accountability of the responsible 
government to their electorate, and empowerment of sub-national levels of government:    
First, fiscal responsibility is needed at decentralized levels of government to link taxing and 
spending decisions and avoid overspending. Second, fiscal responsibility increases 
accountability and the understanding of the electorate, with the subsequent improvement of 
decision making in a democratic context. Third, decentralized fiscal (budget) responsibility 
plays an important role in the distribution and in the control of power, which characterize 
federalism. 
Particularly relevant to the implications of fiscal centralisation is the idea of 
accountability. As Carter (2013, p. 1) describes, the relationship between 
intergovernmental relations and financial subsidiarity are inextricable: 
The relationship… can become very acrimonious. New, unfunded, statutory mandates that 
require extra spending… or even simply a cut in national budget transfers to subnational 
government tiers, require an offsetting and relatively large rise in local taxes or unpopular cuts 
in local services… A blame game often ensues.  
Intergovernmental relations in Australia are characterised by a ‘blame game’, with each 
sphere ‘scapegoating’ other spheres and ‘passing the buck’. As a result, no sphere is held 
accountable for the tyranny of small decisions disrupting the biological integrity of the 




government dependence on federal finance will continue to promote intergovernmental 
conflict and a lack of accountability unless the sub-national governments are able to gain 
access to, and just as importantly control over, the necessary financial resources to fund 
the services and infrastructure they are responsible for (Eccleston 2008).  
A further implication of Australia’s practice of fiscal federalism in terms of coastal 
management is the lack of a strategic approach. Fiscal centralisation constrains state 
governments in policy arenas of their constitutional jurisdiction because they require 
funding from the federal government (Eccleston 2008). Initiatives funded by the 
Commonwealth are not driven by the priorities of state governments, even in cases 
where states have provided matching funds (Hajkowicz 2009, p. 471). Thus, in addition to 
eroding the political accountability of state governments, political authority is also 
hindered where federal funding and partnerships are involved (Eccleston 2008). As 
Walker (1999, p. 38) explains,   
Diffusion of responsibility is inherent in a system in which one level government raises funds, 
but another spends them. The availability of Commonwealth funding makes it worth a State’s 
while to put forward projects even when their worth is in doubt. As the granting body, the 
Commonwealth has to act as “gatekeeper”. If it refuses funding, it can be blamed while the 
State claims to be “doing its best”. The merits of the project are less important in this case than 
its political utility to the State. The Commonwealth, if it sets up criteria for approval, may be 
tempted … to abandon them for political advantage. In short, the political relationship of 
granter and grantee has the effect of distorting project evaluation away from economic or 
ecological rationality towards political.  
One example of this is federal government intervention in the NRM area since the 1990s, 
which has significantly altered the way the coast is governed in South Australia. The SA 
government completely revised its NRM legislation (the Natural Resource Management 
Act 2004) and state departmental administrative arrangements to “capitalise on the 
existing regions established by the Commonwealth” (Farrelly 2005, p. 397). This entailed 
a merger of the previous soil conservation, water management and pest control boards 
and the formation of the current statutory regional NRM Boards in 2005 (Farrelly 2005).  
Further to this, any state government strategic approach is undermined by the significant 
level of direct funding being provided by the Commonwealth government to regional 
NRM Boards, local governments or community groups. These initiatives are driven by a 
Commonwealth agenda to achieve Commonwealth strategies, and are not examples of 
cooperative governance. Crowley (1999, p. 255) notes that “between 40 per cent and 60 
per cent of funds have bypassed state and local government to directly fund community-
based projects”.  
Demonstrating the incompatibility of these federal funding initiatives with a strategic 
approach at the state government level, Farrelly (2005, p. 395) notes that:  
Many projects were spatially and temporally incongruent … in part due to groups working 
independently of one another … but also owing to a lack of formal regional contexts or 
integrated policies.  
The Envirofund program released under NHT II provided “local environmental community 




(Farrelly 2005, p. 396). The subsequent federal government funding initiative, CfoC, was 
also criticised for its “narrower agenda, increased central government control, and 
compromised buy-in by state and territory governments” (Robins & Kanowski 2011, p. 
88).  
With respect to the coast, Clarke (2011, p. 10) has criticised the shift in political focus of 
federal government funding programs away from an early emphasis on coastal NRM to 
increasingly focus on water, dryland salinity and terrestrial environments. Regarding 
coastal NRM, Clarke (2011, p. 10) finds that Rudd’s CfoC further restricted coastal NRM 
“through a narrow and spatially selective lens”. In this way, federal government 
intervention does little to support the strategic goals and priorities of the state 
government.  
9.5 Key findings 
A handful of scholars in the coastal management field have acknowledged issues relating 
to VFI and the centralisation of power at the federal level (Haward 1995b; Huggett 1998; 
Kay & Lester 1997; Wescott 2009). This study builds on these ideas by providing empirical 
evidence of the existence of these issues, and the on-ground implications of this system 
in terms of intergovernmental tension and poor intergovernmental relations. As a result, 
this thesis proposes that Australia’s practice of fiscal centralisation hinders 
intergovernmental integration, and is thus a significant barrier to the successful 
implementation of integrated coastal management in Australia.  
Uniquely, this study contends that the damage to intergovernmental relations in the 
context of coastal management is not limited to the state and federal spheres. Rather, it 
has a ripple effect, which cascades through the entire governance system and impacts 
significantly on local-state intergovernmental relations. This is evidenced by 
intergovernmental tension resulting from the compulsion of the SA governments to cost 
shift to local government, due to their inability to raise sufficient own-source revenue.  
The interference of the federal sphere with funding of local government is also damaging 
to local-state relations, since it means local and state governments essentially compete 
for federal funding (Sansom 2002). Furthermore, to use the analogy of (Sansom 2002), 
the local-state relationship is subverted as local governments wish to escape their 
‘loveless marriage’ with the state government in favour of a more fruitful funding 
relationship with the federal government – the ‘rich uncle’22.  
Fiscal centralisation also enables a lack of accountability for all three spheres of 
government, since revenue-raising capacity is not aligned with expenditure 
responsibilities. In this way, each sphere can argue that they either do not have the 
capacity, or they do not have the responsibility, for any given issue. Thus, 
intergovernmental relations in the Australian federation are characterised by a blame 
game, scapegoating and passing the buck to other spheres.  
                                                     
22 Referring to Sansom’s (2002) paper ‘Three weddings, a loveless marriage and a rich uncle: Local 




9.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter has demonstrated the relationship between governance arrangements and 
poor intergovernmental relations in a case study of coastal management in South 
Australia. As observed in this case study, problematic governance arrangements leading 
to intergovernmental tension and poor intergovernmental relations include (i) 
asymmetries in responsibility versus capacity, and (ii) a perceived lack of autonomy. This 
was evident at both the local and state government levels.  
Moreover, through synthesis of the case study results with the broader literature on 
Australian federalism and intergovernmental relations, this thesis posits that poor 
intergovernmental relations are an inherent part of Australia’s federal system of 
government, since fiscal centralisation renders the overall governance system 
adversarial23 rather than cooperative. It is in this way that intergovernmental integration 
is hindered rather than helped.  
Hence, the nature of the political system in which ICM is striving to operate in Australia 
presents an incredible challenge to intergovernmental integration, as prescribed by the 
ICM model.  
 
  
                                                     
23 While coercive federalism has been used to describe intergovernmental relations between the state and 
federal governments by several authors (Cranston 1979; Mathews 1977; Smart 1991), in the context of this 
study, the term adversarial is preferred as it better reflects intergovernmental relations on the whole 
between the three spheres of government – local, state and federal. The term ‘adversarial’ was chosen in 
preference to ‘coercive’ for two main reasons. Firstly, Else-Mitchell (1977, p. 110) asserts that the phrase 
“coercive federalism” is “pejorative and … some caveat should be entered because coercion as it is properly 
understood in a legal and constitutional sense, if practiced by the Commonwealth would infringe the basis 
of the federal compact and probably be regarded as invalid by the High Court”. Secondly, the term 
adversarial better captures the impact of Australian federalism on local-state relations, whereby local and 
state governments are essentially competing for federal funding rather than working cooperatively as 
partners. For this reason, this thesis asserts that Australian federalism, by nature of the financial dominance 
of the federal sphere in spite of the constitutional autonomy of the state sphere, generates adversaries 





10.1 Chapter overview 
Chapter Ten provides an overview of this thesis, restating the importance of coastal 
management and the problem of a lack of intergovernmental integration in Australia, 
which provided the focus for this study. This chapter also outlines the design framework 
and methodology selected to address the aim of the study; summarises the case study 
findings; and, reiterates the theory generated. Finally, the chapter suggests future 
research on this topic, and concludes with a discussion on the implications of these 
research findings in relation to the introductory section’s dialogue on a lack of a national 
approach in Australian coastal management. 
10.2 Study premise 
The coastal zone is critical to human civilization: the majority of the world’s population 
live and work in the coastal zone, and humans are reliant on coastal resources and intact 
coastal ecosystems for livelihoods and food (Martínez et al. 2007). However, coastal 
ecosystems are showing signs of degradation, and are under increasing development 
pressure from the dependence of growing populations on coastal resources (Harvey & 
Caton 2010). The Australian coast is no exception. In Australia, the coast comprises 17 per 
cent of the land mass (Harvey & Caton 2010), is home to 86 per cent of the population 
(Norman 2009b), and is “fundamentally important to the Australian lifestyle and 
economy” (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Climate Change Water 
Environment and the Arts 2009, p. 1). Though sparsely populated in comparison to many 
other coastlines around the world, this significant national environmental asset remains 
at risk of serious degradation because of cumulative impacts of human activity in the 
coastal zone. Australia has a history of degraded coastal assets due to poor coastal 
management and planning practice, now intensified by increasing pressure on the coastal 
zone due to population growth and amenity migration (Norman 2009b) and the threat of 
climate change impacts (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Climate 
Change Water Environment and the Arts 2009).  
The competitive nature of coastal resource use together with escalating deterioration of 
coastal ecosystems necessitates effective management of the coastal zone. However, 
management of the coastal zone is exceedingly complex due to the dynamic nature of the 
biophysical features of the land-sea interface, coupled with the discrete governmental 
arrangements for coastal management that have been developed based on 
administrative rather than biophysical boundaries. Nevertheless, there is a global 
imperative for an integrated approach to management of coastal resources, as stated by 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED):  
Each coastal state should consider establishing, or where necessary strengthening, appropriate 
coordinating mechanisms ... for integrated management and sustainable development of 





Australia is a signatory to several important international conventions dealing with 
environmental issues, including the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development quoted above. Agenda 21, Chapter 17 commits Australia 
to integrated management and sustainable development of coastal areas. However, in 
Australia, integrated management of coastal areas involving the three spheres of 
government has been difficult to achieve (Glazewski & Haward 2005; Haward 1995b; 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Climate Change Water Environment 
and the Arts 2009; Kay & Lester 1997; Wescott 2006, 2009, 2012).  
Effective coastal management necessitates the coordination of any stakeholders who 
may impact on or be impacted by the coast. This is acknowledged in what has become 
the internationally accepted best-practice approach towards coastal management, known 
as Integrated Coastal Management (ICM). ICM promotes a focus on coordinated decision-
making between various levels of government and broad consultation with all interest 
groups (Cicin-Sain & Knecht 1998; Harvey & Caton 2010; Kay & Alder 1998). The 
dissatisfaction with coastal resource management has been the topic of numerous 
Commonwealth government inquiries over the past four decades. The regular repetition 
of such inquiries, and inaction despite major recurring recommendations, shows that 
little has changed in spite of the knowledge, understanding and recommendations 
generated by these inquiries.     
In Australia, the governance arrangements for coastal management are a function of the 
division of powers within the Australian federation, as determined by the Australian  
Constitution. However, few scholars have focused on examining the relationship between 
the federal system of government and integrated coastal management in Australia. The 
dependence of the state governments on federal finance has been suggested to be 
restrictive to the states’ ability to provide their constitutionally-bound services and 
infrastructure (Haward & VanderZwaag 1995; Kay & Lester 1997; Resource Assessment 
Commission 1993; Wescott 2009). Yet, the detailed nature of the problems caused by the 
federal system of government in the context of coastal management in Australia has 
been under-researched. Thus, the purpose of this study was to investigate the 
relationship between federalism and coastal governance in the context of ICM in 
Australia, using a case study of South Australia. The broad aim was to develop a theory to 
explain why intergovernmental integration, as endorsed by the ICM model, has been so 
hard to achieve or sustain in Australia. 
The relationship between federalism, coastal governance and ICM was investigated by 
combining elements of grounded theory with a comparative case study approach. Three 
coastal NRM regions across South Australia – one eastern, one western and one 
metropolitan/peri-urban region – were utilised to provide a varied geographical 
perspective on the governance issues impacting coastal management in the state. Thirty 
three semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted with representatives of local 
government, NRM Boards and staff, and South Australian government Department for 
Environment staff, in order to obtain a varied perspective of the issues facing each sphere 
of government responsible for coastal management. Interview data was analysed using 
NVIVO 10 qualitative data analysis software, following the constant comparative method, 




literature review and document analysis. Findings were verified using a range of 
strategies, including triangulation.  
The research questions were designed to explore key determinants in the success or 
failure of ICM implementation: the nature of prevailing political system and the nature, 
function and strength of the local, provincial, and central levels of government (Cicin-Sain 
& Knecht 1998). Issues regarding coastal governance arrangements, including the division 
of responsibilities for coastal management between the spheres of government and their 
associated capacity to fulfil these responsibilities were considered.  
Thus, this thesis has synthesised empirical data obtained via interview with secondary 
data from document analyses and literature from a range of disciplines such as 
geography, politics, economics, public policy and environmental management, in order to 
develop a theory as to why intergovernmental integration, as prescribed by the ICM 
model, has been so difficult to achieve in Australia. The answers to the research 
questions that were devised to meet the aim of this study are discussed below.  
10.3 Research Question 1 
What is the nature of local government in South Australia? From the local 
government perspective, what are the governance issues posed by Australian 
federalism? 
The main coastal governance issue raised by local government representatives was a lack 
of financial resources to deal with various aspects of coastal management, particularly in 
the face of population pressure and impending climate change impacts and ongoing cost 
shifting from state government. The attitudes of local government representatives 
towards the SA government consistently reflected feelings of disempowerment, distrust 
and resentment in the face of their delegated responsibilities.  
The observed acrimony was greatest around the subject of local government’s roles and 
responsibilities within the federal system with regard to two related issues. Firstly, local 
government suffers from asymmetries in responsibility versus capacity, whereby they 
have insufficient financial resources to carry out delegated responsibilities and have 
limited fiscal capacity to raise revenue for their increasing expenditure needs. This issue is 
exacerbated by on-going cost shifting from state to local government. Secondly, local 
government perceives that their position as a creature of the state government conflicts 
with their legislative role to serve their local constituency – this issue is referred to as the 
local-state antinomy (Wild River 2002).  
Coupled with a lack of recognition as a legitimate sphere of government in the Australian 
Constitution, local government lacks autonomy in the Australian federation. These issues 
are fundamentally a function of asymmetrical power relations between the three spheres 
of government, which ultimately disempowers local government, underpinning the 




10.4 Research Question 2 
What is the nature of state government in South Australia? From the state 
government perspective, what are the governance issues posed by Australian 
federalism? 
From the perspective of SA government representatives, there were three main coastal 
governance issues: (i) a lack of financial resources; (ii) a lack of autonomy from the federal 
government, driven by vertical fiscal imbalance and a limited fiscal capacity; and (iii) a 
lack of power to direct coastal development decision-making in the face of pro-
development agendas at local and state government levels. Each of these issues 
ultimately reflect the position of the state government as having responsibility without 
matching capacity. This is underpinned by a lack of autonomy, in terms of both fiscal 
capacity and fiscal autonomy, both of which enable federal government intervention in 
areas of state government jurisdiction.  
Furthermore, this study’s findings are unique in suggesting that the impact of insufficient 
funds for coastal management at the state government level exceeds the practical 
problem of not being able to provide funding for maintenance and protection. In 
addition, it was found to significantly impact intergovernmental relations between the 
local and state spheres by: 
1) hindering the possibility of more positive relations with local government, since 
funding of local government appears to be a driver of a more positive 
intergovernmental relationship;  
2) straining relationships with local government due to state government cost-
shifting; and,  
3) exacerbating the disempowerment of the states’ by motivating local government 
to partner with federal government in funding relationships.  
Moreover, this situation hinders the political autonomy and authority of state 
governments. Thus, like local government, the overall sense of the position of state 
government in the Australian federal system is one of disempowerment.  
10.5 Research Question 3 
What is the nature of federal government in Australia? How does this relate to the 
local and state spheres? 
Despite the Commonwealth government having few exclusive powers over the 
management of coastal land and resources in Australia, it exerts considerable influence 
through its financial clout. Given the prominence of the themes, disempowerment and 
intergovernmental tension, which emerged from the interviews with local and state 
government representatives, it is important to appreciate how the federal balance has 
been skewed to create a dominant federal sphere.  
The financial dominance of the Commonwealth government has been significantly aided 
by the Commonwealth’s legislative dominance, which is largely determined by the 




enhanced considerably by the interpretations and rulings of the High Court over the 
years. As a result, fiscal federalism in Australia is characterised by a high vertical fiscal 
imbalance and a reduction in fiscal autonomy of state governments. Indeed, Australia has 
one of the highest VFIs of all OECD nations (Twomey & Withers 2007).  
As demonstrated in Chapter Eight, fiscal centralisation and an accompanying sense of 
federal superiority have become entrenched in the practice of Australia’s federal system. 
The predicaments at the local and state government levels outlined in Chapters Six and 
Seven have evolved along with the federal government’s financial dominance within the 
Australian federation. 
The issue with fiscal centralisation in the Australian federation is twofold. Firstly, VFI and 
limited fiscal capacity render local and state governments under-resourced to meet their 
coastal management responsibilities. Secondly, fiscal centralisation contributes to the 
intergovernmental tension observed in this case study, by disempowering local and state 
governments and undermining their autonomy.   
10.6 Research Question 4 
Considering the nature of Australian federalism, given the findings of this study, 
what are the implications for intergovernmental integration and the 
implementation of integrated coastal management in Australia?   
The intergovernmental tension and poor intergovernmental relations observed in this 
case study of coastal management in South Australia are related to problematic 
governance arrangements. These include (i) asymmetries in responsibility versus capacity 
– both fiscal and legal – and (ii) a perceived lack of autonomy, at both the local and state 
level.  
Moreover, through synthesis of the case study results with the broader literature on 
Australian federalism and intergovernmental relations, it is contended that poor 
intergovernmental relations are an inherent part of Australia’s federal system of 
government due to fiscal centralisation. The impact of fiscal centralisation on the 
autonomy of sub-national governments creates an adversarial rather than cooperative 
governance system. It is in this way that intergovernmental integration is hindered rather 
than helped. Hence, the nature of the political system in which ICM is striving to operate 
in Australia presents an incredible challenge to intergovernmental integration, as 
prescribed by the ICM model.  
Furthermore, it is suggested that the financial dominance of the federal government 
undermines the political autonomy and authority of state governments and leads to 
accountability issues for all three spheres, thus enabling a lack of leadership despite 
pressing and increasing coastal management issues.  
Thus, this thesis theorises that fiscal centralisation is a significant barrier to meaningful 





10.7 Contribution to knowledge 
This study has contributed empirical data on the coastal management and governance 
issues being experienced at the local and state government level in South Australia, and 
has provided evidence of the on-ground implications of Australian federalism, in terms of 
intergovernmental tension and poor intergovernmental relations.  
Importantly, comparison of coastal management issues across the South Australian case 
study regions and LGAs revealed similar concerns, irrespective of geophysical, social and 
economic variables, related to the twin pressures of climate change and population 
pressure at the coast. The importance of addressing these issues effectively is evidenced 
by their ubiquity.  
In addition to this, and rather surprisingly, the coastal governance issues being 
experienced at the local and state government levels were also similar. From the 
perspective of local and state government representatives, governance issues were 
dominated by a perceived:  
1) lack of financial resources,  
2) lack of fiscal and legal capacity to fulfil responsibilities; and,  
3) lack of autonomy from the state and federal sphere, respectively.  
In the interviews with local and state government representatives, these coastal 
governance issues were manifest in discussions, and examples were coded as 
intergovernmental tension and disempowerment. Synthesis of the case study results with 
secondary data and academic literature led to a theory linking the observed 
intergovernmental tension with the concentration of power at the federal level, resulting 
from increasing fiscal centralisation since federation.  
While scholars have previously acknowledged issues relating to VFI and the centralisation 
of power at the federal level (Haward 1995b; Huggett 1998; Kay & Lester 1997; Wescott 
2009), this study has produced empirical evidence of the on-ground implications of fiscal 
centralisation, comprising intergovernmental tension and poor intergovernmental 
relations between the local and state spheres of government in South Australia.  
The implications of Australia’s high VFI, beyond constraining the capacity of state 
governments to fund their constitutional responsibilities, have not previously been 
considered in the Australian coastal management literature. This thesis asserts that the 
implications of fiscal centralisation are much broader than have been identified 
previously in terms of a lack of financial resources for effective coastal management at 
the local and state government levels.  
In addition to limiting the capacity of sub-national governments to fulfil their coastal 
management responsibilities, Australia’s high VFI has major implications for 
intergovernmental relations. This is because of Australia’s practice of fiscal federalism, 
whereby the fiscal autonomy of local and state governments is restricted, exacerbates 
their disempowerment within the federal system. Uniquely, this study shows that the 




effect, which cascades through the entire governance system and impacts significantly on 
local-state intergovernmental relations.  
In summary, the aim of this study was to generate a theory on why intergovernmental 
integration, as prescribed by the ICM model, has been so hard to achieve or sustain in 
Australia. The objective was to develop this theory based on empirical evidence obtained 
by comparative case study and qualitative analysis of interviews with coastal managers 
and decision-makers at the local and state government level. This thesis has theorised 
that Australia’s practice of fiscal federalism, resulting in fiscal centralisation, is an 
inherent part of Australian federalism, and that it hinders intergovernmental integration 
between the spheres of government in the Australian federation. In this way, Australia’s 
federal system is at the heart of the consistent failure to meaningfully achieve or sustain 
ICM. 
The following section considers this theory in the context of the scope and limitations of 
this study and, in light of this, suggests avenues for further research. 
10.8 Future directions 
The intention of this thesis was to situate issues related to coastal management and 
governance, which have been well-established to date in the academic and grey 
literature, within the context of federalism, which has rarely been examined.  
This thesis contends that the state of intergovernmental relations between the spheres of 
government in the Australian federation is particularly relevant to the practice of 
integrated coastal management. However, this topic has been under-researched in the 
Australian coastal management literature to date. Future research should consider 
conducting deeper analysis into the relationship between federalism and 
intergovernmental relations in the context of coastal management in Australia, to further 
refine and test the theory developed in this study. 
In particular, the perspective of federal government representatives could be sought, 
along with the perspective of other local and state governments across Australia. Since 
this case study was based in South Australia, comparison with other states would serve to 
test the theory, and establish whether fiscal centralisation is a significant issue 
underpinning intergovernmental tension and a lack of intergovernmental integration in 
Australia. In addition, examining the perspectives of elected members at the local, state 
and federal levels would be interesting.   
Further to this, it would be beneficial to explore aspects affecting horizontal and spatial 
integration in the context of Australian federalism and fiscal centralisation. In this vein, 
including stakeholders from the marine side, including federal government 
representatives, as well as the perspectives of fisheries representatives, other state 
government agencies (such as Planning, State Development, Department of Premier and 
Cabinet) would be valuable in order to understand other possible drivers of 
intergovernmental tension and barriers to intergovernmental integration – both 




To complete the analysis in the Australian context, it would be valuable to include an 
investigation of the perspectives of community groups, NGOs and industry, especially the 
influence of economic associations such as Regional Development Australia.  
In addition to this, is would be worthwhile conducting case studies on coastal 
development decision-making – both local (DAP) and state (DAC) cases – to identify 
whether the drivers of decisions not in accord with state-based coastal expert advice are 
fundamentally associated with the limited fiscal capacity of the local and state 
governments, as well as what other factors might be at play. 
Another avenue for exploration could be to re-examine the best-case scenarios of ICM in 
Australia to date, for example Coastcare and the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, to 
question the role of the states in these examples and determine whether they were 
examples of cooperative, or coercive, federalism in action.  
Since the theory developed should apply to any form of intergovernmental integration 
required within the Australian federation, the analysis could be expanded beyond the 
coast to look at the nature of intergovernmental integration and intergovernmental 
relations in many sectors, especially those where state governments have the 
constitutional responsibility such as health, education and other environmental issues. 
One example for analysis could be the level and nature of intergovernmental integration 
in the governance of the Murray-Darling Basin. 
Finally, it would also be useful to compare Australia’s version of federalism, in particular 
fiscal federalism, with that practiced by other federations, to explore whether similar 
tensions exist and what the related outcomes are for the implementation of integrated 
coastal management in other federations.  
To conclude this thesis, the next section reflects on the introductory chapter’s dialogue 
on a lack of a national approach in Australian coastal management. 
10.9 The national leadership debate and the role of the states 
This study sought to build on what is known about the implementation of ICM in Australia 
by improving our understanding of factors related to coastal governance arrangements 
and federalism, which might impede the level of intergovernmental integration assumed 
necessary for successful implementation of the integrated coastal management model. 
Thus, as outlined in the Introduction, this research aimed to provide an explanation for 
the previously-reported observed phenomena of incomplete ICM implementation in 
Australia.  
The opposition of state governments to Commonwealth intervention in coastal zone 
management matters has been implied by several authors to be one reason that 
intergovernmental integration has failed in Australia (Cicin-Sain & Knecht 1998, p. 349; 
Harvey & Caton 2010; Huggett 1998; Kay & Lester 1997; Lazarow et al. 2006). These 
assertions have neglected to understand the perspective of the states, and the role the 
Commonwealth has played in undermining their political authority and accountability 




Given the hegemonic nature of the federal government in Australia, it is unsurprising that 
the prevailing discourse in the Australian coastal management literature is one calling for 
increased federal government action and leadership in coastal management (Clarke & 
Harvey 2013; Harvey 2016; Huggett 1998; Wescott 2012). It is interesting to note that the 
latest federal government inquiry into coastal management highlighted that the states 
have finally joined in the call for national leadership, as long as this takes the form of 
collaboration and consistency rather than prescription and coercion:  
The Committee further notes that, while the states and the NT have called for national 
leadership, they have expressed the desire for the Australian Government to lead the process 
of collaboration between the jurisdictions and introduce new consistency into coastal zone 
management rather than calling for a prescriptive top-down arrangement that would hand 
coastal zone management responsibilities to the Australian Government (House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Climate Change Water Environment and the Arts 
2009, p. 267). 
As explained in Chapter One, the recommendations of the various federal government 
inquiries have rarely been implemented, and if they have, they have been short-lived (e.g. 
Commonwealth Coastal Policy) or ineffective (e.g. The ICZM Framework and 
Implementation Plan). The question was asked ‘why is this so?’  
Based on the findings of this study’s exploration of coastal management in the context of 
Australian federalism, the answer appears to be that the Australian federation, through 
its mechanisms of fiscal centralisation, has created a system whereby no sphere of 
government is able to be held accountable.  
As explained in Chapter Nine, fiscal centralisation enables a lack of accountability, since 
revenue-raising capacity is not aligned with expenditure responsibilities. In this way, each 
sphere can argue that they either do not have the capacity, or they do not have the 
responsibility, for any given issue. Thus, intergovernmental relations in the Australian 
federation are characterised by a blame game, scapegoating and passing the buck to 
other spheres. For this reason, the Australian federal system is adversarial rather than 
cooperative.  
Thus, the question of a national approach to coastal zone management in Australia is an 
intricate one and must be considered carefully. In light of this study’s findings, to avoid 
further intergovernmental tension one must be careful not to conflate ‘national 
approach’ into federal government intervention. In Australia’s current federal system, the 
role of the federal government in coastal management must be clearly defined and 
agreed to, if not determined by, the needs of state and local governments.  
Furthermore, the requirements for federal government involvement should be carefully 
considered. The high level of fiscal centralisation in the Australian federation predicates 
federal government funding involvement. However, it should be noted that national 
coordination between the states does not necessarily require federal government 
intervention. For example, national associations like the Australian Coastal Councils 
Association pool resources, contract-in expertise and share knowledge and information. 
In theory, this approach could also be used between state governments to improve 




The federal government’s involvement in international conventions has been beneficial in 
some environmental matters, since it often requires reporting from the local and state 
governments which places them on the agenda for funding. However, the notion of 
solving Australia’s coastal management issues though increased Commonwealth power 
over coastal management should be cautiously examined.  
Given the low priority the federal government has given to ocean policy and 
management, which is their constitutional responsibility (Haward 1996; Wescott 2000), 
and given the federal government’s track record of funding issues based on political whim 
and the capricious cycle of political will (Clarke & Harvey 2013; Walker 1999), the role of 
the federal government in the future of Australian coastal management should be 
carefully considered.  
The lack of sustained federal government action in the coastal management space – 
despite the numerous major inquiries and their recommendations over the years – raises 
the question whether the federal government is the right sphere to pin these 
expectations on. While it is tempting to argue that they are the only sphere that can 
afford to provide this ‘leadership’ and that any money flowing into coastal management 
initiatives on-the-ground is good, relying on these federal government transfers 
decreases the political accountability of the states: while all eyes are on the 
Commonwealth for assistance, they are not pressuring the states for action.  
In conclusion, the asymmetries in responsibility versus capacity produced by Australia’s 
practice of fiscal federalism creates blurred lines, sometimes referred to as ‘fuzzy’ 
governance (Hovik & Bjørn Stokke 2007). This makes it difficult for the constituency to 
fully understand which sphere of government is responsible for what, and when they do, 
to make demands to the responsible sphere of government and have them acted upon. 
Moreover, due to their relative incapacity to raise revenue, state governments are not 
empowered to lead by creating a vision for their coastal zone and implementing means of 
raising own-source revenue to fund it. Further, Australia’s practice of fiscal federalism 
reinforces an ‘economic-growth-at-all-costs’ agenda for state and local governments – a 









Abel, N, Gorddard, R, Harman, B, Leitch, A, Langridge, J, Ryan, A & Heyenga, S 2011, 'Sea 
level rise, coastal development and planned retreat: analytical framework, governance 
principles and an Australian case study', Environmental Science & Policy, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 
279-288. 
ABS 2015a, Population forecasts, viewed 24 January 2016, 
<http://forecast.id.com.au/onkaparinga>. 
ABS 2015b, Welcome to the City of Port Adelaide Enfield Community Profile, viewed 24 
January 2016, <http://profile.id.com.au/port-adelaide-enfield>. 
ABS 2016a, City of Onkaparinga viewed 24 January 2016, 
<http://economy.id.com.au/onkaparinga/about>. 
ABS 2016b, City of Onkaparinga Employment (Census) by industry, viewed 24 January 
2016, <http://economy.id.com.au/onkaparinga/employment-census>. 
ABS 2016c, City of Port Adelaide Enfield Employment (Census) by industry, viewed 24 
January 2016, <http://economy.id.com.au/port-adelaide-enfield/employment-census>. 
ABS 2016d, Community profile, viewed 24 January 2016, <http://profile.id.com.au>. 
ABS 2016e, Welcome to the City of Onkaparinga Community Profile, viewed 24 January 
2016, <http://profile.id.com.au/onkaparinga>. 
ABS 2016f, Welcome to the City of Port Adelaide Enfield Economic Profile, viewed 24 
January 2016, <http://economy.id.com.au/port-adelaide-enfield>. 
ABS 2016g, Welcome to the City of Victor Harbor Economic Profile, viewed 23 January 
2016, <http://economy.id.com.au/victor-harbor/home>. 
Adelaide and Mount Lofty Ranges Natural Resources Management Board 2013, Adelaide 
and Mount Lofty Ranges Natural Resources Management Plan - Strategic Plan 2014-15 to 
2023-24, vol. 1 Part 1, Government of South Australia, Eastwood, SA. 
Australia State of the Environment Committee 1996, State of the environment 1996, 
Commonwealth Publishing, Collingwood, VIC. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016, Regional Statistics by LGA, viewed 24 January 2016, 
<http://stat.abs.gov.au/>. 
Australian Government 2015, RE:think. Tax discussion paper: Better tax system, better 
Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
Australian Local Government Association 2006, Local Government - Summary of Coastal 
Management, Policy and Legislative Arrangements, Australian Local Government 





Australian Local Government Association 2012, The Case for Change: Why Local 
Government needs to be in the Australian Constitution, Australian Local Government 
Association, Deakin, ACT. 
Australian State of the Environment Committee 2001, State of the Environment 2001 - 
Independent Report to the Commonwealth Minister for the Environment and Heritage, 
CSIRO Publishing, Canberra. 
Australian State of the Environment Committee 2006, State of the Environment 2006 - 
Independent report to the Australian Government Minister for the Environment and 
Heritage, Department of Environment and Heritage, Canberra. 
Australian State of the Environment Committee 2011, State of the Environment 2011 -
Independent report to the Australian Government Minister for Sustainability, 
Environment, Water, Population and Communities, Department for Sustainability, 
Environment, Water, Population and Communities, Canberra. 
Australian Treasury 2008, Architecture of Australia’s tax and transfer system, viewed 24 
January 2016, <http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/>. 
Ballinger, R 2015, 'On the Edge: Coastal Governance and Risk', in U Fra.Paleo (ed.), Risk 
Governance: The Articulation of Hazard, Politics and Ecology, Springer Dordrecht, 
Netherlands, pp. 373-394. 
Baxter, J 2010, 'Case studies in qualitative research', in I Hay (ed.), Qualitative Research 
Methods In Human Geography, Third edn, Oxford University Press Oxford, Canada, pp. 
81-98. 
Bazeley, P 2007, Qualitative Data Analysis With Nvivo, Sage Publications Limited, London. 
Bazeley, P 2009, 'Analysing qualitative data: more than ‘identifying themes’', Malaysian 
Journal of Qualitative Research, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 6-22. 
Beer, A & Kroehn, M no date, Development Assessment Panel Models: A Discussion Paper 
for the LGASA, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, University of Adelaide, 
LGASA, Adelaide. 
Bell, J & Baker-Jones, M 2014, 'Retreat from retreat–the backward evolution of sea-level 
rise policy in Australia, and the implications for local government', Local Government Law 
Journal, vol. 19, pp. 14-18. 
Berwick, M 2007, 'The challenge of coastal governance', In Federalism and Regionalism in 
Australia. ANU E Press, Canberra, pp. 83-94. 
Bevir, M 2007, Encyclopedia of Governance, ed. M Bevir, SAGE Publications, Thousand 
Oaks, CA. 




Birks, M & Mills, J 2011, Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide, First edn, Sage Publications, 
London. 
Blaikie, NW 1991, 'A critique of the use of triangulation in social research', Quality & 
Quantity, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 115-136. 
Blank, Y 2010, 'Federalism, subsidiarity, and the role of local governments in an age of 
global multilevel governance', Fordham Urban Law Journal, vol. 37, p. 509. 
Bonyhady, T 2010, 'How Australia once led the world', Monash University Law Review, 
vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 54-68. 
Bourman, RP, Murray-Wallace, CV & Harvey, N 2016, Coastal Landscapes of South 
Australia, University of Adelaide Press, Adelaide. 
Bowditch, G 2014, 'Beggar bowl politics blocks Federation's potential'. The Conversation, 
(23 June), 1-3. 
Bowen, GA 2009, 'Document analysis as a qualitative research method', Qualitative 
Research Journal, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 27-40. 
Bower, BT, Ehler, CN & Basta, DJ 1994, A framework for planning for integrated coastal 
zone management, US Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, National Ocean Service, Office of Ocean Resources Conservation and 
Assessment. 
Bringer, JD, Johnston, LH & Brackenridge, CH 2006, 'Using computer-assisted qualitative 
data analysis software to develop a grounded theory project', Field Methods, vol. 18, no. 
3, pp. 245-266. 
Broschek, J 2014, 'Reforming Federal Systems: Insights from Australia, Canada, Germany 
and Switzerland'. CÉRIUM Working Paper No3. Centre d’études et de recherches 
internationales, Université de Montréal. 
Cambers, G 2001, 'Coastal Hazards and Vulnerability: Department of Civil Engineering, 
The University of the West Indies, in conjunction with Old Dominion University, Norfolk, 
VA, USA and Coastal Engineering Research Centre', US Army, Corps of Engineers, 
Vicksburg, MS, USA. 
Campbell Page 2010, State of Our Community Report South East SA, Campbell Page, 
Kingston, South Australia. 
Carley, M & Christie, I 2000, 'The World’s Commons: The Challenge of Governance', 
Governance for a Sustainable Future. Reports of the Commissions of the World Humanity 
Action Trust, World Humanity Action Trust, London. 
Carson, R 1955, The Edge of the Sea, Mariner, New York. 
Carter, A 2013, 'Tax, decentralisation and intergovernmental relations', Organisation for 




Caton, B 2007, 'The impact of climate change on the coastal lands of the City of 
Onkaparinga', Report for the City of Onkaparinga. 
Caton, B, Detmar, S, Fotheringham, D, Laurence, S, Quinn, J, Royal, M, Rubbo, N & 
Sandercock, R 2011, 'Eyre Peninsula Coastal Action Plan and Conservation Priority Study', 
Eyre Peninsula NRM Board and Department of Environment and Natural Resources, 
Adelaide. 
Caton, B, Quinn, J, Detmar, S, Fotheringham, D, Rubbo, N, Royal, M, Sandercock, R & 
Laurence, S 2011, 'Limestone Coast and Coorong Coastal Action Plan and Conservation 
Priority Study', South East NRM Board and Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources, Adelaide. 
Charmaz, K 2014, Constructing Grounded Theory, Sage, London. 
Christie, P, Pollnac, RB, Oracion, EG, Sabonsolin, A, Diaz, R & Pietri, D 2009, 'Back to 
Basics: An Empirical Study Demonstrating the Importance of Local-Level Dynamics for the 
Success of Tropical Marine Ecosystem-Based Management', Coastal Management, vol. 
37, no. 3-4, pp. 349-373. 
Cicin-Sain, B 1993, 'Sustainable development and integrated coastal management', Ocean 
& Coastal Management, vol. 21, no. 1–3, pp. 11-43. 
Cicin-Sain, B & Knecht, RW 1998, Integrated Coastal And Ocean Management: Concepts 
And Practices, Island Press, Washington DC. 
Cicin-Sain, B, Knecht, RW & Fisk, GW 1995, 'Growth in capacity for integrated coastal 
management since UNCED: An international perspective', Ocean & Coastal Management, 
vol. 29, no. 1–3, pp. 93-123. 
City of Onkaparinga 2010a, About Council, viewed 24 January 2016, 
<http://www.onkaparingacity.com/onka/council/about_council/organisational_structure.
jsp>. 
City of Onkaparinga 2010b, Discover, viewed 24 January 2016, 
<http://www.onkaparingacity.com/onka/discover.jsp>. 
City of Onkaparinga 2010c, Living Here, viewed 24 January 2016, 
<http://www.onkaparingacity.com/onka/living_here.jsp>. 
City of Port Adelaide Enfield 2015a, About Council, viewed 24 January 2016, 
<https://www.portenf.sa.gov.au/page.aspx?u=2392>. 
City of Port Adelaide Enfield 2015b, Coast & Marine, viewed 24 January 2016, 
<https://www.portenf.sa.gov.au/page.aspx?u=2292>. 





City of Port Adelaide Enfield 2015d, Our Profile - Council Demographics, viewed 24 
January 2016, <https://www.portenf.sa.gov.au/page.aspx?u=2288>. 
City of Port Lincoln 2016, About City of Port Lincoln, viewed 23 January 2016, 
<http://www.portlincoln.sa.gov.au/page.aspx?u=482>. 
City of Victor Harbor 2011, Council Information, 
<https://www.victor.sa.gov.au/page.aspx?u=149>. 
City of Victor Harbor 2013, Coast and Marine, 
<https://www.victor.sa.gov.au/page.aspx?u=191>. 
Clark, JR 1995, Coastal Zone Management Handbook, CRC Press. 
Clarke, B 2003, 'Coastcare, Australia's Community-based Coastal Management Program: 
An Effective Model of Integrated Coastal Management?', Department of Geographical 
and Environmental Studies, PhD Thesis, University of Adelaide, Adelaide. 
Clarke, B 2008, 'Seeking the grail: Evaluating whether Australia's Coastcare Program 
achieved “meaningful” community participation', Society and Natural Resources, vol. 21, 
no. 10, pp. 891-907. 
Clarke, B 2010, 'Analysis of Coastal Policies of Australian State and Territory 
Governments', South Australian Government, Adelaide, SA. 
Clarke, B 2011, 'NRM and the coast: Past, present and future', paper presented at 20th 
NSW Coastal Conference, Tweed Heads, NSW, 8-11 November. 
Clarke, B & Harvey, N 2013, 'Wither coastal management in Australia-a call for National 
Leadership', Journal of Coastal Research, vol. 65, no. sp1, pp. 915-920. 
Clarke, B & Simpson, N 2010, Climate Change Vulnerability – Identification of threatened 
coastal habitat in the Adelaide and Mount Lofty Ranges Region, NR Adelaide and Mt Lofty 
Ranges, Adelaide, South Australia. 
Clarke, B, Stocker, L, Coffey, B, Leith, P, Harvey, N, Baldwin, C, Baxter, T, Bruekers, G, 
Galano, CD & Good, M 2013, 'Enhancing the knowledge–governance interface: Coasts, 
climate and collaboration', Ocean & Coastal Management, vol. 86, pp. 88-99. 
Clarke, B, Tually, S & Scott, M 2016, 'Social networks and decision-making for coastal 
land-use planning, development and adaptation response', Australian Journal of Maritime 
& Ocean Affairs, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 101-116. 
Coast Protection Board 1991, Policy on Coast Protection and New Coastal Development  
Coast Protection Board, South Australia. 
Coast Protection Board 2009, Coast Protection Board Strategic Plan 2009-2014, 




Coast Protection Board 2012, Coast Protection Board Policy Document: Revised 22 May 
2012, Coast Protection Board, Keswick, South Australia. 
Coast Protection Board 2013, 'Think design deliver: South Australia’s planning reform', 
Coast Protection Board submission to expert panel, Government of South Australia,  
viewed 3 October 2016, 
<http://www.thinkdesigndeliver.sa.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/120663/Coastal_
Protection_Board.pdf>. 
Coast Protection Board 2015, Coast Protection Board of South Australia Position Paper 
May 2015, Government of South Australia, Keswick, South Australia. 
Coastal Climate Change Advisory Committee 2010, Issues and Options Paper - Main 
Report, Victorian Planning & Environmental Law Association, Victoria. 
Coastal Management Review Committee 1988, Review of Coastal Management in South 
Australia, Department of Environment and Planning, South Australia. 
Coffey, B & Vodden, K 2012, 'The politics of coastal policy, planning and governance in 
Canada and Australia: business as usual, at a distance, or collaborative?', Australasian 
Canadian Studies, vol. 30, no. 1-2, pp. 65-92. 
Commonwealth of Australia 1995, 'Living on the Coast: The Commonwealth Coastal 
Policy', AGPS, Canberra. 
Commonwealth of Australia 2012, GST Distribution Review - Final Report, AGPS, Canberra. 
Cope, M 2010, 'Coding qualitative data', in I Hay (ed.), Qualitative Research Methods in 
Human Geography, Third edn, Oxford University Press Oxford, Canada, pp. 281-294. 
Corbin, J & Strauss, A 2008, Basics of Qualitative Research 3e - Techniques and Procedures 
for Developing Grounded Theory, Sage Publications, London. 
Cranston, R 1979, 'From co-operative to coercive federalism and back', Federal Law 
Review, vol. 10, p. 121. 
Crawford, B, Stanley Cobb, J & Friedman, A 1993, 'Building capacity for integrated coastal 
management in developing countries', Ocean & Coastal Management, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 
311-337. 
Creary, M 2003, 'Methodologies, tools and best practices for managing information for 
decision-making on sustainable development in the Caribbean SIDS - Decision-making on 
integrated coastal zone management', Integrated Coastal Zone Management Module, 
University of the West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica. 
Creswell, JW 2012, Qualitative Inquiry And Research Design: Choosing Among Five 
Approaches, Sage, London. 
Creswell, JW & Miller, DL 2000, 'Determining validity in qualitative inquiry', Theory into 




Crotty, M 1998, The Foundations Of Social Research: Meaning And Perspective In The 
Research Process, Sage, London. 
Crowley, K 1999, 'Explaining environmental policy: Challenges, constraints and capacity', 
in KJ Walker & K Crowley (eds), Australian Environmental Policy 2: Studies in Decline and 
Devolution, UNSW Press, Sydney, pp. 45-64. 
Dafflon, B 2006, 'The assignment of functions to decentralized government: from theory 
to practice', in A Ehtisham & B Giorgio (eds), Handbook Of Fiscal Federalism, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA, pp. 271-305. 
de Freitas, DM, Smith, T & Stokes, A 2013, 'Planning for uncertainty: Local scale coastal 
governance', Ocean & Coastal Management, vol. 86, pp. 72-74. 
Department for Environment Water and Natural Resources 2016, Nature Maps, 
Government of South Australia, viewed 27 November 2016, 
<http://spatialwebapps.environment.sa.gov.au/naturemaps/?locale=en-
us&viewer=naturemaps>. 
Department of Climate Change 2009, Climate Change Risks to Australia’s Coast - A First 
Pass National Assessment, AGPS, Canberra. 
Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency 2011, Climate Change Risks to 
Coastal Buildings and Infrastructure - A Supplement to the First Pass National Assessment, 
AGPS, Canberra. 
Department of Environment Water and Natural Resources 2013, Coastal Planning 
Information Package, Government of South Australia, South Australia. 
Department of Environment Water and Natural Resources 2015, Coast Protection Board - 
Policies & Strategic Plans, viewed 8 May 2016, 
<http://www.environment.sa.gov.au/about-us/boards-and-
committees/Coast_Protection_Board/policies-strategic-plans>. 
Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development 2015, Local Government 
National Report: 2013-2014, Government of South Australia. 
Department of Planning and Local Government 2011, South Australian Planning Policy 
Library Version 6, Government of South Australia, Adelaide. 
Department of Planning Transport and Infrastructure 2015, Development Plan - District 
Council of Tumby Bay, Government of South Australia, Adelaide. 
District Council of Kingston 2011, Welcome to Kingston, viewed 23 January 2016, 
<http://www.kingstondc.sa.gov.au/page.aspx>. 





District Council of Lower Eyre Peninsula 2016, About Us, viewed 23 January 2016, 
<http://www.lowereyrepeninsula.sa.gov.au/welcome>. 
District Council of Robe 2016a, Demographics, viewed 23 January 2016, 
<http://www.council.robe.sa.gov.au/page.aspx?u=264>. 
District Council of Robe 2016b, History of Council, viewed 23 January 2016, 
<http://www.council.robe.sa.gov.au/page.aspx?u=286>. 
District Council of Tumby Bay 2007a, Economic Development, viewed 23 January 2016, 
<http://www.tumbybay.sa.gov.au/page.aspx?u=168>. 
District Council of Tumby Bay 2007b, General Information, viewed 23 January 2016, 
<http://www.tumbybay.sa.gov.au/page.aspx?u=149>. 
District Council of Tumby Bay 2007c, Size, Population, Climate, viewed 23 January 2016, 
<http://www.tumbybay.sa.gov.au/page.aspx?u=173>. 
District Council of Wattle Range 2016a, About Wattle Range, viewed 23 January 2016, 
<https://www.wattlerange.sa.gov.au/page.aspx?u=2295>. 
District Council of Wattle Range 2016b, Our Council, viewed 23 January 2016, 
<https://www.wattlerange.sa.gov.au/page.aspx?u=457>. 
Dollery, B 2002, 'A century of vertical fiscal imbalance in Australian federalism', History of 
Economics Review, no. 36, p. 26. 
Dollery, B, Stewart, M & Worthington, A 2000, 'Australian fiscal federalism: An empirical 
note on long‐term trends in state and local government finance, 1969/70 to 1994/95', 
Economic Papers: A Journal of Applied Economics and Policy, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 16-27. 
Dunn, K 2010, 'Interviewing', in I Hay (ed.), Qualitative Research Methods In Human 
Geography, Third edn, Oxford University Press Oxford, Canada, pp. 101-137. 
Eccleston, R 2008, 'Righting Australia's Vertical Fiscal Imbalance: Transferring Public 
Hospital Funding as an Option for Reform', Agenda: A Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Reform, vol. 15, no. 3, p. 39. 
Ehler, CN 2003, 'Indicators to measure governance performance in integrated coastal 
management', Ocean & Coastal Management, vol. 46, no. 3–4, pp. 335-345. 
Eisenhardt, KM 1989, 'Building theories from case study research', Academy of 
Management Review, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 532-550. 
Eisenhardt, KM & Graebner, ME 2007, 'Theory building from cases: opportunities and 
challenges', Academy of Management Journal, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 25-32. 
Else-Mitchell, R 1977, 'The rise and demise of coercive federalism', Australian Journal of 




English, BJ 2003, 'Integrated Coastal Resource Management: A Prescription for 
Sustainable Development', Electronic Green Journal, vol. 1, no. 19. 
Eyre Peninsula Local Government Association 2014a, Eyre Peninsula Local Government 
Association, viewed 23 January 2016, <http://eplga.com.au/>. 
Eyre Peninsula Local Government Association 2014b, Eyre Peninsula Local Government 
Association - Members, viewed 23 January 2016, <http://eplga.com.au/about-
2/members/>. 
Eyre Peninsula Natural Resources Management Board 2009, State of our Resources: 
Recognising the State of Natural Resources of the Eyre Peninsula, Eyre Peninsula Natrual 
Resources Management Board, South Australia. 
Eyre Peninsula Natural Resources Management Board 2013a, About NRM, Department of 
Environment Water and Natural Resources, viewed 23 January 2016, 
<http://www.naturalresources.sa.gov.au/eyrepeninsula/about-us/about-nrm>. 
Eyre Peninsula Natural Resources Management Board 2013b, Our region, Department of 
Environment Water and Natural Resources, viewed 23 January 2016, 
<http://www.naturalresources.sa.gov.au/eyrepeninsula/about-us/our-region>. 
Eyre Peninsula Natural Resources Management Board 2015, Eyre Peninsula NRM Board 
Business Plan 2015-2018, Creative Commons. 
Farrelly, M 2005, 'Regionalisation of environmental management: a case study of the 
Natural Heritage Trust, South Australia', Geographical Research, vol. 43, no. 4, pp. 393-
405. 
Finlay, L 2012, ‘The Power of the Purse: An Examination of Fiscal Federalism in Australia’,  
Journal of Constitutional History, vol. 24, p. 81. 
Flick, U 1992, 'Triangulation revisited: strategy of validation or alternative?', Journal for 
the Theory of Social Behaviour, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 175-197. 
Flyvbjerg, B 2006, 'Five misunderstandings about case-study research', Qualitative 
Inquiry, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 219-245. 
Fontana, A & Frey, JH 2000, 'The interview: From structured questions to negotiated text', 
in N Denzin & Y Lincoln (eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research, Sage, London, pp. 645-
672. 
Foster, EG & Haward, M 2003, 'Integrated management councils: A conceptual model for 
ocean policy conflict management in Australia', Ocean & Coastal Management, vol. 46, 
no. 6, pp. 547-563. 
Gallop, G 2012, 'How healthy is Australian Federalism?', Address for the Australian Senate 




Glazewski, J & Haward, M 2005, 'Towards integrated coastal area management: A case 
study in co-operative governance in South Africa and Australia', International Journal of 
Marine & Coastal Law, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 65-84. 
Government of South Australia 2008, South Australian Government Submission to the 
Inquiry into Climate Change and Environmental Impacts on Coastal Communities, 
Parliament of Australia, ACT, Australia. 
Government of South Australia 2014, 'Development Act 1993', viewed 6 May 2016, 
<https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/DEVELOPMENT%20ACT%201993/CURRENT/1
993.55.UN.PDF>. 
Government of South Australia 2015, 'Coast Protection Act 1972', viewed 6 May 2016, 
<https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/COAST%20PROTECTION%20ACT%201972/CU
RRENT/1972.49.UN.PDF>. 
Grix, J 2010, The Foundations of Research, Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
Gurran, N, Blakely, E & Squires, C 2007, 'Governance responses to rapid growth in 
environmentally sensitive areas of coastal Australia', Coastal Management, vol. 35, no. 4, 
pp. 445-465. 
Gurran, N, Hamin, E & Norman, B 2008, Planning for climate change: Leading practice 
principles and models for sea change communities in coastal Australia, University of 
Sydney, Faculty of Architecture Design & Planning. 
Gurran, N, Norman, B & Hamin, E 2013, 'Climate change adaptation in coastal Australia: 
An audit of planning practice', Ocean & Coastal Management, vol. 86, pp. 100-109. 
Gurran, N, Squires, C & Blakely, E 2005, 'Planning for sea change in coastal Australia', 
Australian Planner, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 10-11. 
Hajkowicz, S 2009, 'The evolution of Australia's natural resource management programs: 
towards improved targeting and evaluation of investments', Land Use Policy, vol. 26, no. 
2, pp. 471-478. 
Harvey, N 2016, 'The combination-lock effect blocking integrated coastal zone 
management in australia: The role of governance and politics', Ocean Yearbook Online, 
vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 1-31. 
Harvey, N & Caton, B 2010, Coastal Management in Australia, University of Adelaide 
Press, Adelaide. 
Harvey, N, Clarke, B, Pelton, N & Mumford, T 2012, 'Evolution of sustainable coastal 
management and coastal adaptation to climate change', in R Kenchington, L Stocker & D 
Wood (eds), Sustainable Coastal Management and Climate Adaptation, CSIRO Publishing, 




Harvey, N, Clarke, BD & Carvalho, P 2001, 'The role of the Australian Coastcare program in 
community-based coastal management: A case study from South Australia', Ocean & 
Coastal Management, vol. 44, no. 3–4, pp. 161-181. 
Harvey, N, Rudd, D & Clarke, B 2008, 'The 'sea change' phenomenon in South Australia', 
South Australian Geographical Journal, vol. 107, no. 2008, p. 69. 
Harvey, N & Stocker, L 2015, 'Coastal residential waterways, science and policy-making: 
The Australian experience', Estuarine, Coastal and Shelf Science, vol. 155, pp. 1-13. 
Haward, M 1989, 'The Australian offshore constitutional settlement', Marine Policy, vol. 
13, no. 4, pp. 334-348. 
Haward, M 1995a, 'The Commonwealth in Australian fisheries management: 1955/1995', 
Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 313. 
Haward, M 1995b, 'Institutional design and policy making ‘down under’: Developments in 
Australian and New Zealand coastal management', Ocean & Coastal Management, vol. 
26, no. 2, pp. 87-117. 
Haward, M 1996, 'Institutional framework for Australian ocean and coastal management', 
Ocean & Coastal Management, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 19-39. 
Haward, M & VanderZwaag, D 1995, 'Implementation of UNCED Agenda 21 Chapter 17 in 
Australia and Canada: A comparative analysis', Ocean & Coastal Management, vol. 29, no. 
1, pp. 279-295. 
Henry, K, Harmer, J, Piggott, J, Ridout, H & Smith, G 2008, Australia's Future Tax System: 
Consultation Paper, viewed 29 August 2016,  
<http://www.taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/ConsultationPaper.aspx?doc=html/publi
cations/Papers/Consultation_Paper/executive_summary.htm>. 
Higgins-Desbiolles, F 2011, 'Death by a thousand cuts: Governance and environmental 
trade-offs in ecotourism development at Kangaroo Island, South Australia', Journal of 
Sustainable Tourism, vol. 19, no. 4-5, pp. 553-570. 
Hinrichsen, D 1999, Coastal waters of the world: Trends, threats, and strategies, Island 
Press. 
Hitchcock, D 2006, Regional NRM Levy updates - Circular 24.3, Local Government 
Association of South Australia, Adelaide, viewed June 27 2014, 
<http://www.lga.sa.gov.au/page.aspx?c=10980>. 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Climate Change Water Environment 
and the Arts 2009, Managing Our Coastal Zone In A Changing Climate: The Time To Act Is 
Now, AGPS, Canberra. 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics Finance and Public 





House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and Conservation 1980, 
Australian Coastal Zone Management, Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra. 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment Recreation and the Arts 
1991, The Injured Coastline - Protection of the Coastal Environment, AGPS, Canberra. 
Hovik, S & Bjørn Stokke, K 2007, 'Network governance and policy integration—the case of 
regional coastal zone planning in Norway', European Planning Studies, vol. 15, no. 7, pp. 
927-944. 
Huberman, AM & Miles, MB 1994, 'Data management and analysis methods' In Denzin, 
NK; Lincoln, YS. (Ed). Handbook Of Qualitative Research, Sage Publications, Thousand 
Oaks, CA, pp. 428-444. 
Huggett, D 1998, 'The role of federal government intervention in coastal zone planning 
and management', Ocean & Coastal Management, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 33-50. 
Huppatz, T 2005, 'Planning and coastal development in South Australia', Australian 
Planner, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 12-13. 
Ibrahim, HS & Ghoneim, SA 2013, 'Integration as a significance factor in effective coastal 
management: Egypt as a case study', International Journal of Marine Science, vol. 3. 
International Geosphere-Biosphere Program 1993, Land-Ocean Interactions In The 
Coastal Zone (LOICZ) Science Plan,  IGBP Report No. 28, Stockholm, Sweden. 
Javier, G-S 2015, 'The approach of integrated coastal zone management: From technical 
to political point of view', Journal of Coastal Zone Management, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 1-3. 
Jentoft, S 2007, 'In the power of power: The understated aspect of fisheries and coastal 
management', Human Organization, vol. 66, no. 4, pp. 426-437. 
Kay, R & Alder, J 1998, Coastal Planning And Management, CRC Press. 
Kay, R & Lester, C 1997, 'Benchmarking the future direction for coastal management in 
Australia', Coastal Management, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 265-292. 
Kelly, AH, Dollery, B & Grant, B 2009, 'Regional development and local government: three 
generations of federal intervention', Australasian Journal of Regional Studies, vol. 15, no. 
2, p. 171. 
Kenchington, R & Crawford, D 1993, 'On the meaning of integration in coastal zone 
management', Ocean & Coastal Management, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 109-127. 
Kerstetter, K 2012, 'Insider, outsider, or somewhere in between: The impact of 
researchers' identities on the community-based research process', Journal of Rural Social 




Korakandy, R 2005, Coastal zone management: a study of the political economy of 
sustainable development, vol. 1, Gyan Publishing House. 
Koutsogeorgopulou, V & Tuske, A 2015, 'Federal-State Relations in Australia', OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1198, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
Lazarow, N, Souter, R, Fearon, R & Dovers, S 2006, Coastal management in Australia: Key 
institutional and governance issues for coastal natural resource management and 
planning, Cooperative Research Centre for Coastal Zone, Estuary and Waterway 
Management (Coastal CRC), Indooroopilly, QLD. 
Lazarow, NS 2010, 'Managing and Valuing Coastal Resources: An Examination of the 
Importance of Local Knowledge and Surf Breaks to Coastal Communities', PhD thesis, 
Australian National University, Canberra. 
Leech, NL & Onwuegbuzie, AJ 2007, 'An array of qualitative data analysis tools: A call for 
data analysis triangulation', School Psychology Quarterly, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 557-584. 
LGASA 2003, LGA Coastal Management Strategy - Report to the Local Government 
Association of South Australia, LGASA, South Australia. 
LGASA 2016, Meet the Lean Machine, LGASA, viewed 27 September 2016, 
<https://www.lga.sa.gov.au/page.aspx?u=6580>. 
Liamputtong, P 2009, 'Qualitative data analysis: Conceptual and practical considerations', 
Health Promotion Journal of Australia, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 133-139. 
Lincoln, Y & Guba, E 1985, Naturalistic Inquiry, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, California. 
Lincoln, YS & Guba, EE 1985, 'Research, evaluation, and policy analysis: Heuristics for 
disciplined inquiry', Review of Policy Research, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 546-565. 
Lincoln, YS & Guba, EG 1986, 'But is it rigorous? Trustworthiness and authenticity in 
naturalistic evaluation', New Directions for Program Evaluation, vol. 1986, no. 30, pp. 73-
84. 
Local Government Association of South Australia 2011, Management of Off Road 
Recreation Vehicles In South Australia - Discussion Paper, LGASA, Adelaide. 
Marshall, N 1997, 'Introduction: Themes and issues in Australian local government', in B 
Dollery & N Marshall (eds), Australian Local Government: Reform And Renewal, 
Macmillan Education, South Melbourne, VIC, pp. 1-14. 
Martínez, M, Intralawan, A, Vázquez, G, Pérez-Maqueo, O, Sutton, P & Landgrave, R 2007, 
'The coasts of our world: Ecological, economic and social importance', Ecological 
Economics, vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 254-272. 
Mathews, R 1977, 'Innovations and developments in Australian federalism', Publius, vol. 




McLean, I 2004, 'Fiscal Federalism in Australia', Public Administration, vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 
21-38. 
McQuestin, M-A & Woods, SD 2010, 'The tension between intergovernmental relations 
and cooperative federalism', in B Galligan (ed.), Australian Political Science Association 
Conference, viewed 12 January 2014, <http://apsa2010.com.au/full-
papers/pdf/APSA2010_0089.pdf>. 
Mee, L 2012, 'Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: The coastal zone in an Era of 
globalisation', Estuarine, Coastal and Shelf Science, vol. 96, pp. 1-8. 
Megarrity, L 2011, Local government and the Commonwealth: An evolving relationship, 
Research Paper no. 10 2010–11, viewed 12 January 2012, < 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_L
ibrary/pubs/rp/rp1011/11RP10>. 
Mills, AJ 2010, Encyclopedia of Case Study Research, Sage, London. 
Moksness, E, Dahl, E & Støttrup, J 2013, Global Challenges In Integrated Coastal Zone 
Management, Wiley-Blackwell, West Sussex, UK. 
Morcom, NF & Harvey, N 2002, 'South Australian Coastal planning: Protection or 
integration?', Australian Planner, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 19-24. 
Mumford, T & Harvey, N 2014, 'Champions as Influencers of science uptake into 
Australian coastal zone policy', Coastal Management, vol. 42, no. 6, pp. 495-511. 
National Commission of Audit 2014, Towards Responsible Government: Appendix to the 
Report of the National Commission of Audit – Volume 1, viewed 27 August 2016, 
<http://www.ncoa.gov.au/REPORT/docs/appendix_volume%201.pdf>. 
Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council 2006, National Cooperative Approach 
to Integrated Coastal Zone Management: Framework and Implementation Plan, AGPS, 
Canberra. 
Natural Resources Eyre Peninsula 2015, Southern Eyre Sub-regional Plan - Draft, Natural 
Resources Eyre Peninsula, Adelaide. 
Niven, RJ & Bardsley, DK 2013, 'Planned retreat as a management response to coastal 
risk: a case study from the Fleurieu Peninsula, South Australia', Regional Environmental 
Change, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 193-209. 
Norman, B 2009a, Planning for coastal climate change: An insight into international and 
national approaches, Department of Planning and Community Development and 
Department of Sustainability, East Melbourne, Victoria. 
Norman, B 2009b, 'Principles for an intergovernmental agreement for coastal planning 




Nursey-Bray, M 2011, 'Learning and local government: The local government coastal 
management strategy, South Australia', in 20th Anniversary NSW Coastal Conference, 
Tweeds Head NSW, pp. 8-11. 
Nursey-Bray, M & Harvey, N 2013, 'Bridging the science policy divide in the coastal zone: 
is there a role for learning processes', in Moksness, E, Dahl, E & Støttrup, J Global 
Challenges In Integrated Coastal Zone Management, pp. 218-228. 
Nursey-Bray, M, Harvey, N & Smith, TF 2016, 'Learning and local government in coastal 
South Australia: Towards a community of practice framework for adapting to global 
change', Regional Environmental Change, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 733-746. 
Nursey-Bray, M & Shaw, J 2010, 'Australia, climate change and the sea change 
phenomenon', The International Journal Of Environmental, Cultural, Social And Economic 
Sustainability, vol. 6, no. 1. 
Nursey-Bray, M, Vince, J, Scott, M, Haward, M, O’Toole, K, Smith, T, Harvey, N & Clarke, B 
2014, 'Science into policy? Discourse, coastal management and knowledge', 
Environmental Science & Policy, vol. 38, pp. 107-119. 
O'Donnell, T 2016, 'Legal geography and coastal climate change adaptation: The Vaughan 
litigation', Geographical Research, vol. 54, no. 3, pp. 301-312. 
O’Hagan, AM & Ballinger, RC 2010, 'Implementing Integrated Coastal Zone Management 
in a national policy vacuum: Local case studies from Ireland', Ocean & Coastal 
Management, vol. 53, no. 12, pp. 750-759. 
Oates, WE 1999, 'An essay on fiscal federalism', Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 37, 
no. 3, pp. 1120-1149. 
Olsen, S 2003a, Crafting Coastal Governance In A Changing World, Coastal Resources 
Center, University of Rhode Island Narragansett, Rhode Island. 
Olsen, S 2003b, 'Frameworks and indicators for assessing progress in integrated coastal 
management initiatives', Ocean & Coastal Management, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 347-361. 
Olsen, S, Tobey, J & Kerr, M 1997, 'A common framework for learning from ICM 
experience', Ocean & Coastal Management, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 155-174. 
Packer, MJ 2011, The Science Of Qualitative Research, Cambridge University Press, New 
York. 
Painter, M 1996, 'The Council of Australian Governments and intergovernmental 
relations: a case of cooperative federalism', Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 26, 
no. 2, pp. 101-120. 
Parkin, A 2003, 'The States, Federalism and Political Science: A Fifty‐Year Appraisal', 




Parkin, A & Summers, J 2006, 'The constitutional framework', in A Parkin, J Summers & D 
Woodward (eds), Government, Politics, Power And Policy In Australia, Pearson Longman, 
Frenchs Forest, NSW, pp. 46-67. 




Patton, MQ 1990, Qualitative Evaluation And Research Methods, SAGE Publications, 
London. 
Paul 2015, 'An update on SA parks', viewed 23 January 2016, 
<http://vk5pas.org/2015/07/30/an-update-on-sa-parks/comment-page-1/>. 
Petchey, J & Shapiro, P 1994, '"One People One Destiny": The Concentration of Power 
and Conflicts of Interest in Australian Federalism', The Concentration of Power Conflicts of 
Interest in Autralian Federalism. University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics 
Working Paper Series. 
Portman, ME, Esteves, LS, Le, XQ & Khan, AZ 2012, 'Improving integration for integrated 
coastal zone management: An eight country study', Science of The Total Environment, vol. 
439, pp. 194-201. 
Productivity Commission 2008, Assessing Local Government Revenue Raising Capacity,  
Research Reports, Government of Australia Canberra. 
Resource Assessment Commission 1993, Coastal Zone Inquiry: Final Report, viewed 28 
September 2016, 
<https://www.environment.gov.au/archive/coasts/publications/rac/chap1.html>. 
Ritchie, J & Spencer, L 1994, 'Qualitative data analysis for applied policy research', in 
Analyzing Qualitative Data, First edn, Routledge, London, pp. 173-194. 
Robins, L & Kanowski, P 2011, '‘Crying for our Country’: Eight ways in which ‘Caring for 
our Country’ has undermined Australia's regional model for natural resource 
management', Australasian Journal of Environmental Management, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 88-
108. 
Rothwell, DR 1996, 'The legal framework for ocean and coastal management in Australia', 
Ocean & Coastal Management, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 41-61. 
Rothwell, DR & Haward, M 1996, 'Federal and international perspectives on Australia's 
maritime claims', Marine Policy, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 29-46. 
Salkind, NJ 2010, Encyclopedia of Research Design, SAGE Publications, London. 
Sansom, G 2002, 'Three weddings, a loveless marriage and a rich uncle: Local government 
reform and intergovernmental relations in Australia', in CLAIR Forum (Japan Council of 




Sansom, G 2009, 'Commonwealth of Australia', in J Kincaid & N Steytler (eds), Local 
Government and Metropolitan Regions in Federal Systems, vol. 6, McGill-Queen's 
University Press, Montreal, pp. 8-36. 
Sansom, G 2010, 'What's Fair? Intergovernmental Relations in Australia', in E Brunet-Jailly 
& JF Martin (eds), Local Government in a Global World: Australia and Canada in 
Comparative Perspective, University of Toronto Press, pp. 179-212. 
Sargent, S, Allan, R, Bilham, K, Clarke, B, Faulkner, A, Flaherty, T, Gleave, D, Lansdown, D, 
McCuaig, A, Payne, M, Prior, S, Taylor, C & Woehler, EJ 2012, 'Off-road Vehicles on 
Beaches - the impacts, implications and options for coastal managers in Australia', paper 
presented at Coast to Coast 2010, Adelaide. 
Scott, M & Harvey, N 2016, 'Translating Science into Coastal Development Decisions: The 
Articulations Science and Planning in South Australia', Journal of Environmental Policy & 
Planning, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 85-101. 
Shipman, B & Stojanovic, T 2007, 'Facts, Fictions, and failures of integrated coastal zone 
management in Europe', Coastal Management, vol. 35, no. 2-3, pp. 375-398. 
Small, C & Nicholls, RJ 2003, 'A global analysis of human settlement in coastal zones', 
Journal of Coastal Research, pp. 584-599. 
Smart, D 1991, 'Higher education policy in Australia: Corporate or coercive federalism?', 
Journal of Education Policy, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 97-100. 
Smith, T, Carter, R, Thomsen, DC, Mayes, G, Nursey-Bray, M, Whisson, G, Jones, R, 
Dovers, S & O'Toole, K 2009, 'Enhancing science impact in the coastal zone through 
adaptive learning', Journal of Coastal Research, pp. 1306-1310. 
Sorensen, J 1993, 'The international proliferation of integrated coastal zone management 
efforts', Ocean & Coastal Management, vol. 21, no. 1–3, pp. 45-80. 
Sorensen, J 1997, 'National and international efforts at integrated coastal management: 
Definitions, achievements, and lessons', Coastal Management, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 3-41. 
Sorensen, J 2002, 'Baseline 2000 background report: The status of integrated coastal 
management as an international practice (second iteration)'. Urban Harbors Institute 
Publications. Paper 31. 
Sorensen, J & McCreary, S 1990, Institutional Arrangements for Managing Coastal 
Resources and Environments, Coastal Management Publication No. 1, NPS/US AID Series, 
National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C.  
South Australian Centre for Economic Studies 2012a, Regional Development Australia 
Limestone Coast, South Australian Centre for Economic Studies, University of Adelaide. 
South Australian Centre for Economic Studies 2012b, Regional Development Australia 





South East Natural Resources Management Board 2010, Natural Resources South East, 
Government of South australia, Adelaide, viewed June 3 2014, 
<http://www.senrm.sa.gov.au/AboutUs.aspx>. 
South East Natural Resources Management Board 2013, Natural Resources South East - 
Our region, Department of Environment Water and Natural Resources, viewed 23 January 
2016, <http://www.naturalresources.sa.gov.au/southeast/about-us/our-region>. 
Stanley, J 2016, 'Adaptation in small coastal towns in Australia', in Climate Adaptation 
Governance in Cities and Regions, John Wiley & Sons, pp. 371-388. 
Stilwell, F & Troy, P 2000, 'Multilevel governance and urban development in Australia', 
Urban Studies, vol. 37, no. 5/6, p. 909. 
Stocker, L, Harvey, N & Metcalf, S 2016, 'Management of coastal canal estates in 
Australia: Challenges and opportunities', Ocean & Coastal Management, vol. 130, pp. 
148-161. 
Stocker, L, Pokrant, B, Wood, D, Harvey, N, Haward, M, O’Toole, K & Smith, T 2010, 
'Australian universities, government research and the application of climate change 
knowledge in Australian coastal zone management', in Universities and Climate Change, 
Springer, pp. 31-46. 
Stojanovic, T, Ballinger, RC & Lalwani, CS 2004, 'Successful integrated coastal 
management: measuring it with research and contributing to wise practice', Ocean & 
Coastal Management, vol. 47, no. 5–6, pp. 273-298. 
Summers, J 2006, 'The federal system', in A Parkin, J Summers & D Woodward (eds), 
Government, Politics, Power And Policy In Australia, Pearson Longman, Frenchs Forest, 
NSW, pp. 135-159. 
Takacs, D 2003, 'How does your positionality bias your epistemology?', Thought & Action 
Journal, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 27–38. 
Thia-Eng, C 1993, 'Essential elements of integrated coastal zone management', Ocean & 
Coastal Management, vol. 21, no. 1–3, pp. 81-108. 
Thom, B 2004, 'Geography, planning and the law: A coastal perspective', Australian 
Geographer, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 3-16. 
Thom, B & Harvey, N 2000, 'Triggers for late twentieth century reform of Australian 
coastal management', Australian Geographical Studies, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 275-290. 
Thomas, G 2009, How To Do Your Research Project: A Guide For Students In Education And 
Applied Social Sciences, SAGE, London. 
Twidale, CR & Bourne, JA 2010, 'South Australia', in ECF Bird (ed.), Encyclopedia of the 




Twomey, A & Withers, G 2007, 'Federalist Paper I: Australia's Federal Future', A Report for 
the Council for the Australian Federation, Melbourne. 
UN Economic and Social Council 2006, 'Definition of basic concepts and terminologies in 
governance and public administration', United Nations, New York. 
United Nations 1992, 'Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development: Chapter 17', in United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, United Nations, Rio de Janeiro. 
Vallega, A 2013, Fundamentals of Integrated Coastal Management, Springer, 
Netherlands. 
Victorian Planning & Environmental Law Association 2010, Reference Group Briefing 
Report, Department of Planning and Community Development, Victoria. 
Walker, K 1999, 'Statist developmentalism in Australia', in KJ Walker & K Crowley (eds), 
Australian Environmental Policy 2: Studies in Decline and Devolution, UNSW Press, 
Sydney, pp. 22-44. 
Wanna, J, Phillimore, J, Fenna, A & Harwood, J 2009, 'Common cause: Strengthening 
Australia's cooperative federalism', The Council for the Australian Federation, Canberra. 
Ward, L 2010, Federalism, in M Bevir (ed) Encyclopedia of Political Theory, SAGE 
Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Warren, N 2006, Benchmarking Australia’s Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangements, New 
South Wales Government, Sydney. 
Wattle Range Council 2014, 'South Australian Election Priority Issues for the MacKillop 
Electorate', viewed 24 July 2016, 
<https://www.wattlerange.sa.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/2014%20State%20Electio
n%20-%20WRC%20Priority%20Issues.pdf>. 
Welsh, E 2002, 'Dealing with data: Using NVivo in the qualitative data analysis process', in 
Qualitative Social Research, vol. 3. 
Wescott, G 1998, 'Reforming coastal management to improve community participation 
and integration in Victoria, Australia', Coastal Management, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 3-15. 
Wescott, G 2000, 'The development and initial implementation of Australia's ‘integrated 
and comprehensive’Oceans Policy', Ocean & Coastal Management, vol. 43, no. 10, pp. 
853-878. 
Wescott, G 2004, 'The theory and practice of coastal area planning: Linking strategic 
planning to local communities', Coastal Management, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 95-100. 
Wescott, G 2006, 'Is there a role for the federal government in implementing integrated 
coastal management in Australia?', in Coastal management in Australia: Key institutional 




Wescott, G 2009, 'Stimulating Vertical Integration in Coastal Management in a Federated 
Nation: The Case of Australian Coastal Policy Reform', Coastal Management, vol. 37, no. 
6, pp. 501-513. 
Wescott, G 2012, 'Disintegration or disinterest? Coastal and marine policy in Australia', in 
Environmental Policy Failure: The Australian Story, pp. 88-101. 
Wescott, Geoff 2012, Disintegration or disinterest? Coastal and marine policy in Australia, 
in Environmental Policy Failure: The Australian Story, Tilde University Press, Prahran, Vic., 
pp. 88‐101. 
Wescott, G & Fitzsimons, J 2011, 'Stakeholder involvement and interplay in coastal zone 
management and marine protected area planning', Marine Resources Management, pp. 
157-170. 
Wild River, S 2002, 'The environmental implications of the local-state antinomy in 
Australia', PhD thesis, Australian National University, Canberra, viewed 10 September 
2014, <http://thesis.anu.edu.au/public/adt-ANU20040922.142838/index.html>. 
Wild River, S 2006, 'The role of local government in environmental and heritage 
management', paper prepared for the 2006 Australia State of the Environment 
Committee, Department of Environment and Heritage, Canberra, viewed 14 January 
2014, <http://www.deh.gov.au/soe/2006/integrative/local-government/index.html>.   
Winer, SL & Hettich, W 1997, 'The political economy of taxation', Perspectives On Public 
Choice: A Handbook, pp. 481-505. 
Wong, L 2008, 'Data analysis in qualitative research: A brief guide to using NVivo', 
Malaysian Family Physician, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 14-20. 
Worthington, AC & Dollery, BE 1998, 'The political determination of intergovernmental 
grants in Australia', Public Choice, vol. 94, no. 3, pp. 299-315. 






Appendix 1.1 Terms of Reference of Commonwealth Government 
Inquiries into Coastal Management in Australia 
Management of the Australian Coastal Zone 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and Conservation, 1980.  
Terms of reference (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and Conservation 1980): 
On 23 November 1978 the Committee resolved to inquire into and report on management of the Australian 
coastal zone with particular reference to:  
(a) the alternative uses, including industrial and residential development, tourism and recreation, mining, 
forestry and fishing;  
(b) Commonwealth Government owned and controlled property; and  
(c) the development of a co-ordinated approach. 
The Injured Coastline: Protection of the Coastal Environment  
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and Arts, 1991.  
Terms of reference (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment Recreation and the Arts 
1991): 
That the Committee inquire into the environmental degradation of the Australian coastline and coastal waters, 
with particular reference to: causes, effects and costs of pollution, sewage disposal, coastal land degradation and 
resource depletion; management of urban water resources; impacts on tourism, fishing and other industries 
dependent on the coastal zone and coastal waters; the adequacy of existing management regimes; 
administrative arrangements, legislative measures and development policies required to ensure sustained use 
and environmental protection; review of previous parliamentary reports relating to the coastal zone; and the role 
of the Commonwealth Government in ensuring proper management of the coastal zone. 
Coastal Zone Inquiry 
Resource Assessment Commission, 1993.  
Terms of reference, as prescribed by the Prime Minister of the Labor government of the day, Bob Hawke 
(Resource Assessment Commission 1993): 
I require the Resource Assessment Commission to conduct an inquiry into Building, Tourism, Mariculture and 
associated development in Australia's coastal zone. The scope of the inquiry shall be to: 
- examine and report on the future use of Australia's coastal zone resources with particular reference to the 
integrated management of building, tourism, mariculture and associated development, particularly outside 
metropolitan areas; 
- examine and report on the use, including potential use, of regulatory and economic instruments and 
institutional arrangements to promote integrated coastal zone management. 
In preparing its report, the Commission should: 
- take into account and give due weight to, the findings of previous related inquiries and existing background and 
policy work by Commonwealth, state, territory and local governments; 
- take into account and give due weight to the work and objectives of the special Premiers' Conference aimed at 
providing a clear definition of the roles and responsibilities of the different spheres of government; reducing 
duplication and overlap of functions and services; and providing more integrated and effective delivery of 
programs and services; 
- assess the environmental, cultural, social, industry, and economic impact of such development; 
- develop criteria for evaluating the future use of coastal zone resources. 
Managing Our Coastal Zone In A Changing Climate: The Time To Act Is Now  
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Climate Change, Water, Environment and the Arts, 2009.  
Terms of reference (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Climate Change Water Environment and 
the Arts 2009, p. xiii): 
The Committee will inquire into and report on issues related to climate change and environmental pressures 





Appendix 3.1 Interview schedule 
PROJECT INFORMATION FOR INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS 
 
Definitions of Key Terms used in this Study 
Federalism 
The system of government in Australia in which governmental power is divided between 
separate tiers of government, i.e. the Commonwealth and the State/Territory governments. 
Each tier has a degree of authority and sovereignty over particular governmental functions, 
outlined in a formal written Constitution.  
Coastal Governance 
Governance is a management framework through which fundamental goals are strived for via 
institutional processes and structures that form the basis of planning and decision-making. 
Coastal governance refers to the processes and structures in place for the management of 
coastal resources. 
Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) 
Integrated Coastal Management has been internationally endorsed as the best-practice 
approach towards coastal resource management. Among other things, ICM promotes 
integration through coordinated decision-making within and between government 
departments and tiers of government, and broad consultation with all interest groups.  
 
Project Summary 
An array of Commonwealth and State departments, regional bodies and local governments 
are involved in the management of coastal resources in Australia. Many of the debates and 
conflicts involving management of the coast are underpinned by the actual process of 
governance. It is well-established that coastal governance arrangements play an important 
role in determining whether Integrated Coastal Management can be successfully 
implemented. However, the influence of the federal system of government on coastal 
governance arrangements and ICM in Australia is under-researched.  
In this study I will investigate whether Australian federalism has any impact on coastal 
governance arrangements and, in turn, whether or not this affects the implementation of 
ICM in Australia. I seek to understand the relationship between federalism, coastal 
governance and ICM via: 
 An analysis of coastal governance arrangements in Australia, using South Australia as 
a case study; 
 Case studies at different levels of government involved in coastal management 
administration and practice, i.e. Federal government, State government, Natural 
Resource Management Boards and local government. 
 
Interviews 
The case studies will involve semi-structured qualitative interviews engaging key individuals 
with knowledge and experience in aspects of governance arrangements that affect 
management of the coastal zone in Australia. There will be a focus on gathering information 
that reveals the working relationships between local, regional, State and national governance 
arrangements, including the influence of intra- and inter-governmental relations and funding 
on coastal management. The interview questions are intended to stimulate discussion of the 
issues of specific interest to this study. The questions are provided below in advance to give 







1. Briefly explain your current role and/or your background in coastal management in 
Australia. 
◦ If your work is/was directly related to the practice of coastal management, who 
do/did you work most closely with?  
▪ Include all agencies/departments, other organisations etc.  
▪ Explain the nature of the collaboration(s).  
 
 
2. In your opinion, please discuss what you believe to be the most serious issue(s) 
currently facing the coastal zone. 
 
3. In your opinion, what are the current roles and responsibilities of the following 
governance bodies in coastal management in Australia? Explain your answer. 
a. Federal government 
b. State government 
c. Regional NRM bodies 
d. Local government 
i. In your opinion, should these roles and responsibilities be different? If so, 
how? If not, why not? 
 
4. How do you see the power balance between the three tiers of government in 
Australia: Local, State and Commonwealth? 
a. Who has power? What form(s) of power are there? 
b. Do you think power differentials between the three tiers of government affect 
the way the coast is managed in South Australia?  
c. What types of power do you think most influence coastal management? 
d. Do you think power, or lack of power, affects the implementation of ICM?  
 
5. Do you think the roles of the different tiers of government have changed over time?  
a. Has power shifted? If so, how/where? 
 
6. What do you consider to be the strengths and weaknesses of Australia’s federalist 
system of government with regards to coastal management in South Australia? 
 
7. What do you consider to be the advantages and disadvantages of Natural Resource 
Management bodies becoming involved in the management of the coastal zone? 
 
8. Describe the relationship and degree of integration between the different tiers of 
government in Australia (e.g. Local through to Federal). 
a. Do you think these relationships affect coastal governance and/or 
management? 
 
9. Describe the relationship and degree of integration between different departments 
and agencies involved in environmental management at the State government level 




a. Do you think these relationships affect coastal governance and/or 
management? 
 
10. Describe the relationship and degree of integration between the different branches 
within the State government’s Department of Environment and Natural Resources in 
South Australia. 
a. Do you think these relationships affect coastal governance and/or 
management? 
 
11. What do you think were the main driving forces behind the re-organisation of State 
government institutions for environmental management (DEH & DWLBC)? 
 
12. What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of the recent changes to the 
organisational structure within DENR, in terms of the State government’s ability to 
achieve Integrated Coastal Management? 
 
13. Do you think that Integrated Coastal Management a useful concept? Why or why not? 
 
14. Do you think the principles of ICM are used in decision-making at the State 
government level? Why or why not? 
 
15. At the State government level, how are the different environmental areas within 
DENR prioritised in terms of budget funding?  
 
16. How is coastal management financed in South Australia? 
a. In your opinion, what is the influence of financial arrangements for the funding of 
coastal management on coastal management outcomes? 
i. How do these particular funding mechanisms influence coastal management? 
ii. What are the outcomes that are mainly affected by such funding 
mechanisms? 
 
17. Are there coastal issues that are not able to be adequately dealt with due to the 
current funding arrangements? 
a. If yes, why? At what scale are these issues?  
 
18. In your opinion, how does direct funding from the Commonwealth government to 
local government, community groups and NRM bodies affect the implementation 
and/or outcomes of coastal management? 
 
19. Could funding mechanisms and overall financial arrangements for coastal 
management be improved? If so, how? If not, why not? 
 
20. In your opinion, do the coastal governance arrangements in South Australia affect 
coastal development and/or land-use decisions in South Australia?  
a. If yes, what are the main factors linking the relationship between coastal 






21. In your opinion, on a scale of 1 (very effective) to 5 (detrimental), how effective are 
the governance arrangements for achieving Integrated Coastal Management in 
Australia? 
1. very effective 
2. effective enough 
3. effective in some ways but ineffective in others 
4. ineffective 
5. detrimental to effective ICM 
a. Why? (Please explain your reasoning for choosing 1-5) 
 
22. Can you recommend five people who would be relevant for me to interview? 
 
23. Is there anything else you would like to add?  
 
24. Would you like to be informed of the results of this study?   
a. If yes, what is the best method of contacting you for this? 
 
********************* 
I am grateful for your contribution to this study. 






Appendix 3.2 Consent form 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE 
HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE 
 
 
STANDARD CONSENT FORM 
FOR PEOPLE WHO ARE PARTICIPANTS IN A RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
 
1. I,  …………………………………………………………….............................................. (please print name) 
consent to take part in the research project entitled:   
GOVERNANCE AND INTEGRATED COASTAL MANAGEMENT IN AUSTRALIA 
 
2. I acknowledge that I have read the attached Information Sheet entitled:   
INFORMATION SHEET FOR THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
GOVERNANCE AND INTEGRATED COASTAL MANAGEMENT IN AUSTRALIA 
 
3. I have had the project, so far as it affects me, fully explained to my satisfaction by the 
research worker.  My consent is given freely. 
 
4. I have been informed that, while information gained during the study may be published, I 
will not be identified and my personal data will not be divulged. 
 
5. I understand that I am free to withdraw from the project at any time, and can choose to 
answer none, some or all of the questions asked in the interview. 
 
6. I am aware that I should retain a copy of this Consent Form, when completed, and the 
attached Information Sheet and Complaints Procedure Form. 
 
 
 ……………………………………….......…..........………… ………………….........………………………... 
 (signature)                                                                                          (date) 
 
WITNESS 
 I have described to …………………………………….........................................…………. (name of subject) 
the nature of the research to be carried out.  In my opinion she/he understood the 
explanation. 
 
 Status in Project:     …………………………………………………………………..............................……. 
 Name:                       …………………………………………………..................................................... 
 
 ………………….............………………………………… ……….........…………………………………... 





Appendix 3.3 Information Sheet 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE 
HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE 
 
INFORMATION SHEET 
FOR PEOPLE WHO ARE PARTICIPANTS IN A RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
The purpose of this study is to develop a more detailed understanding of the institutional context 
in which coastal management is practiced. Your participation is requested to complete a semi-
structured interview comprising roughly 20 questions which will be used to drive discussion of 
governance issues associated with coastal management in your experience. The questions will be 
provided in advance and will cover such topics as your knowledge, experience and/or opinion on 
matters related to coastal governance arrangements in Australia.  
 
It is estimated that the interview will take up to 1 hour. The interview will be conducted by the 
project coordinator, Nicole Pelton. The interviewer will travel to a location convenient to you at a 
time convenient to you to conduct the interview. If necessary, a telephone interview may be 
conducted. Interviews will be audio-recorded with your permission only. 
 
No payment will be offered for your participation in this study. You may choose to withdraw from 
participating in this study at any point prior to the completion of the research. Anonymity and 
confidentiality will be maintained at all times in the storage, discussion and presentation of your 
contributed data.  
 
A consent form and a complaints form are also attached. If you choose to participate, you will be 
provided with a copy of these to keep, as well as this information sheet. 
 
If you wish to receive a copy of the study results and/or publications, please provide your contact 
details. 
 






CONTACT DETAILS OF RESEARCH GROUP 
Ms Nicole Pelton      
PhD Student 
Geography, Environment & Population 
University of Adelaide, South Australia 
Ph: (08) 830 35645 
Email: nicole.pelton@adelaide.edu.au 
Professor Nick Harvey 
Executive Dean  
Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences 
University of Adelaide, South Australia 





Appendix 3.4 Complaints form 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE 
HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE 
 
Document for people who are participants in a research project 
 
CONTACTS FOR INFORMATION ON PROJECT AND INDEPENDENT COMPLAINTS 
PROCEDURE 
 
 The Human Research Ethics Committee is obliged to monitor approved research 
projects.  In conjunction with other forms of monitoring it is necessary to 
provide an independent and confidential reporting mechanism to assure quality 
assurance of the institutional ethics committee system.  This is done by 
providing research participants with an additional avenue for raising concerns 
regarding the conduct of any research in which they are involved. 
 
 The following study has been reviewed and approved by the University of 
Adelaide Human Research Ethics Committee: 
 
 Project title:   
 
GOVERNANCE & INTEGRATED COASTAL MANAGEMENT IN AUSTRALIA 
 
 1. If you have questions or problems associated with the practical aspects of 
your participation in the project, or wish to raise a concern or complaint about 
the project, then you should consult the project co-ordinator: 
 
 Name: Miss Nicole Pelton 
 Telephone: (08) 830 35645   
 
 
 2. If you wish to discuss with an independent person matters related to  
  Making a complaint, or  
  Raising concerns on the conduct of the project, or  
  The University policy on research involving human participants, or  
  Your rights as a participant 
 






Appendix 4.1 Coastal Zone Categories for Development Plans 
Source: Department of Environment Water and Natural Resources (2013, pp. 22-23). 
Coastal zone When to use 
Coastal Conservation Zone 
This zone includes undeveloped and natural parts 
of the coast that include sensitive coastal 
features and land subject to coastal processes. 
The role of this zone is to safeguard areas of 
environmental significance on the coast and to 
protect development from coastal hazards, such 
as flooding, erosion and acid sulfate soils. 
This zone should be selected where the land 
includes:  
• coastal features and habitats that are sensitive 
to the direct impacts of development (including 
coastal dunes and cliffs, coastal wetlands, 
saltmarsh and mangrove areas)  
• important coastal geological features or other 
natural features of scientific, educational, 
heritage or cultural importance (including coastal 
cliffs)  
• buffer areas separating development from 
sensitive coastal and marine features and 
habitats  
• coastal landscapes of high scenic quality  
• areas exposed to coastal hazards (including 
flooding, erosion, acid sulfate soils and sand dune 
drift) where there are not adequate provisions to 
mitigate the hazard (such as a managed seawall 
or levee bank) or any strategies to provide future 
protection.  
The zone boundary should include land that 
allows for the retreat of the coastline where this 
is anticipated. 
Coastal Settlement Zone 
This zone primarily accommodates existing 
dwellings or shack areas that are located on the 
coast and which are to be retained. The zone 
prevents the further division of land or the 
creation of new dwellings, but permits 
alterations and additions to the shacks. 
This zone should be selected where the land 
contains:  
• dwellings or shacks that are exposed to coastal 
hazards (such as seawater flooding or erosion) 
where there are neither adequate provisions to 
resolve the deficiency (such as a council-
managed seawall or levee bank) nor any 
strategies to protect development  
• coast protection measures such as erosion 
buffer areas, seawalls and levee banks located to 
the front of a settlement area.  
Note: If coastal hazards are adequately 
addressed, a non-coastal zone such as a 
Settlement Zone or similar may be appropriate 
over the land containing the dwellings or shacks 
(perhaps with the inclusion of required minimum 
site and floor levels or setback requirements. 
Coastal Open Space Zone 
This zone accommodates areas located on the 
coast of a settlement, town or urban area that 
are subject to coastal processes and that do not 
have a high conservation value. The zone has 
This zone should be selected where the land 
includes areas located in front of a settlement or 
town that include:  




been designed to facilitate low-scale 
development that strengthens the recreational 
value of these coastal areas. Public access and 
recreational facilities such as jetties, boardwalks, 
and boating facilities may be appropriate in the 
zone. Public amenities, shelters and landscaped 
areas for passive recreation are also envisaged. 
Coast protection works designed to protect 
inland development from coastal hazards are 
anticipated in appropriate locations and should 
be designed to support the recreational and 
amenity value of the area. 
high conservation significance  
• coast protection measures such as erosion 
buffer areas, seawalls and levee banks  
• land subject to coastal hazards (such as 
seawater flooding or erosion) where there are 
neither adequate provisions to resolve the 
deficiency (such as a council-managed seawall or 
levee bank) nor any strategies to protect 
development. 
Aquaculture Zone (and Coastal Policy Area) 
This zone applies where aquaculture 
development has been developed, or is proposed 
to be developed. The zone has been prepared to 
accommodate the on-land services that support 
off-shore aquaculture as well as on-land 
aquaculture facilities (e.g. hatcheries and grow-
out facilities). If coastal hazards are present in 
this zone that cannot be easily addressed 
through policy, a Coastal Policy Area should also 
be included to ensure development applications 
are referred to the Coast Protection Board. (If the 
risk can be addressed through floor and site 
levels, referrals to the Board may not be required 
and therefore a Coastal Policy Area would not be 
required.) 
This zone should be selected where the land 
includes areas developed for aquaculture, or 
proposed to be developed for aquaculture.  
Note: The Coastal Policy Area should also be 
selected where the land includes areas 
developed for aquaculture, or proposed to be 
developed for aquaculture, that are exposed to 
coastal hazards (such as seawater flooding or 
erosion) where there are no provisions to resolve 
the deficiency (such as a council-managed 
seawall or levee bank) or strategies to protect 
development. 
Coastal Marina Zone 
This zone accommodates the development of a 
marina, The zone anticipates infrastructure such 
as moorings, boat launching facilities, revetment 
walls etc. These should be incorporated into the 
zone to ensure appropriate referrals to the Coast 
Protection Board are in place. Abutting land uses, 
such as housing, industry and commercial 
development, where the coastal hazards are 
adequately addressed (e.g. by protection works 
or by the inclusion of required minimum site and 
floor levels or setback requirements) should be 
located in non-coastal zones. 
This zone should be selected where the land 
includes coast protection works, marina 
waterways and berths, pontoons, jetties, piers, 
slipways and boat ramps.  
Note: Non-coastal zones (containing residential, 
commercial and other development) may be 
appropriate landward of the above features 
where the coastal hazards are adequately 
addressed. 
 
 
 
